How firms export: Processing vs. ordinary trade with financial frictions☆

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1. Introduction

The decline in transportation costs and policy barriers over the last few decades has revolutionized global trade by enabling the splicing of production across borders. Firms today can choose to perform only intermediate segments of the supply chain by processing and assembling imported inputs, before re-exporting to ordinary trade. However, more profitable trade regimes require more working capital because they entail higher up-front costs. As a result, credit constraints induce firms to conduct more processing trade and pure assembly trade – implicitly a choice of production technology and position in global supply chains – and how this decision affects performance. We examine how financial frictions affect companies’ choice between processing and ordinary trade – implicitly a choice of production technology and position in global supply chains – and how this decision affects performance. We explore matched customs and balance sheet data from China, where exports are classified as ordinary trade, import-and-assembly processing trade (processing firm sources and pays for imported inputs), and pure assembly processing trade (processing firm receives foreign inputs for free). Value added, profits, and profitability rise from pure assembly to processing with imports to ordinary trade. However, more profitable trade regimes require more working capital because they entail higher up-front costs. As a result, credit constraints induce firms to conduct more processing trade and pure assembly in particular and preclude them from pursuing higher value-added, more profitable activities. Financial market imperfections thus impact the organization of production across firms and countries and inform optimal trade and development policy in the presence of global production networks.
processing trade and preclude them from pursuing higher value-added, more profitable activities. At the same time, processing trade enables constrained firms that could not undertake ordinary exports to share in the gains from trade. Financial market imperfections thus affect the organization of production across firms and countries and inform the design of trade and development policy in the presence of global value chains.

We use matched customs and balance sheet data at the firm level for China, an economy ideally suited to this analysis because of its major role in international production networks. To boost exports, in the mid-1980s China formally introduced a processing trade regime (PT) that exempts materials imported for further processing and re-exporting from import duties. By 2005, 32.7% of Chinese exporters pursued processing trade and contributed 54.6% of total exports. In addition, Chinese firms choose between two operating modes within the processing regime. Under pure assembly (PA), they receive foreign inputs at no cost from the trade partner abroad to whom they also send the final product. Under processing with imports (PI), also known as import-and-assembly, the Chinese firm instead independently sources and pays for imported parts. These institutional features introduce wedges between the costs and returns associated with ordinary trade (OT), PI, and PA. Finally, China’s financial system is underdeveloped and segmented across provinces. It thus provides a perfect setting for exploring the link between credit constraints and firms’ choice of export mode.

We establish two main results. First, profitability varies systematically across trade strategies. Profits, profit-to-sales ratios, and value added are higher for companies that undertake more ordinary relative to processing trade and more import-and-assembly relative to pure assembly. Producers settling for PA or PI must therefore face some constraint that prevents them from doing OT.

Second, limited access to capital poses such a constraint and determines exporters’ choice of trade regime. We first demonstrate that (i) in the cross-section of firms within finely disaggregated industries, financially healthier enterprises with more liquid assets and less leverage pursue more ordinary trade relative to processing trade and more import-and-assembly relative to pure assembly. Moreover, (ii) within continuing exporters over time, improvements in financial health are followed by reallocations of trade activity towards regimes with higher working capital needs. Similarly, new exporters’ financial health prior to export entry strongly predicts their trade regime upon entry.

Since (i) and to a lesser degree (ii) may arise endogenously, we exploit a series of exogenous sources of variation to establish a causal effect of credit constraints. We show that (iii) following the removal of MFN quotas on textiles and apparel in 2005, new exporters of such products choose different trade modes depending on their financial status before 2005. (iv) Across sectors within firms, exporters conduct more OT than PT and more PI than PA in financially less vulnerable sectors, i.e., sectors that rely less on external capital markets for exogenous reasons. (v) The impact of firms’ financial health and sectors’ financial vulnerability is bigger in Chinese provinces with weaker financial systems, where liquidity constraints are more likely to bind for the Chinese exporter. By contrast, this impact is stronger for financially more developed export destinations, where the foreign partner is less constrained and can more easily bear the costs that the Chinese seller cannot.

These empirical findings are consistent with liquidity needs and profitability varying across trade regimes such that financial frictions shape firms’ choice of export mode. Conceptually, different trade regimes correspond to a different distribution of production stages, costs, and profits between Chinese suppliers and foreign buyers. From the perspective of the Chinese manufacturer, ordinary trade requires the most working capital because he pays for product design, domestic and foreign inputs, import duties on foreign inputs, final assembly, and distribution abroad. Processing with imports necessitates less financial liquidity since it avoids the costs of product design, import tariffs, and distribution. Financing needs are lowest under pure assembly, when up-front expenses comprise only domestic inputs and product assembly. When the costs borne by each party represent relationship-specific investments and contracts are incomplete, hold-up problems arise, and trade partners split revenues according to Nash bargaining with their contribution to the relationship as bargaining weight. Chinese firms thus sort into trade modes based on their access to capital, and this in turn pins down their profitability.

Our analysis uncovers an important and previously unexplored determinant of firms’ export mode: credit constraints. The recent literature has proposed other factors that govern the choice between processing and ordinary trade in China. These include firm productivity (Brandt and Morrow, 2015; Dai et al., 2011; Defever and Riaño, 2012), space-based industrial policies (Defever and Riaño, 2012), import tariffs (Brandt and Morrow, 2015), and incentives for foreign firms to vertically integrate their Chinese supplier (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005; Fernandes and Tang, 2012). We use a variety of estimation strategies in order to account for these alternative factors, as well as for other observable and unobservable firm and sector characteristics. We control for the variation in aggregate supply and demand conditions with a stringent combination of firms’ province, industry, and destination fixed effects, and for unobserved company characteristics with firm fixed effects. We establish that the role of firms’ financial health is independent from that of firm size, age, productivity, ownership structure (private vs. state, domestic vs. foreign), production technology (capital-, skill-, material intensity), and tariffs on imported inputs. Of note, its effect is economically large relative to that of firm productivity, which is weakly correlated with access to capital due to frictions in Chinese financial markets. We ensure that our results for sectors’ financial vulnerability are not driven by the variation in physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, relationship specificity, and upstream import tariffs across sectors.

Our findings suggest that financial frictions influence the organization of global production networks across firm and country boundaries. The three trade regimes correspond to the integration of different segments of the value chain (product design, input sourcing, input processing, final assembly, distribution) under the control of the Chinese exporter. Hence, credit-constrained firms, and presumably financially underdeveloped countries as a whole, might be stuck in low value-added stages of the supply chain and unable to pursue more profitable opportunities. Strengthening capital markets might thus be an important prerequisite for moving into higher value-added, more profitable activities.

Our study provides a bridge between two active literatures on trade and finance and on global value chains. There is growing evidence that credit constraints impede firms’ export activity and distort aggregate trade flows, both in normal times and during crisis episodes (Foley and Manova, 2015; Manova, 2013; Berman and Héricourt, 2010; Bricongne et al., 2012; Amiti and Weinstein, 2011; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Chor and Manova, 2012; Feenstra et al., 2011). We propose a novel mechanism – choice of trade regime and implicitly global value chain position – through which credit constraints operate. There has also been increased interest in international production networks and their implications for the transmission of shocks across borders during the 2008–2009 crisis (Bems et al., 2011; Levchenko et al., 2010; Baldwin, 2012). An important advance in this area has been the inference of domestic value added and production line position from trade flows and input–output tables at the country level (Johnson and Noguera, 2012; Antrás and Chor, 2013; Fally, 2011) and in China in particular (Brandt and Morrow, 2015; Kee and Tang, 2012; Koopman et al., 2011). To this line of research, we add one of the first micro-level studies of how and why individual firms operate at different stages along the global value chain. We also shift attention to the decisions of

1 Kim and Shin (2012) model global supply chains with production delays and show that inventories, accounts receivable, and productivity are procyclical and track financial conditions.
Southern firms, rather than those of Northern manufacturers looking to relocate production to the low-cost South.2

Our analysis illustrates how liquidity constraints shape the design of international trade contracts. Compared to OT and PI, PA is a codified form of trade credit extended by the foreign buyer to the Chinese supplier for the purpose of financing imported inputs. Our paper thus extends previous work on the use of trade credit in cross-border transactions (Antràs and Foley, 2015; Demir and Javorcik, 2014) and on the effect of financial frictions on multinationals’ decision to offshore intra-firm or at arm’s length (Antràs et al., 2009; Manova et al., 2015; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009).

Finally, our conclusions shed light on the gains from trade and the role of trade policy in the presence of processing trade and global supply chains. Our results reinforce recent evidence that facilitating access to imported materials can boost the export performance of developing countries by enabling manufacturers to improve product quality and to broaden product scope (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009, 2012; Goldberg et al., 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012). This is particularly relevant for economies that rely on trade for growth and knowledge spillovers. Our findings further suggest that the international fragmentation of production and its institutionalization with the processing regime in China allow liquidity constrained firms to share in the gains from trade, when they could not have done so otherwise. This highlights the differential effects of trade policy and global value chains across heterogeneous firms in a world with financial market imperfections.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides institutional background on China’s trade regimes. Section 3 outlines a conceptual framework that guides our empirical analysis. We introduce the data in Section 4 and present the empirical results in Section 5. The last section concludes.

2. Institutional background

For the past 30 years, China has used a variety of policy instruments to stimulate export activity. A particularly consequential intervention has been the establishment of a designated trade regime that exempts imported inputs from import duty as long as they are used for further processing, assembly, and ultimately re-exporting on behalf of foreign buyers. In place since the mid-1980s, this provision encourages the formation of processing trade relationships between local firms and overseas companies looking to offshore production to China.

Chinese customs authorities distinguish between two carefully enforced trade regimes: processing trade (PT) and ordinary trade (OT).2 Processing trade is formally defined as “business activities in which the operating enterprise imports all or part of the raw or ancillary materials, spare parts, components, and packaging materials, and re-exports finished products after processing or assembling these materials/parts.” A firm conducting processing trade can claim import-duty exemption only if, at the time of importing, it shows proof of a contractual agreement with a foreign buyer to whom it will export the processed goods.

Processing trade comprises two sub-categories: processing with imports (PI) and pure assembly (PA). Pure assembly is also known as processing with foreign-client supplied materials. It refers to “business activities in which the operating enterprise receives materials/parts from a foreign enterprise without needing to pay foreign exchange for the import, and carries out processing or assembling with the materials/parts as per the requirements of the foreign enterprise, only charging for the processing or assembling, while any finished products are to be sold and marketed by the foreign enterprise.” By contrast, processing with imports, also known as processing with imported materials or import-and-assembly, refers to “business activities in which the operating enterprise imports materials/parts by paying foreign exchange for their processing, and exports finished processed products for sale abroad.”

Under both types of processing trade, the import duty is waived, the Chinese party pays for domestic inputs and labor and customizes the product to the specifications of the foreign buyer, and the foreign buyer handles product design, marketing, and distribution. However, under PA, the Chinese firm is not responsible for sourcing foreign materials and incurs no cost for using them. Under PI on the other hand, it decides what parts to source, from which countries, and at what prices. It also has to pay for any imported inputs. The foreign input suppliers are typically not the same party to whom the Chinese firm ultimately exports. From a contractual perspective, whoever purchases a given input preserves ownership rights over it until the processing transaction has been completed.

Firms exporting under ordinary trade often manufacture exclusively with local inputs, but they are allowed to combine foreign and domestic materials and to sell both at home and abroad. This makes it prohibitively difficult for Chinese customs to ascertain what fraction of any imported inputs go towards production for exporting, especially when the Chinese company exports under its own brand name. Ordinary exporters thus incur import tariffs on any foreign intermediates they use.

A Chinese manufacturer may legally undertake both ordinary and processing trade, in which case each of its import and export transactions is recorded and treated separately according to its specified trade regime.3 For example, a garment maker may use imported materials in order to sell domestically and abroad under its own brand (e.g., Youngor) as well as to export under a foreign brand (e.g., Nike, Gap). It would then enjoy the import tariff waiver on its processing imports but not on the foreign inputs it acquired for its domestic production and ordinary exports.

The introduction of the processing trade regime has significantly contributed to the expansion in China’s trade activity. In 2005 – the year our empirical analysis focuses on – 54.6% of all exports by value represented processing trade. While China’s import duties have declined over time, the exemption for processing imports remains important: average tariff rates dropped from 41% in 1992 to 16.8% before entry into the WTO in 2001 and reached 9% in 2005 (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004; Yu, 2015).

3. Conceptual framework

Chinese firms can participate in international trade via ordinary trade, processing with imports and pure assembly. We posit that the institutionalized differences among these three trade regimes generate trade-offs between ex ante costs and ex post profits: From the perspective of the Chinese company, more profitable export modes are associated with higher up-front expenditures. As a result, financially unconstrained firms are able to conduct the most profitable activity, while firms with limited access to capital are forced into less profitable trade regimes with lower liquidity needs. Credit constraints thus affect not only directly firms’ export strategy but also implicitly their production technology. This section provides intuition for these economic forces and develops empirically testable hypotheses.

2 See, for example, Helpman (1984), Hanson et al. (2005), and Yeaple (2003).
3 There are a number of other regimes that capture less than 4% of exports (e.g., warehousing trade, entrepot trade by bonded area, international aid, barter trade). All regime definitions are from “Measures of the Customs of the People’s Republic of China on the Control of Processing-Trade Goods” released in 2004 and amended in 2008 and 2010.
4 On the import side, ordinary imports include final consumption goods, intermediates used in production for the domestic market, and intermediates used in production for foreign markets by firms exporting under the OT regime.
3.1. Key intuitions

We first build intuition by focusing on single-product firms exporting to a single destination. Consider a Chinese firm facing foreign demand for a product such as a toy doll. Manufacturing and selling this product requires multiple activities: product design, input sourcing, import assembly, marketing, and distribution. Each activity entails up-front costs that must be incurred before any sales and payoffs are realized. Moreover, not all required inputs are available domestically. For example, plastic molds, paints, and hair might have to be imported because local suppliers lack the technological know-how to make them or cannot meet the quality standards of foreign consumers. Conversely, malleable plastic, dress cloth, and assembly workers can be reliably and cost-effectively secured at home.

The Chinese firm can choose to conduct ordinary trade and sell directly to foreign consumers, or alternatively to engage in processing trade with a foreign party via pure assembly or processing with imports. The up-front expenses and hence liquidity needs of the Chinese firm are lowest under pure assembly, higher under processing with imports, and highest under ordinary trade. With PA, the Chinese firm pays only for domestic inputs and assembly. With PI, it is responsible for domestic inputs, foreign inputs, and assembly. With OT, it covers product design, domestic and foreign inputs, import duties on foreign inputs, assembly, and distribution abroad. The foreign trade partner bears the cost of any activities not performed by the Chinese firm.

We hypothesize that the profits of the Chinese firm are lowest under pure assembly, higher under processing with imports, and highest under ordinary trade. With OT, it operates completely independently and captures all profits from foreign sales. With PT, on the other hand, trade partners presumably make relationship-specific investments in product design, input sourcing, assembly, and distribution. In the presence of incomplete contracting, this would generate a two-sided hold-up problem, such that profit sharing would be determined by ex post Nash bargaining (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). The return to the Chinese firm would then be its outside option (i.e., revenues from selling the assembled product to another buyer) plus its share of the surplus rents from the partnership. Since bargaining power stems from parties’ relative importance to the relationship, each side's bargaining weight would likely increase with its contribution to total costs. The Chinese firm’s profits would thus rise from PA to PI to OT.

The ranking of trade regimes by up-front costs and ex post payoffs might be reinforced by three additional factors. To the extent that other forces might make it ambiguous, we would be less likely to find support for our hypotheses. Thus, which mechanisms dominate is ultimately an empirical question.

First, given demand, there is a profit-maximizing level of output for each export mode. Producing less would reduce costs and financing needs, but also profits. If a firm has sufficient liquidity for first-best production in one trade regime (e.g., PI) but not in a higher-ranked regime (e.g., OT), it could choose to operate at a second-best scale under the higher-ranked regime. By revealed preference, however, this would still imply greater profits with the higher-ranked regime.

Second, ordinary firms can opt to use fewer imported inputs than processing firms if foreign parts are more expensive than domestic parts, especially if the import tariff is high; processing firms have little flexibility or interest in doing so because they must observe the specifications of the foreign buyer and because they do not incur import duties. This is unlikely to reduce OT costs below PI costs given the high costs of product design and distribution and the loss in profits associated with deviations from the first-best input mix. By revealed preference, an OT firm would therefore substitute towards local inputs only if this still guarantees higher profits than alternative trade regimes.

Finally, imperfect contractibility might generate moral hazard in production: Trade partners would underinvest if they incur the full cost of an input but receive only a share of its marginal revenue. For example, the Chinese producer might have to exert effort in sourcing inputs and managing operations. The higher his bargaining weight, the more effort he would be incentivized to expend and the higher sales and profits would be. This would magnify the difference in profitability across trade modes.

Given the ranking of profits across export regimes, ceteris paribus ordinary trade will be the dominant strategy for Chinese firms with the requisite financial liquidity. However, some companies might have restricted access to internal and external capital. The former would arise if they cannot retain sufficient earnings from operations and must transfer profits to stockholders because of principal-agent issues inside the firm. The latter would occur in the presence of credit market frictions due to limited contract enforcement (e.g., endogenous default; weak protection of collateral claims) or asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers (e.g., adverse selection; unobserved cost or demand shocks).

Chinese firms will therefore pursue the most profitable trade mode they can, sorting into different regimes based on their financial health: Ceteris paribus, most financially constrained exporters will conduct pure assembly and earn low profits. Less financially constrained exporters will conduct import-and-assembly and earn higher profits. Least financially constrained exporters will conduct ordinary trade and earn the highest profits.

3.2. Empirical hypotheses

We next consider multi-product firms selling to multiple destinations. This accounts for the rich choice sets available to manufacturers in reality and sheds more light on underlying mechanisms of interest. It also allows us to develop empirical hypotheses and identification strategies.

Firms actively choose how many products to export, which products to export, and under what trade regime so as to maximize total profits. They must allocate their financial resources across product lines and export modes, recognizing that different products feature different up-front liquidity needs and ex post payoffs because of different cost and revenue structures. This allocation entails two liquidity-profit trade-offs: First, manufacturing more products can increase total revenues but impose higher ex ante costs. Second, processing trade (especially pure assembly) uses up less liquidity per product than ordinary trade and can thereby enable a firm to spread its funds across more products. This tends to increase total profits along the extensive margin. However, PT (especially PA) offers lower returns per product than OT. This tends to decrease total profits along the intensive margin.

This complex optimization problem has an intuitive solution. Ordering products by their revenue-to-liquidity needs ratio, firms will add products in decreasing order of attractiveness until they exhaust their available liquidity, and adjust export modes along the way. Both the level of up-front costs and the ratio of payoffs to up-front costs matter. Pursuing trade regimes that guarantee a bigger share of revenues is only worthwhile if these revenues are sufficiently high relative to the higher liquidity needs that such regimes impose. Firms will thus choose ordinary trade for products with relatively low up-front costs and high revenue potential, processing with imports for goods with intermediate cost and revenue levels, and pure assembly for articles with high liquidity requirements but limited returns.

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5 This assumes that there is sufficient demand abroad both for final goods supplied by ordinary Chinese exporters and for outsourcing production to China via processing trade. We believe that this approximates well the economic environment in China, and it allows us to concentrate on the trade-offs faced by the Chinese entrepreneur. See also Section 6.6.

6 This assumes that the foreign party does not underinvest or its underinvestment is less harmful to production. This would be more likely when it resides in a country with stronger contract enforcement.
We expect exporters with more access to finance to differ from capital-scarce firms in a number of respects. First, financially healthier manufacturers can allocate more liquidity to each of their product lines. Hence, for any given product, less constrained firms will be more likely to conduct ordinary trade relative to processing trade and import-and-assembly relative to pure assembly. Second, financially healthier producers can export more products. They will go further down the product hierarchy, adding goods with progressively higher liquidity needs that create stronger incentives for processing trade and pure assembly. Aggregating across products to the firm level, the relationship between firms’ financial health and overall export composition by trade regime is therefore theoretically ambiguous. Finally, firms with more access to capital will earn higher profits because they can always undertake (weakly) more profitable trading strategies than producers with less access to capital.

This framework implies that firms will adopt a single trade mode per product. In practice, we observe firm exports by destination country and 8-digit product category or 3-digit sector. While each product category and sector arguably groups products with varying cost and revenue structures, we can measure the reliance on external capital for up-front costs only at the sector level. Separately, cross-country differences in consumer demand, product customization, and distribution costs can incentivize an exporter to sell the same product to different markets via different trade modes. For these reasons, we anticipate that firms might use multiple trade regimes within a product category or sector.

These arguments imply systematic and smooth variation in profitability and export strategies across firms and sectors. We summarize these predictions with the following three hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1.** Across firms within a sector, profits decrease with the share of processing exports in total exports \( \left( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA} + X_{PI}} \right) \) and with the share of pure assembly in processing exports \( \left( \frac{X_{AS}}{X_{AS} + X_{PA}} \right) \).

**Hypothesis 2.** Across firms within a sector and across firms within a destination-sector pair, the share of processing exports in total exports \( \left( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA} + X_{PI}} \right) \) and the share of pure assembly in processing exports \( \left( \frac{X_{AS}}{X_{AS} + X_{PA}} \right) \) decrease with firms’ financial health.

**Hypothesis 3.** Across sectors within a firm and across sectors within a firm–destination pair, the share of processing exports in total exports \( \left( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA} + X_{PI}} \right) \) and the share of pure assembly in processing exports \( \left( \frac{X_{AS}}{X_{AS} + X_{PA}} \right) \) increase with sectors’ financial dependence.

4. Data

4.1. Trade and balance sheet data

Our analysis makes use of two proprietary data sets on the activities of Chinese firms in 2005. Firms are legally required to complete both, and compliance is strictly enforced by different government agencies. The first one is the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics.\(^7\) It provides standard balance sheet data for all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and all private companies with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan.\(^8\) We observe each firm’s location in one of 31 provinces and its main industry of activity out of 475 finely disaggregated categories in the Chinese GBT 4-digit classification. The main variables of interest to us are measures of firm profitability and financial status, which we discuss in greater detail below. We also use information on total sales, employment, capital, and material inputs to construct proxies for firm size and productivity.

We also utilize the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) collected by the Chinese Customs Office, which contains detailed information about the universe of trade transactions.\(^9\) It reports the value of firm exports (free on board) and imports (cost, insurance, and freight included) in U.S. dollars by country and product for 243 destination/source countries and 7526 products in the 8-digit Harmonized System.\(^10\) The records indicate whether each cross-border sale occurs under ordinary trade, processing with imports or pure assembly. The trade regime classification thus characterizes individual transactions rather than firms. This allows us to construct continuous measures of the provicity for using different trade regimes at the firm level. Since we are interested in manufacturers’ export decisions, we drop export-import companies that serve exclusively as intermediaries between domestic producers (buyers) and foreign buyers (suppliers).\(^11\)

Our empirical analysis critically relies on combining data from both sources. While each is organized around company registration numbers, the authorities have not released a unique firm identifier. We therefore merge the census files to the customs records based on an algorithm that matches firm names and contact information.\(^12\) While imperfect, this procedure generates a large and representative sample. We are able to obtain balance sheet data for 44% of all exporters in CCTS and trade transactions for 67% of all firms reporting positive exports in ASIF. We have verified that matched exporters exhibit similar trade patterns as the full sample of exporters in the customs registry. Likewise, the balance sheets of the matched exporters are comparable to those of all exporters in the census.

4.2. Summary statistics

Table 1 illustrates the substantial variation in size and performance across the 50,606 Chinese firms in our matched sample. Mean log sales and log exports amount to 10.64 and 13.83, with standard deviations of 1.35 and 2.08, respectively. Log profits and log value added averaged 7.33 and 9.23, with corresponding standard deviations of 1.95 and 1.48. The dispersion in profitability, measured by the ratio of profits to sales, is greater with a mean of 0.03 and standard deviation of 0.20.

The Venn diagram in Fig. 1 shows the distribution of firms operating in a single vs. multiple trade regime. It shows the percentage share of exporters engaged in each of 7 possible combinations of trade modes (PA; PI; OT; PA and PI; PA and OT; PI and OT; PA, PI, and OT). The reported percentages sum to 100%. 63.0% of all sellers ship only ordinary exports, while 2.7% and 11.0% conduct exclusively pure assembly and processing with imports, respectively. The remaining 23.3% pursue mixed trade strategies, with 3.5% undertaking some activity under all three regimes. Similar patterns obtain when we look at a finer level of disaggregation and consider firm–sector pairs instead of firms (not shown). Fig. 2 replicates Fig. 1, but instead of the percentage share of firms, it reports the percentage share of aggregate exports captured by firms in that segment. Processing trade, especially PI, contributes substantially more to the value of Chinese exports than its number of firms would suggest. This is despite the low value added associated with processing trade and reflects its high import content.

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\(^{7}\) As in Wang and Yu (2012), the ASIF data are cleaned by excluding observations according to the following criteria: (a) firms in non-manufacturing industries (2-digit GBT industry code 43 or 13) and tobacco (GBT code 16); (b) observations with negative values for output, sales, exports, capital or intermediate inputs; and (c) observations with total assets less than total fixed assets or total liquid assets, or with total sales less than exports.

\(^{8}\) This is equivalent to 0.6 million USD based on the USD-CNY exchange rate in 2005.

\(^{9}\) Manova and Zhang (2009) describe the data and stylized facts about firm heterogeneity in Chinese trade.

\(^{10}\) Product classification is consistent across countries at the 6-digit HS level. The number of distinct product codes in the Chinese 8-digit HS classification is comparable to that in the 10-digit HS trade data for the US.

\(^{11}\) Since the data do not directly flag trade intermediaries, we follow standard practice and use keywords in firm names to identify them (Ahn et al., 2011). We drop 29,982 wholesalers that mediate 22.3% of China’s trade.

Table 1
This table provides summary statistics for all exporting firms in the matched sample of firms with ASIF and CCTS data. Productivity is constructed as value added per worker (VA) or according to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP). Firms’ financial health is measured by liquidity = (current assets - current liabilities)/total assets or leverage = current liabilities/current assets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St Dev</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(log) Sales</td>
<td>50,567</td>
<td>10.64</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Value added</td>
<td>49,801</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Employment</td>
<td>50,606</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Total exports</td>
<td>50,606</td>
<td>13.83</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Total imports</td>
<td>31,551</td>
<td>12.65</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(log) Profits</td>
<td>39,844</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits/sales</td>
<td>50,582</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity (LP)</td>
<td>47,297</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity (VA)</td>
<td>49,735</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquidity</td>
<td>50,574</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverage</td>
<td>50,567</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.28</td>
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Table 2 documents the variation in the composition of firm exports in terms of trade regimes. We analyze two indicators: the share of processing exports (both pure assembly and import-and-assembly) in total exports, (PA + PI)/(PA + PI + OT), and the share of pure assembly in total processing exports, PA/(PA + PI). We construct each measure at different levels of aggregation in order to study the variation along different dimensions of trade activity. Table 2 reports summary statistics for all firms in the CCTS data, but similar patterns obtain in the matched ASIF-CCTS sample.

The average firm conducts 27% of its exports via processing trade and 24% of its processing exports via pure assembly. However, there is considerable variation in activity across firms—standard deviations are 41% and 41%. We observe comparable means and standard deviations when we compute the two trade shares separately for each firm–ISIC sector pair, each firm–ISIC–destination triplet, each firm–HS product pair, or each firm–HS–destination triplet. On the other hand, we see less variation in trade regime choices across sectors or products within firms, even less across sectors or products within firm–destination pairs, and the least across destination markets within firm–product or firm–sector pairs. This can be inferred by comparing respective standard deviations and means. For example, the standard deviation of (PA + PI)/(PA + PI + OT) across destinations within firm–ISIC pairs is 5% relative to a mean of 18%, while its overall standard deviation across firms is 41% relative to a mean of 27%.

Manufacturers’ use of foreign inputs is consistent with their choice of export mode. For instance, ordinary exporters are less prone to import parts from abroad, while companies exporting under more than one trade regime import intermediates under multiple regimes as well. Accounting for province, industry, and firm ownership fixed effects, the conditional correlation between the share of processing exports in total exports and the share of processing imports in total imports is 0.603 across firms and significant at 0.1%. Likewise, the conditional correlation between the share of pure assembly exports in total processing exports and the share of pure assembly imports in total processing imports is 0.946 across firms and significant at 0.1%.

4.3. Measuring financial constraints

We employ four different proxies for sectors’ financial vulnerability, which have been commonly used in the literature on the role of credit constraints for trade and growth. These variables are meant to identify technologically determined characteristics of each sector that are inherent to the nature of the manufacturing process and beyond the control of individual firms. They are available from Kroszner et al. (2007) for 29 ISIC 3-digit sectors, which we match to the Chinese HS 8-digit products.13

There are systematic differences across sectors in firms’ reliance on external capital for funding operations. These arise because of variation in the relative importance of up-front costs and the lag between the time when production expenses are incurred and the time when revenues are realized. We use the ratio of inventories to sales (Inventory) to proxy the duration of the manufacturing process and the working capital firms require in order to maintain inventories and meet demand. This measure indexes producers’ liquidity needs in the short run, which are associated mainly with variable costs such as the cost of labor and intermediate inputs. We exploit two indicators of firms’ funding needs for long-term investments that comprise mostly fixed costs. The classic measure is sectors’ external finance dependence (ExteFin), obtained as the share of capital expenditures not financed

---

13 The measures are constructed following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003). They are averaged over the 1980–1999 period for the median U.S. firm in each sector.
financial health

PA/(PA+PI)

working capital requirement

PA/(PA+PI)

2007), and Ding et al. (2013).

when accessing capital markets. This is gauged by asset tangibility
endowment of hard assets that companies can pledge as collateral
fi

beginning of a production cycle before manufacturing and marketing
fi

Finally, what is required for identifi-
cation is not that industries have
the same tangibility and liquidity needs in the U.S. and China, but rather
that the ranking of sectors remain relatively stable across countries. To
the extent that it does not, measurement error would once again bias
and Claessens and Laeven (2003), among others, argue that the mea-
ures of financial vulnerability capture a large technological component
that is innate to a sector and therefore a good proxy for ranking indus-
tries in all countries. Consistent with this argument, the measures vary
substantially more across industries than across
countries. Consistent with this argument, the measures vary

with internal cash flows. We also study the share of R&D spending in
total sales (RD), since research and development typically occur at
the beginning of a production cycle before manufacturing and marketing
can commence.

Sectors vary not only in firms’ reliance on external finance but also in
firms’ ability to raise external finance. We proxy the latter with the
endowment of hard assets that companies can pledge as collateral when
accessing capital markets. This is gauged by asset tangibility (Tang), defined as the share of net plant, property, and equipment in
total book-value assets.

As standard in the literature, these sector measures are constructed
from data on all publicly traded U.S.-based companies from Compustat’s
annual industrial files. This approach is motivated by a number of
considerations. First, the United States have one of the most advanced
and sophisticated financial systems, which makes it reasonable that
the behavior of U.S. companies reflects firms’ optimal asset structure
and use of external capital. Second, having the U.S. as the reference
country eliminates the concern that sectors’ financial vulnerability
might endogenously respond to China’s level of financial development.
In fact, if the most financially vulnerable industries in the U.S. employ
more internal financing and tangible assets in China because of the
worser financial system there, our results would be biased downwards.

Finally, what is required for identification is not that industries have
the same tangibility and liquidity needs in the U.S. and China, but rather
that the ranking of sectors remain relatively stable across countries. To
the extent that it does not, measurement error would once again bias
and Claessens and Laeven (2003), among others, argue that the mea-
ures of financial vulnerability capture a large technological component
that is innate to a sector and therefore a good proxy for ranking indus-
tries in all countries. Consistent with this argument, the measures vary
substantially more across industries than across
countries. Consistent with this argument, the measures vary

leverage have more financial obligations outstanding in the short run and
less freedom in managing cash flows or raising additional external
capital. We thus expect exporters with high liquidity and low leverage
to be financially healthier and less constrained.

A first glimpse at the variation in trade activity with
firms’ financial health and sectors’ financial vulnerability reveals patterns consistent with our hypotheses (Fig. 3). We divide firms into two subsamples with liquidity above and below the sample median. While the average share of processing trade in total exports is 29.4% for high-liquidity firms, it is 31.2% for low-liquidity firms. The corresponding numbers are 17.7% and 19.4% for the share of pure assembly in processing exports. When we distinguish between sectors with working capital needs above and

Table 2
Summary statistics: trade activity.
This table provides summary statistics for all exporting firms in the CCTS data. PA, PI, and
OT represent the value of exports under pure assembly, processing with imports, and
ordinary trade respectively. Columns 1–3 report summary statistics for the share of processing
exports in total exports. Columns 4–6 report summary statistics for the share of pure
assembly in total processing exports. A sector is a 3-digit ISIC category. A product is an
8-digit HS category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variation across</th>
<th>(PA + PI)/(PA + PI + OT)</th>
<th>PA/(PA + PI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N (1)</td>
<td>Mean (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIC within firm</td>
<td>114,883</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS within firm</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm–ISIC</td>
<td>258,658</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm–HS</td>
<td>1,160,175</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination within firm–ISIC</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination within firm–HS</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination within firm–HS</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS within firm–destination</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3. Trade shares across firms and sectors. This figure shows how the propensity for
firms to pursue different trade regimes varies with firms’ financial health and with
sectors’ working capital requirements in 2005. In Fig. 3A, firms are split into two
subsamples with liquidity above and below the sample median. In Fig. 3B, sectors are
split into two subsamples with inventory ratios above and below the median. The left
column (red) report the average share of processing trade in total exports across firms in
a sample. The right column (yellow) report the average share of pure assembly in processing
trade across firms in a sample. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

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14 See, for example, Whited (1992), Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Greenaway et al. (2007), and Ding et al. (2013).
15 Leverage is often defined as short-term debt/current liabilities. In standard Chinese accounting practices, short-term debt and current liability correspond to the same variable
on firms’ balance sheets, “Liu Dong Fu Zhai.”

16 We control for systematic differences in liquidity across firms with different ownership structures by defining these medians separately for private domestic firms, state-owned enterprises, joint ventures, and foreign affiliates.
below the median, we observe substantially bigger differences. In industries with high inventory-to-sales ratios, the typical firm conducts 19.9% of its exports via processing trade and 22.7% of its processing exports via pure assembly. By contrast, these shares drop to 14.3% and 14.6% for industries with low inventory-to-sales ratio.

5. Firm profitability and attributes across trade regimes

The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In this section, we first examine the variation in profitability and other firm attributes across Chinese exporters engaged in different trade regimes. In Section 6, we then analyze the effect of financial frictions on companies’ choice of trade regimes.

According to Hypothesis 1, firm profitability should increase as the composition of foreign sales shifts from pure assembly to processing with imports to ordinary trade. To assess the empirical validity of this prediction, we construct the share of processing exports (\( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA}+X_{PI}+X_{OT}} \)) and the share of pure assembly in processing exports (\( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA}+X_{PI}} \)) for firm \( f \), after summing \( f \)'s exports across all of its destinations and products. We estimate the following specification separately for each Trade Share in the matched ASIF-CCTS sample of exporters with balance sheet data:

\[
\text{Profitability}_f = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Trade Share}_f + \Gamma \cdot Z_f + \varphi_p + \varphi_i + \varphi_{even} + \epsilon_f \quad (1)
\]

Here Profitability represents \( f \)'s log total profits or profit-to-sales ratio. We include 31 province \( \psi_p \) and 475 industry \( \psi_i \) fixed effects using ASIF information on firms’ location and main industry of activity in the Chinese GBT 4-digit classification. These fixed effects capture exogenous supply and demand conditions that might both favor certain export modes and import profits, such as factor costs, factor intensities, transportation costs, tax treatment, institutional and financial market frictions. We account for the role of firm size and ownership status with log employment and dummies for state-owned enterprises, joint ventures, and wholly-owned multinational affiliates, the excluded category being private domestic firms. We employ Huber–White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors \( \psi_e \).

The coefficient of interest \( \beta \) reflects the sign of the conditional correlation between firms’ profitability and trade regime. It is identified from the variation across exporters within narrowly defined segments of the economy. We cannot and do not want to give \( \beta \) a causal interpretation since profits and export activity are joint outcomes of firms’ maximization problem that are affected by producers’ financial health. Other firm attributes unrelated to credit constraints might also influence both variables.

The results in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 indicate that manufacturers’ profits and profitability indeed vary systematically with their trade strategy: they both decrease with the share of processing exports in total exports and with the share of pure assembly in processing exports. These patterns are independent of the fact that bigger firms tend to be more profitable (the unreported coefficient on employment is positive). They are also economically significant. A one-standard-deviation fall in \( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA}+X_{PI}+X_{OT}} \) is associated with 0.66% higher profit-to-sales returns, while processing exporters with a one-standard-deviation lower share \( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA}+X_{PI}} \) enjoy 0.54% higher profitability. The profit levels of two companies whose trade shares are one standard deviation apart differ by 6.2% and 11.4%, respectively.

As customary with balance sheet data, Chinese firms report consolidated profits from worldwide sales. To the extent that trade regime choices affect foreign revenues but not home operations, the findings above may underestimate the importance of trade modes for export profitability. In Columns 2 and 4, we repeat the analysis for the subset of firms that sell exclusively abroad but not domestically. While “pure exporters” represent only 20% of the sample, we can be sure that their profits capture solely cross-border activities. As anticipated, we obtain 50% bigger point estimates in this group of producers.

The rest of Table 3 illustrates other differences among companies with varying export strategies. Each cell reports the coefficient \( \beta \) from estimating specification (1) for a different firm characteristic as the outcome variable.\(^{17}\) First, firms that conduct more processing trade have lower total sales, value added, and domestic sales, but higher export revenues. Among processing exporters, those that pursue more pure assembly record lower sales, exports, and value added. Second, more productive firms are less likely to undertake processing trade and especially pure assembly, where we measure productivity with TFP or value added per worker. Third, capital, skill, and material intensity generally rise with \( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA}+X_{PI}+X_{OT}} \) and fall with \( \frac{X_{PA}}{X_{PA}+X_{PI}} \). Finally, exporters that perform more processing trade and especially pure assembly have higher imports and a bigger share of processing imports.

These findings suggest that multiple firm characteristics might determine or be correlated with the choice of trade regimes. Our analysis below ensures that the estimated effects of financial frictions do not capture the role of other factors such as company size, productivity, capital, and skill intensity.

6. Financial frictions and firms’ choice of trade regimes

Having established that profitability differs across trade regimes, we next show that credit constraints prevent entrepreneurs from pursuing more profitable regimes. We perform a series of complementary tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 in order to establish causality and examine the channels through which financial frictions operate. In particular, we

\(^{17}\) Domestic sales are calculated as the difference between total sales and total exports. TFP is constructed as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), by 2-digit industry and ownership type (foreign vs. domestic) using the complete ASIF panel for 2001–2006. Skill, capital, and material intensity are measured with the log average wage, the ratio of net fixed assets to the wage bill, and the ratio of material purchases to the wage bill, respectively.
explore the variation in financial health across firms and within firms over time, the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors within firms, and the variation in financial market development across space.

6.1. Firms’ financial health: cross section

We first study the relationship between firms’ financial health and export activity in the cross section with the following specification:

\[
\text{Trade Share}_f = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Fin Health}_f + \Gamma \text{Z}_f + \varphi \text{p}_f + \varphi_{\text{own}} + \varepsilon_f
\]

(2)

Trade Share\(_f\) refers to one of the two trade regime shares. We proxy Fin Health\(_f\) interchangeably with \(f\)'s liquidity or leverage ratio lagged by 1 year, where firms with more liquid assets and fewer debt obligations are deemed less constrained. We lag the financial health measures to alleviate concerns with reverse causality since concurrent indicators are more likely to respond to trade activity; using concurrent liquidity and leverage delivers qualitatively similar results of slightly greater magnitudes.

We allow for any dispersion in supply and demand conditions across Chinese regions and economic sectors with province \(\varphi\_p\) and industry \(\varphi\_i\) fixed effects based on the location and primary GBT-4 industry affiliation of each firm. We further control for systematic differences among producers of different organizational structures with ownership dummies. This extensive set of fixed effects accounts for many independent factors determining the choice of trade regime, such as space-based industrial policies (e.g., special economic zones, Defever and Riaño, 2012) and the optimal organization of production across firm boundaries (e.g., domestic vs. foreign ownership; Feenstra and Hanson, 2005 and Fernandes and Tang, 2012). In robustness checks, we consider the role of other firm characteristics \(\text{Z}_f\) as discussed below. We report robust standard errors \(\varepsilon\).

Table 4 indicates a strong link between companies’ financial status and choice of export regime. Manufacturers with lower liquidity and higher leverage conduct more processing trade (Column 1). Conditional on performing processing trade, they also engage in more pure assembly relative to import-and-assembly (Column 2). These results are highly statistically significant and economically meaningful. Improving liquidity or leverage by one standard deviation would reduce the share of processing exports by 1–1.5% and the share of pure assembly in processing exports by up to 1%.

In unreported regressions, we have confirmed that companies’ financial health is related to their use of foreign inputs in a manner consistent with their choice of export regime: Credit-constrained firms are more likely not only to export, but also to import under processing trade, especially pure assembly.

A number of factors other than credit constraints could affect firms’ choice of trade regime and bias our estimates. We next show that our baseline results survive a series of robustness checks that alleviate such concerns and help us rule out alternative explanations.

6.1.1. Firm size and productivity

One potential concern is omitted variable bias arising from the relationship between financial health and other firm characteristics. The key issue is whether these other characteristics impact companies’ trade regime directly through non-financial channels, indirectly by determining access to finance which in turn affects trade outcomes, or both. This will depend on the nature of financial market imperfections.

Consider first firm productivity. Evidence suggests that Chinese firms conducting processing trade are less productive than ordinary exporters (Brantl and Morrow, 2015; Dai et al., 2011; Defever and Riaño, 2012). This could have three distinct implications for our results. First, productivity might be the primitive attribute that pins down all firm

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Productivity, size control</th>
<th>Full control</th>
<th>Bilateral trade share</th>
<th>Binary bilateral trade share</th>
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<td>5%</td>
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<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Panel A. Liquidity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag liquidity</td>
<td>-0.044***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
<td>-0.015***</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-8.72)</td>
<td>(-2.73)</td>
<td>(-2.18)</td>
<td>(-2.03)</td>
<td>(-1.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag productivity</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
<td>-0.018***</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
<td>-0.015***</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-9.42)</td>
<td>(-6.71)</td>
<td>(-11.57)</td>
<td>(-5.12)</td>
<td>(-7.45)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lag log employment</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>-0.014***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(41.35)</td>
<td>(-4.47)</td>
<td>(38.03)</td>
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<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<td>379,893</td>
<td>126,466</td>
<td>379,893</td>
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<td><strong>Panel B. Leverage</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lag leverage</td>
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<td>0.002**</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.50)</td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
<td>(1.89)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lag productivity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-9.93)</td>
<td>(-6.63)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag log employment</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>-0.014***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(42.17)</td>
<td>(-4.45)</td>
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<td>R²</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significance at the 1% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
* Significance at the 10% level.
outcomes, including access to capital, choice of inputs and production technology, size, and export mode. For example, if financiers observe firm productivity but are vulnerable to endogenous default, they will extend more credit to more productive firms with higher expected profits, and some less productive firms will be credit constrained (credit underprovision). Regressing firms’ trade regime on firms’ financial health alone would then correctly capture the effect of access to capital in Eq. (2). Controlling for productivity or outcomes of the firm’s maximization problem such as size would bring β down to zero but not invalidate the finance channel.

Second, productivity might not perfectly predict firms’ financial health (credit misallocation). For instance, there might be asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers due to unobserved firm-specific shocks, or access to capital might depend on political or family connections. In this case, conditioning on productivity in specification (2) would reduce β without forcing it to zero such that β would underestimate the effect of financial frictions on trade regime choices.

Third, productivity might directly affect export activity through non-finance channels because of economies of scale à la Melitz (2003). Product design, marketing, and distribution impose fixed costs on ordinary exporters which processing exporters avoid. When trade regimes differ in profitability, more productive firms with higher revenues will self-select into more profitable regimes with higher fixed costs. If financial health is correlated with productivity, omitting the latter from regression (2) would bias the β estimate.

Firm size could similarly impact both access to financing and trade participation. Evidence in the finance literature suggests that bigger firms are less credit constrained ceteris paribus (e.g., Beck et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 2004). If fixed costs vary across trade regimes, bigger companies might pursue more ordinary trade both because they dispose of more liquidity and because they can more easily amortize higher fixed costs. While the former is consistent with the credit mechanism that we emphasize, the latter implies that our results might be spurious.

In sum, firm size and productivity are not classic omitted variables in our context. Including them as controls Z in Eq. (2) could inform the microfoundations of firms’ credit constraints but bias β downwards, while excluding them could bias β upwards.18 In Columns 3–4 of Table 4, we explicitly control for companies’ lagged total factor productivity and lagged log employment. The coefficient on financial health retains its statistical significance. Its magnitude is approximately halved in the case of (XPA + XN)/ (XPA + XN + XST) and less affected in the case of XPA/ (XPA + XN). This suggests that firm size and productivity are imperfectly correlated with access to capital, in line with priors about inefficient financial markets in China. Moreover, comparative statics indicate that the role of financial health is an order of magnitude greater than that of the other two firm characteristics: A one-standard-deviation rise in leverage, TFP, and size is associated, respectively, with a change of 0.3%, 0.02%, and 0.08% in (XPA + XN)/ (XPA + XN + XST) and a change of 0.9%, 0.02%, and 0.01% in XPA/ (XPA + XN). To guard against omitted variable bias, we always condition on firm size and productivity in the rest of the analysis.

6.1.2. Production technology

We address concerns with other omitted variables related to firms’ production technology in Columns 5–6 of Table 4. In particular, we control for exporters’ log age, lagged capital intensity (ratio of net fixed assets to total wage bill), lagged skill intensity (log average wage), and lagged material intensity (ratio of material inputs to total wage bill).20 To the extent that these characteristics constitute endogeneous firm choices over inputs and production technology, they might be determined jointly with trade outcomes by financial health and/or productivity. If so, including them in Z would produce lower-bound estimates for β. On the other hand, if financial health is correlated with these firm characteristics but they affect trade outcomes through non-finance channels, omitting them could bias β. Reassuringly, this robustness check leaves our results qualitatively unchanged. To remain conservative, henceforth we always include the full set of firm-level controls as in Columns 5–6 (see footnote 18).

6.1.3. Bilateral trade shares

The set of export destinations varies significantly across firms in our sample. Since countries differ in trade costs, demand conditions, and the broader economic environment, different trade regimes might be best suited to serving different markets for reasons unrelated to financial frictions. To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by compositional effects, we construct exporters’ trade shares by destination d and estimate a modified version of Eq. (2) that adds country fixed effects ψd:

\[
\text{Trade Share}_{fd} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Fin Health}_f + \Gamma Z_f + \psi_f + \psi_d + \phi_{own} + \epsilon_{fd} \tag{2'}
\]

We employ the full set of firm controls Z discussed above and cluster errors by firm to account for the potential correlation in ψd across markets within producers. This stringent specification delivers qualitatively similar estimates of greater magnitudes than our firm-level analysis (Columns 7–8 in Table 4). We ensure that the market composition of firms’ exports does not affect our subsequent results by presenting evidence at both the firm and the firm–country levels.

6.1.4. Binary trade shares

Given that many Chinese exporters operate under a single trade regime (cf. Fig. 1), the linearity assumptions implicit in ordinary least squares might generate misspecification bias. In our sample, Trade Share and Trade Sharef fall strictly between 0 and 1 for a quarter to a third of the observations. This is consistent with our hypotheses and appears inconsequential econometrically: Our findings remain unchanged or become statistically and economically more significant when we replace the continuous trade shares with binary indicators set to 1 for all values above 0. Columns 9–10 in Table 4 present point estimates based on a linear probability model applied to disaggregated data at the firm–destination level, for which Trade Sharef = [0, 1] holds more frequently than at the firm level. Similar patterns however emerge for binary trade shares at the firm level.

6.1.5. Multiple products and sectors per firm

Specifications (2) and (2’) explore the variation in trade outcomes across firms within 475 finely disaggregated GBT 4-digit industries, where each firm is assigned its main industry as reported in ASIF. This ignores the fact that many exporters are in fact active in multiple industries and products. We address this by exploiting the CCTS statistics on firm exports by ISIC 3-digit sector (29 categories) and by HS 8-digit product (5784 categories). Although the ISIC classification is less granular than GBT-4, we consider it for consistency with our subsequent analysis of ISIC sectors’ financial vulnerability.

In Table 5, we estimate the following equations to more rigorously test Hypothesis 2:

\[
\text{Trade Share}_{fd} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Fin Health}_f + \Gamma Z_f + \psi_f + \psi_d + \phi_{own} + \epsilon_{fd} \tag{3}
\]

18 Pairwise correlations between our financial health measures and the various firm controls we consider are typically statistically significant but small in magnitude. For example, the raw correlations of liquidity with productivity, log employment, capital, skill, material intensity, and age are 0.14, −0.09, −0.13, 0.10, 0.01, and 0.02, respectively.

19 Similar results obtain if we use value added per worker instead of TFP or log sales instead of log employment.

20 Krishna et al. (2015) study how Chinese firms learn from exporting directly vs. indirectly through trade intermediaries. While learning from exporting might also vary across trade regimes, the productivity and age controls account for that.
PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The outcome variable equals 1 for all values above 0. All regressions include lines or even broader sectors, we produce comparable estimates. We cluster standard errors by demand conditions with corresponding ISIC-3 or HS-8 indicators for Trade Share by sector, destination or product fdi with destination in Columns 3–4, each ISIC sector triplet (the most disaggregated level available) in Columns 5–6. We include the full set of firm characteristics $Z_i$. We control for exogenous supply and demand conditions with corresponding ISIC-3 or HS-8 fixed effects $\varphi_i$ and province fixed effects $\varphi_p$ in specification (3), and additionally with destination fixed effects $\varphi_d$ in specification (3'). While many firms pursue a mix of export regimes overall, they often choose a single one for a given industry, and even more frequently for a given industry–destination or product–destination market. We therefore use binary indicators for Trade Share$_{PA}$ and Trade Share$_{PI}$, continuous trade shares produce comparable estimates. We cluster standard errors by firm.

Accounting for the fact that firms may be active in multiple product lines or even broader sectors, we find that companies’ lagged financial health strongly predicts their choice of trade regime. On average, firms with more access to capital are more likely to select regimes with higher liquidity needs for any given sector or product that they pursue. We have separately checked that the baseline results in Table 4 where we assign firms’ total trade flows to their primary industry of activity are robust to controlling for the log number of HS-8 products they export (available on request). Together, these patterns lend further support to Hypothesis 2 and inform the operations of multi-product firms. They speak to the effects of financial frictions on the intensive margin, i.e., the choice of trade regime for sectors actually exported; we later consider the extensive margin of number of sectors exported.

6.1.6. Robustness

A series of additional robustness checks leave our conclusions unchanged (see Online Appendix Tables 1 and 2). First, we have confirmed our results when proxying size with log sales instead of log employment and material intensity with the ratio of material purchases to total sales instead of to the total wage bill. Second, import tariffs in upstream industries can affect firms’ choice between processing and ordinary trade since the former permits duty-free imports of inputs (Brandt and Morrow, 2015). Specifications (2)–(3') implicitly take this into account because the industry fixed effects $\varphi_i$ subsume the average tariff across imported inputs at the output industry level. In addition, China’s import tariffs were relatively low by 2005: The mean and the standard deviation across HS-8 products amounted to 9.7% and 6.6%, respectively. Nevertheless, there might be variation in effective import tariffs across exporters in the same output industry if they use inputs in different proportions. We have therefore verified our findings for $X_{PA} + X_{PI}$ over $X_{PI}/(X_{PA} + X_{PI} + X_{OT})$ controlling for firm-specific import tariffs constructed as the weighted average tariff across all products that a firm imports, using tariff data from WITS and lagged firm imports by product as weights as in Yu (2015).

Finally, we have explored the role of firms’ ownership type. Evidence indicates that the affiliates of multinational companies are less credit constrained than domestic firms because the former can tap additional financial resources by accessing foreign capital markets directly or indirectly via internal capital markets. At the same time, multinational affiliates are not completely unconstrained and insensitive to host-country financial conditions.21 Ceteris paribus, financial frictions can thus affect the trade regime choice of both domestic and foreign-owned firms in China. Since we condition on ownership type, our estimates are identified from the variation among producers with the same organizational structure. Split-sample and interaction analyses reveal that qualitatively similar patterns hold for domestic and foreign-owned firms.

6.2. Endogeneity

It is important to assess whether the strong relationship between firms’ financial health and choice of trade regime is causal. A priori, even if export levels might influence firms’ access to finance, it is less obvious how the composition of exports would. We

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Binary trade share by ISIC sector</th>
<th>Binary bilateral trade share by ISIC sector</th>
<th>Binary bilateral trade share by HS product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PA/ISIC</td>
<td>PI/ISIC</td>
<td>OT/ISIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel A. Liquidity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag liquidity</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. observations</td>
<td>92,370</td>
<td>28,487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B. Leverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag leverage</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. observations</td>
<td>92,347</td>
<td>28,474</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity; size; age; K, H, M intensity</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own, Prov FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination FE</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry FE</td>
<td>ISIC-3</td>
<td>ISIC-3</td>
<td>ISIC-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significance at the 1% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
* Significance at the 10% level.
nevertheless consider two potential endogeneity problems that could arise only if financial markets are efficient. Their relevance may thus be limited given the widely recognized inefficiency of Chinese capital markets.

First, with frictionless capital markets, manufacturers can fund and implement their first-best export strategy. Since liquidity needs decline from OT to PI to PA, so would the observed use of external finance across firms with different trade modes. This could spuriously generate our results even though we lag firms’ financial health if financial health and trade activity are sufficiently slow-moving. What makes this an unlikely possibility is the substantial variation in profitability across trade regimes: Were Chinese exporters financially unconstrained, they would have pursued ordinary trade ceteris paribus.

Second, if firms face no credit constraints and profitability falls from OT to PI to PA due to non-finance factors (unlike in Section 3.1), firms might sort into trade regimes for exogenous reasons. If investors are more willing to fund more profitable ventures, exporters more active in trade regimes that happen to have higher returns would exhibit stronger financial health. While not impossible, this rationalization is hardly credible as it requires a very special alignment of exogenous forces.

Of note, reverse causality could lead us not only to overestimate but also to underestimate the true impact of financial frictions on exporters’ activity. If partnerships with foreign buyers under processing trade increase the trustworthiness of Chinese firms as borrowers, conducting PA or PI might improve their access to external finance in the Chinese capital market, as well as to trade credit from input suppliers. We would then be less likely to find empirical support for our hypotheses.

Finally, some of our results might be spurious because of how standard accounting practices affect measured financial health. Recall that liquidity and leverage are defined as (current assets – current liabilities) / total assets and current liabilities / current assets, respectively.22 Since current assets include input inventories, inventories of foreign inputs provided by foreign buyers do not enter the financial ratios of Chinese firms under PA, whereas inventories of foreign inputs acquired by Chinese firms under OT and PI do. It is not obvious if this systematically affects the measured liquidity of firms with different export regimes: Foreign input inventories enter both the numerator and the denominator, and their outstanding cost is netted out of the numerator since accounts payable are part of current liabilities. It is also unclear how foreign input inventories might vary across trade modes, even if foreign input purchases do. As for leverage, it might be mechanically higher for firms conducting more PA relative to PI and OT because foreign input inventories enter only the denominator. This concern would be mitigated to the extent that their outstanding cost is part of accounts payable in the numerator.

To establish the causal effect of credit constraints on firms’ choice of trade regime, we complement the evidence above based on the cross-firm variation in financial health with a series of results that exploit other sources of variation in the data for identification purposes.

6.3. Firms’ financial health: dynamics

We next provide consistent time-series evidence for the relationship between firms’ financial health and export activity using panel data for 2002–2006.23 We separately examine export entrants and continuing exporters to assess how changes in financial status affect trade behavior upon entry and subsequently. We also study how firms respond to an exogenous shock to export demand depending on their access to capital prior to the shock—the cleanest set-up for identifying causal effects in the time series.

6.3.1. Changes within firms over time

We explore whether changes in financial health lead continuing exporters to reorient operations across trade regimes by including firm fixed effects $\phi_f$ in a panel version of Eqs. (2) and (3):

$$\text{Trade Share}_{t, f} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Fin Health}_{t-1, f} + \gamma Z_{f, t-1} + \phi_f + \phi_d + \phi_i + \epsilon_{t, f}$$

(4)

$$\text{Trade Share}_{t, f}' = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Fin Health}_{t-1, f} + \gamma Z_{f, t-1} + \phi_f + \phi_d + \phi_i + \epsilon_{t, f}$$.24

The unit of observation in these regressions is either the firm–destination–year or firm–ISIC industry–destination–year. The $\phi$’s subsume the role of firms’ ownership type, province and primary industry affiliation, and control for time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics such as entrepreneurial ability or stable bank relationships that permanently improve access to credit. Coefficient $\beta$ is thus identified purely from adjustments across trade modes within firms over time. We allow for common cost and demand shocks across manufacturers with destination $\phi_d$, ISIC industry $\phi_i$, and year $\phi_t$ fixed effects. We also condition on the full set of time-variant firm controls $Z_f$ introduced above, and cluster standard errors by firm.24 We report results using binary indicators as the outcome variable, but qualitatively similar patterns hold with continuous measures.

Of note, we have less identification power in the panel than in the cross-section: While the averages (standard deviations) of liquidity and leverage are 0.09 (0.32) and 0.99 (1.28) in the cross section for 2005, they are 0.08 (0.13) and 1.04 (0.34) within the average firm over the 2002–2006 period. At the same time, there is significant turnover, with many firms entering and exiting different markets and frequent changes in the trade regime composition of exports within surviving firm–destinations over time. For instance, 7.2% of firm–destinations with 100% processing exports in 2002 have switched to 100% ordinary exports by 2006, while another 21.8% have adopted mixed export strategies. Of firm–destinations with mixed trade regimes in 2002, 25.4% switch to purely ordinary exports by 2006, and another 34.7% reduce their share of processing trade closer to 0. Of firm–destinations with 100% ordinary exports in 2002, only 13% initiate processing trade by 2006. A sizeable number of firm–destinations thus gradually move from processing to ordinary exports, although the opposite trajectory also exists. The composition of processing exports in terms of PA and PI behaves similarly.

Table 6 indicates that improvements in financial health within firms are indeed followed by export activity shifting away from processing trade towards ordinary trade and away from pure assembly towards processing with imports (Columns 1–4). The estimates for $\beta$ are, however, substantially smaller than in Tables 4 and 5. This suggests that continuing exporters do not modify operations on an annual basis, possibly because of sunk adjustment costs and uncertainty about future demand and credit conditions. Combined with our earlier results, this implies that financial frictions are an important determinant of the variation in trade activity across firms, but play a lesser role in surviving exporters’ dynamics in the short run. The latter may be

22 Current assets ("Liu Dong Zi Chan") include inventories, cash, accounts receivable, investments, and prepaid expenses, where inventories comprise finished products in the process of being sold and materials and inputs intended for future production. Note that the latter differs from the value of inputs used in production. Current liabilities ("Liu Dong Fu Zhai") include short-term loans, accounts payable, and accrued liabilities, where accounts payable may include input purchases that have not yet been settled. Total assets ("Zong Zicai") are the sum of fixed and current assets.

23 Customs data are available 2000–2006, but the census panel begins in 2001, and we use 1-year lagged Fin Health. We have verified that our baseline cross-sectional results hold in the pooled panel with year fixed effects.

24 Since we observe material intensity only in 2004, it is subsumed by the firm fixed effects in the panel regressions.
Table 6
Trade regimes and firms' financial health: export dynamics.
This table examines the relationship between firms' export trade regimes and financial health in the panel. The unit of observation is the firm–destination–year in Columns 1–2 and 5–6, the firm–destination–year–ISIC sector in Columns 3–4 and 7–8, and the firm–destination in Columns 9–10. The sample covers all firms in 2002–2006 in Columns 1–4, only firms with positive exports in year t but not in the previous 2 years in Columns 5–6, and only firms exporting MFA-affected products to the US, Canada, and/or EU-25 in 2005 but not in the previous 2 years in Columns 9–10. All variables are defined in the text. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The outcome variable equals 1 for all values above 0. All regressions include firms' age and lagged productivity, size, capital, and skill intensity, as well as firm, year, and destination fixed effects. Industry fixed effects are included based on the main GFT-4 digit industry of each firm in Columns 5–6 and 9–10 and on ISIC-3 digit industries in Columns 3–4 and 7–8. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Binary bilateral share</td>
<td>Binary bilateral share by ISIC</td>
<td>Binary bilateral share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3) (4)</td>
<td>(5) (6) (7) (8)</td>
<td>(9) (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel A. Liquidity</td>
<td>Lag liquidity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–0.007** –0.005**</td>
<td>–0.008** –0.008**</td>
<td>–0.035** –0.070** –0.042***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(–2.50) (–1.92)</td>
<td>(–2.17) (–2.55)</td>
<td>(–2.82) (–2.50) (–2.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.82 0.89</td>
<td>0.35 0.40 0.32 0.42</td>
<td>0.44 0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,427,114 507,415</td>
<td>1,868,108 619,636</td>
<td>3731 1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B. Leverage</td>
<td>Lag leverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0003* 0.0004**</td>
<td>0.0006* 0.0004*</td>
<td>0.007** 0.023** 0.009** 0.018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.67) (2.20)</td>
<td>(1.85) (1.91)</td>
<td>(2.20) (2.17) (2.48) (1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.82 0.89</td>
<td>0.35 0.40 0.32 0.42</td>
<td>0.44 0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,427,041 507,382</td>
<td>1,867,978 619,598</td>
<td>3731 1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity; size; age; K, H intensity</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y</td>
<td>78,194 13,465 94,691 14,996</td>
<td>3731 1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year, destination FE</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y</td>
<td>78,184 13,465 94,677 14,996</td>
<td>3731 1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm FE</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y</td>
<td>78,184 13,465 94,677 14,996</td>
<td>3731 1339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry FE</td>
<td>– –</td>
<td>ISIC-3 ISIC-3</td>
<td>GBT4 GBT4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significance at the 1% level.  
** Significance at the 5% level.  
* Significance at the 10% level.

more responsive over a longer horizon than our panel permits us to study. For example, exporters that begin with processing trade may be able to accumulate sufficient financial resources through retained earnings and gradually transition into ordinary trade.

6.3.2. Export entry and MFA reform
We next turn to first-time exporters and study how financial health prior to entry affects companies' choice of trade regime upon entry. We postulate that if a producer begins exporting in year t, he will be more likely to choose trade modes with lower liquidity requirements if he had access to less financial capital in year t – 1. We test this hypothesis by re-estimating specifications (4) and (4') in the subsample of firms exporting for the first time in year t.25 We once again report results for binary outcome variables, but similar patterns hold for continuous trade shares. As expected, new exporters with ex ante less liquidity are more responsive over a longer horizon than our panel permits us to study. For example, exporters that begin with processing trade may be able to accumulate sufficient financial resources through retained earnings and gradually transition into ordinary trade.

To more convincingly establish the causal effect of financial frictions, we next test Hypothesis 3 and examine the variation in export activity across firms and find patterns very similar to those in the panel of export survivors and entrants. Analogous results obtain for new exporters of quota-bound products, which we can identify in the case of the US (available on request).

6.4. Sectors' financial vulnerability
While the evidence in Sections 6.1 and 6.3 strongly supports Hypotheses 1 and 2, there might be sources of simultaneity bias that we are unable to address even with our analysis of export dynamics because this still uses balance sheet measures of firms' financial health. To more convincingly establish the causal effect of financial frictions, we next test Hypothesis 3 and examine the variation in export activity within firms across sectors at different levels of financial vulnerability. Financial vulnerability is technologically determined and reflects innate characteristics of the manufacturing process in an industry. It is by

25 We consider a firm to be a new exporter in year t if it did not export in years t – 1 and t – 2. Our results are not sensitive to making this filter stricter, for example, by requiring that it also did not export in year t – 3, or by focusing only on entry in 2005 conditional on no exports in 2000–2004.
construction exogenous to individual firms, allowing us to circumvent concerns with endogeneity due to reverse causality, omitted variables, or accounting bias.

Exploiting the rich customs data, we estimate two specifications using four alternative measures of sectors’ financial vulnerability $\text{Fin Vuln}_i$:

\[
\text{Trade Share}_{iy} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Fin Vuln}_i + \Gamma \cdot Z_{iy} + \varsigma_j + \epsilon_{iy} \tag{5}
\]

\[
\text{Trade Share}_{iyh} = \alpha + \beta \cdot \text{Fin Vuln}_i + \Gamma \cdot Z_{iy} + \varsigma_j + \phi_d + \epsilon_{iyh} \tag{5'}
\]

The outcome variable of interest is the share of different trade regimes in firm $f$’s exports by ISIC industry $i$ in Eq. (5) and by ISIC industry $i$ and destination $d$ in Eq. (5’). We include firm fixed effects $\varsigma_j$ to control for observed and unobserved company characteristics that affect trade activity in all sectors, such as financial health, productivity, size, ownership type, familiarity with foreign markets, etc. The effect of $\text{Fin Vuln}_i$ is hence identified solely from the exogenous variation across sectors within multi-sector producers. It reflects the way in which exporters allocate their limited financial resources across trade modes and industries with different liquidity needs. Importantly, even if firms’ total access to capital were endogenous to their trade operations, a significant $\beta$ would imply that financial factors determine companies’ export strategy. We cluster errors by firm, to account for the potential correlation in cost or demand shocks across industries and destinations within firms.$^{27}$

We are careful to isolate the impact of financial vulnerability from that of other sector characteristics $Z_{iy}$ that might influence firms’ trade regime. Since specifications (5) and (5’) do not permit industry fixed effects, we condition on sectors’ physical and human capital intensity, as well as on the importance of relationship-specific investments in input production. These variables come from Braun (2003) and Nunn (2007). We also use four different measures of sectors’ financial sensitivity that are imperfectly correlated with each other. This makes it difficult for a single omitted industry characteristic to simultaneously explain robust results for all four measures.

Table 7 clearly indicates that exporters choose different means of servicing foreign markets based on the financial characteristics of the sector. Firms actively pursue processing trade, especially pure assembly, in industries with high working capital requirements as proxied by the inventories-to-sales ratio (Columns 1–2 in Panel A). Increasing short-run liquidity needs by 20% would translate into 10% rise in the share of foreign revenues generated through processing trade and 4% uptake in the share of pure assembly in processing exports. These magnitudes are large relative to the means of the two trade shares (30% and 19%, respectively).

We next examine the importance of sectors’ reliance on outside finance for long-term investment in capital and R&D. As expected, industries’ external finance dependence and R&D intensity affect the choice between ordinary and processing trade (Panels B and C). The trade-off between pure assembly and processing with imports, on the other hand, appears unrelated to the funding of long-run investment projects. This is consistent with the idea that the two processing regimes differ only in terms of the financing of short-run, variable input costs. By contrast, fixed costs incurred in product design, equipment purchases, marketing, and distribution constitute a key distinction between processing and ordinary trade.

We finally turn to industries’ asset tangibility in Panel D. While the three sector measures above capture liquidity needs, tangibility reflects the capacity to raise capital by pledging collateral. Our results confirm that exporters are indeed more likely to choose processing over ordinary exports in industries with softer assets (Column 1). As with the financing of long-term investment, asset tangibility too seems less important for the choice between the two processing methods (Column 2).

In terms of economic significance, financial frictions are a key determinant of firms’ choice of trade regime across sectors. Based on our estimates, the effect of a one-standard-deviation change in $\text{Fin Vuln}_i$ on the share of processing exports in total exports is similar across the four measures (1.8%–2.5%). Compared to the implied impact of a one-standard-deviation change in other sector characteristics, financial vulnerability exerts an effect 5.6 times as large as that of physical capital intensity, 6 times that of human capital intensity, and 16 times that of relationship specificity.

Even within narrowly defined industry categories, the optimal trade strategy might depend on characteristics of the export market. We account for this possibility by estimating Eq. (5’) for the firm–industry–destination as the unit of observation, adding destination country fixed effects. We obtain consistent results for all four sector measures of financial vulnerability in Columns 3–4. In Columns 5–6, we record stable patterns when we instead use binary trade shares set to 1 for all values above 0.

These findings are robust to a number of specification checks presented in Online Appendix Table 3. First, we exploit the full granularity of the data, and define the outcome variable for each firm–HS product–destination triplet instead of at the firm–ISIC sector–destination level. Second, while the firm fixed effects in the regression control for the average tariff each firm pays for its imported inputs, effective import tariffs might vary systematically across output industries within a firm because different output industries combine inputs in different proportion. Our results survive when we control for the average imported input tariff by output sector,$^{29}$ or alternatively, when we exclude firms that face import duties because they import inputs under the ordinary trade regime.

One implication of the conceptual framework in Section 3 is that financially healthier firms should be able to sustain export activity in more sectors and in more financially sensitive sectors. While other factors also influence the operations of multi-sector firms, we provide evidence consistent with this pattern in Online Appendix Table 4. We show that companies with higher (lower) levels of lagged liquidity (leverage) export a bigger number of ISIC sectors. Moreover, the average financial vulnerability of firm exports is higher for less constrained companies, where we calculate the former as the unweighted or weighted average $\text{Fin Vuln}_i$, across all industries $i$ in firm $f$’s export portfolio, using $f$’s exports by industry as weights.

While Section 3 makes clear predictions for the direct effects of firms’ financial health and sectors’ financial vulnerability on exporters’ choice of trade regime, it has ambiguous implications for the differential impact of firms’ access to capital across sectors with different financial sensitivities. Regardless of its financial health, any firm would prefer export modes with lower liquidity requirements in financially more dependent sectors, compared to financially less dependent sectors (Hypothesis 3). In any industry, less constrained firms would be more likely to pursue trade regimes with higher liquidity needs, compared to more constrained firms (Hypothesis 2). However, the regime choices of less constrained firms might be equally, more or less reactive to sectors’ financial dependence relative to those of more constrained firms, because all three scenarios would be consistent with firms’ profit maximization. Interaction analysis suggests that in practice, all firms adjust

$^{26}$ Since this analysis does not require any balance sheet data, we are no longer restricted to the matched sample of firms with both customs and census data, and we are able to include the universe of exporting firms.

$^{27}$ Forty-five percent of all exporters in the sample are active in two or more ISIC 3-digit sectors. They capture the vast majority of trade flows and of the observations in regressions (5) and (5’), ranging 64%–77% across columns in Table 7.

$^{28}$ Moulton (1990) argues that errors should be clustered at the most aggregate level at which the relevant explanatory variable varies in the sample, which in our case is the sector. However, Angrist and Pischke (2008) show that standard error asymptotics require a sufficiently large number of groups (50) that exceeds the number of sectors in our data (29). We have nevertheless confirmed that qualitatively similar results obtain if we instead cluster by sector.

$^{29}$ We thank Brandt and Morrow (2015) for sharing their import tariff data by GBT-4 output industry, which we concord to ISIC-3 industries.
Table 7
Trade regimes and sectors’ financial vulnerability.
This table examines the relationship between firms’ export trade regimes and sectors’ financial vulnerability in the cross section. The unit of observation is the firm–ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 1–2 and the firm–destination–ISIC 3-digit sector in Columns 3–6. All variables are defined in the text. PA, PI, and OT denote pure assembly, processing with imports, and ordinary trade, respectively. The outcome variable is continuous in Columns 1–4, and equals 1 for all values above 0 in Column 5–6. All regressions include sectors’ physical capital (K), human capital (H), and relationship-specific (RS) intensity, as well as firm fixed effects. Columns 3–6 also include destination fixed effects. T-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm reported in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Bilateral trade share</th>
<th>Binary bilateral trade share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td>PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel A. Working capital requirements: inventories ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventories ratio</td>
<td>0.497***</td>
<td>0.201***</td>
<td>0.538***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23.43)</td>
<td>(2.77)</td>
<td>(20.90)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K intensity</td>
<td>–0.310***</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>–0.176***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H intensity</td>
<td>0.016***</td>
<td>–0.016</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS intensity</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>–0.002</td>
<td>0.024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B. Long-run investment needs: external finance dependence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External finance dependence</td>
<td>0.050***</td>
<td>–0.0001</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21.82)</td>
<td>(–0.03)</td>
<td>(18.23)</td>
<td>(–0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K intensity</td>
<td>–0.744***</td>
<td>–0.052</td>
<td>–0.734***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H intensity</td>
<td>0.019***</td>
<td>–0.002</td>
<td>0.031***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS intensity</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>–0.016</td>
<td>–0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel C. Long-run investment needs: R&amp;D intensity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D Intensity</td>
<td>0.988***</td>
<td>–0.018</td>
<td>0.901***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22.81)</td>
<td>(–0.24)</td>
<td>(16.68)</td>
<td>(–0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K intensity</td>
<td>–0.601***</td>
<td>–0.053</td>
<td>–0.611***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H intensity</td>
<td>–0.009***</td>
<td>–0.001</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS intensity</td>
<td>–0.022***</td>
<td>–0.015</td>
<td>–0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel D. Access to collateral: asset tangibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset tangibility</td>
<td>–0.208***</td>
<td>–0.038</td>
<td>–0.207***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(–18.05)</td>
<td>(–1.12)</td>
<td>(–15.94)</td>
<td>(–1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K intensity</td>
<td>–0.036</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H intensity</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>–0.008</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS intensity</td>
<td>0.019***</td>
<td>–0.011</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm FE</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination FE</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. firms</td>
<td>110,018</td>
<td>41,041</td>
<td>110,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. observations</td>
<td>252,296</td>
<td>59,263</td>
<td>1,142,871</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Significance at the 1% level. ** Significance at the 5% level. * Significance at the 10% level.

their trade shares proportionately in response to sectors’ financial vulnerability (not reported).

6.5. Provinces’ financial development

Hypotheses 2 and 3 are valid only in the presence of financial market imperfections: Firms’ need for external capital will distort their export activity only if they face financial constraints. Otherwise, producers will freely obtain the outside finance they need to implement their first-best export strategy, and Hypotheses 2 and 3 will not apply. We can therefore exploit exogenous differences in the strength of financial institutions across space to provide more causal evidence for Hypotheses 2 and 3.

The financial sector in China is known to be segmented, with banks typically serving firms in the same geographic region (World Bank, 2005). This generates variation in the availability of external capital across Chinese provinces that is exogenous to individual firms. We thus expect the export decisions of manufacturers in financially more developed areas to be less sensitive to their measured financial health and to industries’ financial vulnerability. In other words, the effect of low liquidity on the proclivity for processing trade and pure assembly should be smaller for companies based in financially advanced regions relative to companies based in financially lagging regions. Similarly, across sectors within a firm, the effect of sectors’ financial dependence on the two trade shares should be mitigated for firms operating in financially more developed provinces.

We test these predictions by expanding specifications (2') and (5') to include, respectively, interactions of firms’ liquidity and of sectors’ inventory-to-sales ratio with a measure of financial development in the firms’ home province:

\[
\text{Trade Share}_{ijfd} = \alpha + \beta_i \cdot \text{Fin Health}_i + \Gamma \cdot Z_i + \delta \cdot \text{Fin Health}_i \cdot \text{High Fin Devt}_p + \frac{\varphi_p + \varphi_i}{1 + \varphi_p + \varphi_i} + \frac{\varphi_d + \varphi_{own} + \epsilon_{fd}}{1 + \varphi_d + \varphi_{own} + \epsilon_{fd}}
\]

(6)

\[
\text{Trade Share}_{ijfd} = \alpha + \beta_i \cdot \text{Fin Vnl}_i + \Gamma \cdot Z_i + \delta \cdot \text{Fin Vnl}_i \cdot \text{High Fin Devt}_p + \frac{\varphi_p + \varphi_i}{1 + \varphi_p + \varphi_i} + \frac{\varphi_d + \varphi_{cost} + \epsilon_{fd}}{1 + \varphi_d + \varphi_{cost} + \epsilon_{fd}}
\]

(6')

Here High Fin Devt_p is a binary indicator set to 1 for provinces with financial development above the sample median. Following common practice in the literature, we proxy regional financial conditions with the ratio of total credit to GDP from the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (e.g., Héricourt and Poncet, 2015). To account for different trade conditions across countries, we study bilateral trade shares by firm or firm-sector and include destination fixed effects \(\varphi_d\). As above,
in Eq. (6) we add the full set of firm controls $Z_p$, province $\phi_p$, ownership $\psi_{own}$, and industry $\phi_I$ fixed effects using information on the firm's primary industry from ASIF. By contrast, Eq. (6') exploits the variation across sectors within firms by conditioning on firm fixed effects $\phi_p$ and sector controls $Z$. The main effect of High Fin Devt is subsumed by either $\phi_p$ or $\phi_I$. We continue to cluster errors by firm.

We report results for binary bilateral trade shares in Columns 1–2 and 5–6 of Table 8. As expected, Fin Health, and Fin Vuln enter as before, while the interaction terms are significant and of the opposite sign. Comparing the estimates for $\beta$ and $\hat{\delta}$, financial health affects firms' proclivity for processing trade 2.7 times more in financially underdeveloped regions in China than in financially advanced provinces. Raising sectors' working capital needs by 10% makes the extent of relationship specificity (capital endowment, skill endowment, and contract enforcement) more important than the financial capacity of his trade partner: The foreign buyer should be willing to bear more of the financing costs of the transaction if he has access to cheaper capital and if doing so increases the probability of successful production and delivery.

The data reveal two patterns consistent with this idea (available on request). Both are difference-in-differences results that would be difficult to attribute to reverse causality or omitted variable bias, lending further support to our main conclusions.

First, we exploit the variation in financial development across export markets as a proxy for the foreign party's access to external finance. Superior financial development in the destination makes it more likely for Chinese exporters to choose processing trade, especially pure assembly, in sectors with higher working capital needs. The impact of industries' inventory ratio on both trade shares is doubled for destinations with private-credit-to-GDP ratio above the median relative to countries below the median. This aligns with recent theoretical and empirical evidence that the relative cost of capital in the exporting and importing country affects the choice between cash-in-advance and post-shipment payment in international transactions (Antràs and Foley, 2015; Demir and Javorcik, 2014; Hoefele et al., 2013).

Second, we study the cross-sector variation in the importance of product customization via relationship-specific investments in production. The extent of relationship specificity can affect firms' ability to raise external capital and hence choice of trade regime. Financiers can better monitor a borrower to alleviate moral hazard if they can more easily
ascertain that contractual agreements about input sourcing and assembly have been observed. Similarly, the higher the outside market value of a product, the greater the expected return to an investor in case of default, as he could seize and liquidate assets more profitably. If lenders are less likely to fund Chinese firms in industries with more relationship-specific investments, credit constraints would be more binding for such firms and their foreign buyers induced to provide more funding to ensure production. Indeed, interaction analysis indicates that firms’ financial health (liquidity) and sectors’ financial vulnerability (inventory ratio) affect the choice of trade regime relatively more in relationship-specific intensive sectors.

7. Conclusion

This paper examines how firms choose to participate in international trade and how this decision affects performance. We study three export modes that implicitly capture firms’ production technology and position in the global value chain: ordinary trade, processing trade with imported inputs, and processing trade via pure assembly. Using matched customs and balance sheet data for China, we show that conducting more steps of the supply chain increases value added and profits. However, it requires more working capital because it entails higher up-front costs. As a result, credit constraints restrict firms to low value-added stages of production, and preclude them from pursuing more profitable opportunities. Our findings highlight a novel mechanism through which liquidity constraints impact firms’ export outcomes and ultimately profitability. They further suggest that financial frictions influence the design of international trade contracts and the organization of global production across firm and country boundaries. Strengthening financial markets in developing countries might thus be instrumental in increasing aggregate value added, profits, and income. A promising direction for future research is the potential for firms and entire economies to grow over time by starting with processing trade restricted to few assembly tasks and gradually expanding along the value chain into more profitable activities.

These conclusions shed light on the gains from trade in the context of global production networks and on the distributional consequences of trade policy in the presence of financial frictions. In particular, processing trade may allow more credit-constrained firms to share in the gains from trade when they would have otherwise been unable to engage with global markets. More broadly, we provide one of the first firm-level studies of processing trade and inform current discussions of the effects of global value chains on optimal trade policy, exchange rate pass-through, and the transmission of supply and demand shocks across nations.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.02.005.

References


30 See Antrás et al. (2009) for a formal model of a similar mechanism.