Abstract

We study how management practices shape export performance using matched production-trade-management data for Chinese and American firms and a randomized control trial in India. Better managed firms are more likely to export, sell more products to more destinations, and earn higher export revenues and profits. They export higher-quality products at higher prices and lower quality-adjusted prices. They import a wider range of inputs and inputs of higher quality and price, from more advanced countries. We rationalize these patterns with a heterogeneous-firm model in which effective management improves performance by raising production efficiency and quality capacity.

JEL codes: F10, F14, F23, L20, O19, O32.

Keywords: Management, exports, product quality, productivity.

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1 Introduction

Productivity, management practices and international trade activity vary dramatically across firms and countries (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott 2007; Syverson 2011). In the literature, higher measured Total Factor Productivity (TFP) has been associated with export success and superior management with higher profits. However, measured TFP is subject to many potential biases and, even if perfectly measured, still constitutes a residual “black box”, while the mechanisms through which management operates remain largely unknown. From a policy perspective, improving firm capabilities is important for stimulating firm performance and aggregate growth, but this requires knowledge of the determinants of firm productivity. While it is widely believed that management strategies play a central role, especially in emerging economies trying to move up the quality ladder (Sutton 2012), the scant evidence for this is primarily from case studies.

In this paper we perform what we believe is the first large-scale analysis of the role of management practices for export performance and in the process shed light on these questions. We uncover novel empirical facts and interpret them through the lens of a heterogeneous-firm model that disciplines the estimation approach. We study the world’s two largest export economies - China and the United States - and find consistent empirical patterns in both countries despite their very different income levels, institutional quality, and market frictions. In particular, we exploit unique new data on plant-level production, plant-level management practices, and transaction-level international trade activity for 485 Chinese firms in 1999-2008 and over 10,000 US firms in 2010.

We begin with motivating evidence from a randomized control trial (RCT) that offered management consulting to Indian firms. In a study of 31 plants over 10 years initiated by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013), improving management practices exerted causal positive effects on TFP, qualitative measures of output quality, selection into exporting, and total export revenues. Motivated by these patterns, we introduce a stylized model of international trade that rationalizes the RCT results and delivers a rich set of additional predictions which we can evaluate with the comprehensive data for China and the US.

We first establish that better managed firms have superior export performance along multiple dimensions. Companies with more effective management are systematically more likely to engage in exporting. Conditional on exporting, they sell more products to more destinations and earn
higher export revenues and profits. Our findings hold conditional on domestic sales, suggesting that management is disproportionately more important for trade operations.

We then present a set of results that jointly inform the mechanisms through which management strategies affect firm performance. On the sales side, better managed firms charge higher export prices within narrow destination-product markets. We estimate a model-consistent indicator of product quality, and show that better management is associated with higher output quality and lower quality-adjusted prices. On the production side, better managed firms use more expensive, higher-quality imported inputs and more inputs from suppliers in developed economies. They also source a wider range of intermediate inputs from more countries of origin.

Finally, we explore the relative and differential returns to good management. Decomposing revenue-based TFPR, we show that the management component has large explanatory power across the full range of firm trade outcomes compared to the non-management TFPR residual. We then unbundle overall managerial competence into practices linked to the supervision of physical capital ("monitoring") and of human resources ("incentives"). Monitoring appears more important than incentive provision in the US; the two sets of practices play comparable roles in China, with incentives being more consequential in some respects. We find little evidence that the returns to effective management vary across sectors or ownership types.

We propose that these empirical patterns are consistent with management competence being a key component of total factor productivity, whereby effective managerial practices increase both production efficiency and quality capacity. Superior management enables firms to use more sophisticated, higher-quality inputs and more complex assembly technologies that increase output quality. Better management also allows firms to process inputs and execute assembly more cheaply. These efficiency and quality channels push marginal cost in opposite directions, such that the net effect of management competence on prices and quantities is ambiguous, but it unambiguously raises quality, sales, and profits. These predictions hold in model extensions with endogenous input choice, endogenous management practices, or non-management TFP components.

Our main empirical analysis exploits cross-sectional variation in management and trade activity across Chinese and American firms. We therefore do not distinguish between a causal effect of good management and an equilibrium relationship between joint outcomes of firms’ profit maxi-
mization. Instead, we view our baseline findings as conditional correlations that inform the mechanisms through which management operates. In a step towards causality, we provide consistent panel evidence based on changes within US firms over time, which is not fully immune to endogeneity concerns. We are able to convincingly establish causal effects for the subset of firm outcomes that are also observed in the India RCT.

Our findings address two open questions in two active literatures. A large theoretical and empirical literature in international trade emphasizes the role of firm productivity as a key determinant of export performance (Melitz 2003; Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum 2003). More productive firms have been found to export more products to more destinations, thereby generating higher export revenues and profits. This body of work conceptualizes firm productivity as TFPQ, or the ability to manufacture at low marginal cost, such that more productive firms are more successful exporters because they set lower prices. Recent analyses point to the importance of product quality as well, showing that more successful exporters use higher-quality manufactured inputs and more skilled workers to produce higher-quality output that sells at higher prices (Verhoogen 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen 2012; Khandelwal 2010; Manova and Zhang 2012; Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen 2018). Yet productivity is typically measured as TFPR, or a revenue-based residual from production function estimates. This exposes it to estimation bias, and complicates the interpretation of trade-TFPR regression results (Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2015; De Loecker 2011). An important open question in this literature is what constitutes productivity, how it should be measured, and what explains its dispersion across firms. We unpack the black box of TFPR, and identify management practices as a concrete, tangible and directly measured TFPQ component that circumvents estimation concerns. Moreover, this management component accounts for a large share of the variation in firms’ trade performance, and delivers clear policy lessons.

A separate and older literature has examined the relationship between firm management, productivity and performance (Walker 1887; Syverson 2011). One likely route for this management-productivity link emphasized by the management literature is through lean manufacturing and improved quality (Drew, McCallum, and Roggenhofer 2016; Sutton 2007). Yet there is no systematic, direct evidence on the mechanisms through which management operates.[1] We demonstrate that ef-

[1] The most popular management systems in manufacturing (Six-Sigma, Lean, Toyota Product-
ffective management enhances firms’ trade performance through both higher production efficiency and stronger quality capability.

This paper also adds to recent research on the impact of trade liberalization on the organization of production inside firms. Evidence indicates that trade reforms incentivize firms to change the number of management layers, adjust the number and wages of managers and workers along the occupational hierarchy, and upgrade management practices (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg 2012, Chen and Steinwender 2016, Chakraborty and Raveh 2018). At the same time, improved access to imported inputs is important to the product quality, product scope and export success of firms in developing countries, because of the limited domestic supply of high-quality specialized inputs and equipment (Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova 2010, Fieler, Eslava, and Xu 2018, Manova and Zhang 2012). This matters since poor economies often rely on international trade for growth, and specifically on exporting to large, developed and profitable markets that maintain high quality standards. Our results suggest that poor managerial practices may impede trade, growth and entrepreneurship in the world’s poorest economies.

Finally, our findings speak to the literature on the implications of firm heterogeneity for aggregate productivity, welfare and the gains from trade (Hsieh and Klenow 2009, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012, Melitz and Redding 2013). Evidence indicates that reallocations across firms and across products within firms, as well as productivity upgrading within firms, contribute significantly to the aggregate adjustment to trade reforms and macroeconomic shocks (Pavcnik 2002, Bustos 2011). The role of management practices for firm heterogeneity is thus important for understanding trade’s aggregate impact, while the associated firm heterogeneity in worker skill and product quality matters for its distributional effects (Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding 2010).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides RCT evidence for the causal effects of management in India. Section 3 develops a stylized model that rationalizes this evidence and delivers rich additional predictions. Section 4 introduces the unique Chinese and US data on firm management, production and trade that allow us to evaluate all model predictions. Section 5 examination) emphasize that improving productivity and quality is best achieved by reducing defects, and have spread to most sectors, such as Lean Retail, Lean Healthcare and Lean Government (Myerson 2014, Group 2014, Teeuwen 2010).
ines the relationship between firms’ management strategy and export performance, while Section 6 analyzes the mechanisms through which management operates. The last section concludes.

2 Motivating RCT Evidence

We first present motivating evidence that management practices can exert causal effects on firms’ production efficiency, quality capacity, and export activity. We exploit a randomized control trial performed by Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) who worked with the company Accenture to provide free management consulting services to large firms in the textile industry in Mumbai, India. The study examined three sets of plants over the 2008-2011 period. 11 plants owned by 6 firms served as a pure control group and 20 plants owned by 11 firms as the treatment group. In the treated group, 14 plants were randomly selected to receive the management intervention. They had 1 month of diagnostic assessment of management practices in place and 4 months of consulting on 38 core practices across 6 key areas (factory operations, quality control, inventory control, loom planning, human resources, sales and orders). The remaining 6 plants in the treated firms were given only the 1-month diagnostic. Detailed monthly production data was collected for all three groups for a further 3 years. In 2017, Bloom, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts went back to assess the long-term impact of the intervention. They collected performance metrics for 2014 and 2017, including trade activity that we are the first to analyze.

Three lessons emerge from the India RCT. First, the consulting intervention had a large long-lasting effect on firms’ management strategy. The management practice adoption rate in the treatment plants rose from 25.6% to 63.4% in the first year, slipped somewhat over the next eight years to 46%, but remained significantly above its initial level or the control firms.

Second, the management intervention led to a large causal improvement in firms’ TFP and product quality. Figures 1a and 1b plot the change in TFP and product defect rates during the experiment against the change in management competence for both treatment and control plants. The intervention triggered a 37.8% rise in management effectiveness on average. This caused a 43% drop in quality defects, and was one of the major drivers of the 17% increase in TFP.

McKenzie and Woodruff (2013) review the literature on the impact of management RCTs.
Third, the management intervention significantly increased firms’ export participation. In Panel A of Table 1, we explore the intention-to-treat effect with regressions of various export outcomes on a plant-level treatment dummy. Treatment plants were 0.189 more likely to export in the post-treatment period, and had significantly higher export revenues conditional on exporting (up to 51.6% increase). We document similarly strong positive impacts in Panel B, where we use the treatment indicator as an instrument for the management score in a two-stage IV specification.

The key determinant of exports were management practices that guarantee quality control. International buyers offer higher prices than domestic consumers, but impose higher quality standards that require formal quality control systems. While domestic consumers will accept (at a discount) fabric with slight imperfections - stains, inconsistent coloring, holes or bunching, international buyers will not and defective shipments are returned.

This RCT evidence indicates that upgrading management strategies can improve firms’ TFP, product quality, production efficiency, and export performance. This motivates the model in Section 3. While the India RCT supports causal interpretation, however, it covers a small set of establishments, tracks only basic export outcomes, and does not link efficiency and quality to export success. In Sections 4-6, we therefore exploit significantly richer data for China and the US to establish a broad set of novel conditional correlations in line with the model’s predictions and mechanisms.

3 Conceptual Framework

We develop a partial-equilibrium heterogeneous-firm trade model in which management competence enhances firms’ trade performance by increasing production efficiency and quality capacity. This model rationalizes the RCT evidence for India, and delivers a broad set of additional predictions that we can take to administrative data for China and the US.

We treat management effectiveness as an exogenous firm draw that is conceptually equivalent to TFP. This formulation lends tractability and transparency, and is consistent with different microfoundations for the role of management, such as monitoring under principal-agent problems, span of control trade-offs in hierarchies, and career concerns (Holmstrom 1982; Gibbons and Roberts 2013). Since the baseline model shares many properties with Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010),
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and most closely Manova and Yu (2017), we summarize its key features here, and relegate details and proofs to Online Appendix 1 and 2.

### 3.1 Economic Environment

A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms in country $j \in J + 1$ can produce and export horizontally and vertically differentiated goods. Given CES utility

$$U_j = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji}x_{ji})^\alpha di \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}$$

with elasticity of substitution $\sigma \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} > 1$, demand for variety $i$ in market $j$ is

$$x_{ji} = \frac{R_j P_j^{\sigma-1} q_j^\sigma p_j^{-\sigma} x_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \quad \text{where} \quad R_j \text{ is aggregate expenditure, } P_j = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} \left( \frac{p_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \right)^{1-\sigma} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

is a quality-adjusted ideal price index, and $q_{ji}$, $p_{ji}$ and $x_{ji}$ are the quality, price and quantity of variety $i \in \Omega_j$.

Product quality captures any objective attribute or subjective taste preference that increases consumer appeal at a given price. A sufficient statistic for unobserved quality $\ln q_{ji}$ can thus be constructed from observed price and quantity data as

$$\sigma \ln p_{ji} + \ln x_{ji}$$

(Khandelwal, 2010).

Upon paying a sunk entry cost, firms draw firm-wide managerial ability $\varphi \in (0, \infty)$ from distribution $g(\varphi)$ and a vector of i.i.d. firm-product specific expertise levels $\lambda_i \in (0, \infty)$ from distribution $z(\lambda)$. As we show in Online Appendix 3.1 and 3.2, the main model predictions hold if firms could endogenously choose their management practices or managerial strategy were one of multiple components of firm ability.

Firms’ management competence determines both their ability to assemble inputs into final goods (production efficiency) and their capacity to make high-quality goods (quality capacity). Producing one unit of physical output requires $(\varphi \lambda_i)^{-\delta}$ units of labor with wage normalized to 1. Parameter $\delta > 0$ governs the extent to which good management lowers unit input requirements. Intuitively, effective management can improve production efficiency by optimizing inventory control,

\[3\text{For example, entrepreneurs might draw exogenous talent } \phi, \text{ adopt management practice } m(\phi) \text{ at cost } f_m, \text{ and face marginal costs and quality that depend on ability } \varphi = \phi m(\phi) \lambda_i. \text{ If } df_m/dm > 0 \text{ and } d^2 f_m/dm^2 > 0, \text{ then Propositions 1-4 hold for both } \varphi \text{ and } m(\phi).\]

\[4\text{With multiple productivity components, firm ability } \varphi = m(\phi) \text{ may depend on the entrepreneur’s talent } \phi \text{ and the manager’s competence } m. \text{ If entrepreneurs and managers do not match perfectly assortatively due to labor market frictions, then } \text{corr}(m, \phi) \neq 1. \text{ While all firm outcomes would now be pinned down by } \varphi, m \text{ would have the same effects ceteris paribus.}\]
synchronizing and monitoring production targets across manufacturing stages, reducing wastage, incentivizing workers, etc.

At a marginal cost of \((\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta - \delta}\) workers, firms can produce one unit of quality \(q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i) = (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta}\), \(\theta > 0\). This captures the idea that manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs because it requires higher-quality inputs and more complex assembly processes \cite{Baldwin and Harrigan 2011}. For example, making a high-quality dress using skilled labor, silk and pearl buttons is more expensive than making a low-quality dress using unskilled labor, cotton and plastic buttons. Similarly, a 50-part printer is easier to build than a 150-part model that can print, scan and fax. Online Appendix 3.3 formalizes these micro-foundations: Production complementarity between firm ability and input quality induces more capable firms to use higher-quality inputs and produce higher-quality outputs \cite{Kugler and Verhoogen 2012}. Parameter \(\theta\) reflects the degree to which superior management enhances firms’ capacity to produce higher quality. Intuitively, effective management can tighten quality control, ensure the compatibility of specialized inputs, facilitate complex assembly, minimize costly mistakes, etc.

### 3.2 Firm Behavior

Firms maximize profits from their global operations by making optimal entry and sales decisions separately for each country-product market. Producers charge a constant mark-up \(\frac{1}{\alpha}\) over marginal cost, and have the following price, quantity, quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product \(i\) in market \(j\):

\[
\begin{align*}
p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= \frac{r_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta - \delta}}{\alpha}, & x_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= R_j P_j^{-1} (\frac{\alpha}{\tau_j})^\sigma (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta \sigma - \theta}, \\
q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= (\varphi \lambda_i)^\theta, & p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) / q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= \frac{r_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{-\delta}}{\alpha}, \\
r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta (\sigma - 1)}, & \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= \frac{r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\sigma} - f_{pj},
\end{align*}
\]  

\(^5\)See Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015) for an alternative framework with cannibalization effects across products within firms, in which Propositions 1-4 would still hold.
where \( \tau_j \) are iceberg costs, and \( f_{pj} \) are destination-product fixed costs. Note that the empirical analysis examines free-on-board export prices and revenues, that is \( p_{fob}^{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = (\varphi\lambda_i)^{\theta-\delta} / \alpha \) and \( r_{fob}^{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j (P_j \alpha)^{\sigma-1} (\varphi\lambda_i)^{\delta(\sigma-1)} \).

Management competence exerts two opposing effects on firms’ marginal costs and prices through the production efficiency and quality capacity channels. Their net effect is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the magnitudes of \( \theta \) and \( \delta \). If \( \theta = 0 \) and \( \delta > 0 \), effective management improves firm efficiency but there is no scope for quality differentiation. Better managed firms then have lower marginal costs, set lower prices, sell higher quantities, and earn higher revenues and profits. Conversely, if \( \theta > 0 \) and \( \delta = 0 \), management competence improves product quality but the efficiency mechanism is moot. Now all firms share the same quality-adjusted prices, revenues and profits, but better managed companies charge higher prices, offer higher quality, and sell lower quantities.

When \( \theta > 0 \) and \( \delta > 0 \), both management mechanisms are active. In this case, superior management is associated with higher product quality, lower quality-adjusted prices, higher revenues and higher profits. However, the implications for price and quantity remain ambiguous. If \( \theta > \delta \), as management competence grows, product quality rises sufficiently quickly with the cost of sophisticated inputs and assembly to overturn the effects of improved efficiency. As a result, effective management corresponds to higher output prices. If \( \theta < \delta \) by contrast, good management practices translate into lower prices. In the knife-edge case of \( \theta = \delta \), production efficiency and product quality are equally elastic in management capacity, and prices are invariant across the firm management distribution. Finally, better managed firms sell higher quantities if and only if \( \sigma\delta > \theta \).

In sum, well-run companies perform better along multiple dimensions. Since profits rise with managerial competence \( \varphi \) and there are economies of scale (i.e. headquarter-, product- and market-specific fixed costs), there is a zero-profit expertise level \( \lambda^*_j (\varphi) \) below which firm \( \varphi \) will not sell product \( i \) in country \( j \), where \( d\lambda^*_j (\varphi) / d\varphi < 0 \). In addition, only firms with management ability above a zero-profit cut-off \( \varphi^*_j \) will serve destination \( j \), where \( \varphi^*_j \) depends on \( j \)’s market size and trade costs. On the extensive margin, better managed firms thus optimally manufacture more products, select into exporting, serve more export destinations, and sell more products to each destination. On the intensive margin, they earn higher revenues and profits overall, as well as in each market.
3.3 Empirical Predictions

Proposition 1 Better managed firms are more likely to export.

Proposition 2 Better managed firms export more products to more destination markets and earn higher export revenues and profits.

Proposition 3 Better managed firms offer higher-quality products if \( \theta > 0 \) and the quality channel is active, but quality is invariant across firms if \( \theta = 0 \). Better managed firms set lower quality-adjusted prices if \( \delta > 0 \) and the efficiency channel is active, but quality-adjusted prices are invariant across firms if \( \delta = 0 \). Better managed firms charge higher prices if \( \theta > \delta \) and lower prices if \( \delta > \theta \), but prices are invariant across firms if \( \theta = \delta \).

Proposition 4 Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or more expensive assembly of higher complexity if \( \theta > 0 \) and the quality channel is active, but input quality and assembly complexity are invariant across firms if \( \theta = 0 \).

4 Data

Our analysis makes use of unique, matched establishment- or firm-level data for the world’s two largest exporters - China and the US - on production, international trade, and management practices. We exploit six proprietary micro data sources, three for each country, to assemble a dataset that is unprecedented in its coverage and detail. This section describes how management practices are evaluated, introduces the data, and summarizes key features of firm activity.

4.1 Measuring Management Practices

Systematic data on firms’ management practices have only recently become available. Since 2004, the World Management Survey (WMS) has developed standardized measures of management competence for over 20,000 manufacturing firms in 34 countries. WMS considers multiple aspects of firm management, and evaluates the relative effectiveness of different practices within each aspect. It is conducted via double-blind phone interviews with plant managers, and covers representative
firm samples with 100 to 5,000 employees in a large number of countries (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Endorsements by respected institutions and highly-trained interviewers (e.g. MBAs) ensure high response rates (e.g. 45% in China). The Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS) is modeled after WMS. It was introduced as a mandatory part of the US Census’ Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM) in 2010, the first and only census management data of its kind.

WMS (MOPS) includes 18 (16) questions about the management of physical capital (monitoring and targets) and human resources (incentives) inside a firm, examples of which appear in Appendix Figure 1. A first set of questions pertain to the monitoring of progress towards production targets via the frequent collection, analysis and dissemination of performance metrics. A second set of questions characterize the design, integration and realism of production targets. These questions assess to what extent targets are consistently set across production stages and tightly connected to performance, both in the short-run and long-run, for managers and non-managers. A final set of questions capture the use of incentives mechanisms to identify, promote and reward high performers with bonuses, while sanctioning underperformers.

Each management question is scored on a scale of 1 to 5 in WMS and 0 to 1 in MOPS, where higher values indicate more structured management with greater monitoring, more aggressive targets, and stronger performance incentives. For each country, we first standardize the responses to each question to be mean 0 with standard deviation 1 across firms. We then average across questions to obtain a comprehensive management score for each firm. Finally, we standardize these management scores to be mean 0 with standard deviation 1 across firms in each country.

Appendix Figure 2 illustrates the vast dispersion in average management practices across countries in WMS. The US comes out on top, followed closely by Japan, Germany, Sweden, Canada and the UK. In the middle of the country distribution, Chinese firms are on average significantly less well managed than North American and European companies, but score better than firms in Latin America, Africa and other emerging giants such as Brazil and India.

WMS and MOPS are based on the lean manufacturing and modern human resource practices used by leading management consultants, to focus on core management practices that should benefit firm performance regardless of the industry or economic environment. Our analysis will account for the possibility that the relevance of specific management practices might vary across industries.
with industry fixed effects. To the extent that the management surveys are biased towards successful production practices in the West, measurement error would introduce downward bias and work against us finding consistent patterns for both China and the US.

4.2 United States

We employ three comprehensive datasets on the activities of US firms. First, MOPS documents the management practices of about 32,000 manufacturing establishments in 2010 and 2005 (as recall). The sample captures 5.6 million employees, or over half of US manufacturing employment. Appendix Figure 3A plots the distribution of the management score across plants. MOPS also includes variables that we use as noise controls, namely an indicator for filing census forms online, the tenure and seniority of the respondent, and the discrepancy between employment data in MOPS and ASM.

Second, we obtain standard accounting data on US establishments from ASM, available for 1973-2012. ASM records the total output, value added, profits and production inputs (e.g. employment, capital expenditure, energy use, materials purchases) for about 45,000 plants that correspond to over 10,000 firms. We also observe firms’ age, location (out of 50 states), and primary industry of activity in the US NAICS 6-digit classification.

Third, we use the US Longitudinal Federal Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which contains detailed information about the universe of US international trade transactions in 1992-2012, at over 100 million transactions a year. LFTTD reports the value, quantity, unit (e.g. dozens, kilograms, etc.) and organization (intra-firm vs. arm’s length) of all firm-level exports (free on board) and all firm-level imports (cost, insurance and freight included) by country and product for around 7,000 different products in the 10-digit Harmonized System and around 5,000 product categories at the HS 8-digit level. We proxy prices with transaction-level unit values, and define products by both their HS code and unit to ensure comparability. Given the lumpiness and seasonality of international...
trade, we work at the annual frequency.

We link ASM, LFTTD and MOPS using firms’ common tax identifier. We perform our baseline analysis for the cross-section of about 32,000 US establishments in 2010 with contemporaneous production, trade and management data. Firms in this matched sample are on average bigger and better performing than firms without management data, but appear representative in that the relationship between standard productivity, size and performance metrics is the same in both subsamples.

### 4.3 China

We also exploit three comprehensive firm datasets for China. First, WMS reports the management practices of 507 Chinese firms in 2006-2007. Appendix Figure 3B plots the distribution of the management score across firms. We use WMS data on firms’ primary industry (out of 82 SIC 3-digit industries) and a set of survey noise controls (interview duration, day of week and time of day; interviewer ID; interviewee gender, reliability and competence as perceived by the interviewer).

Second, we access firm-level production data for 1999-2007 from China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE). ASIE is collected by the National Bureau of Statistics and provides standard accounting information for all state-owned firms and all private firms with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan, for over 200,000 firms a year. In addition to output, profits, value added and production inputs, we also observe firms’ age, ownership structure (private domestic, state owned, foreign owned), location (out of 31 provinces), and primary industry of activity.

Third, we utilize comprehensive data on the universe of Chinese firms’ cross-border transactions in 2000-2008 from the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS), spanning over 100 million transactions a year. CCTS is collected by the Chinese Customs Office and reports the value and quantity of firm exports (free on board) and imports (cost, insurance and freight included) in U.S. dollars by product and trade partner for 243 destination/source countries and about 7,500 products in the 8-digit Harmonized System. While CCTS does not distinguish between arm’s-length and

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7. We sum ASM production variables across establishments within multi-establishment firms. We take the employment-weighted average MOPS management score across plants within a firm; all results hold for the simple average. We use the age, location and industry of the firm headquarters.

8. While the HS 6-digit classification is consistent across countries, finer levels of disaggrega-
intra-firm flows, it indicates the trade regime of each transaction (ordinary or processing trade).

Of the 507 Chinese firms in WMS, we are able to match 485 to ASIE using a common firm identifier. We obtain the complete ASIE record for these 485 firms during 1999-2007, which produces an unbalanced panel of 3,233 firm-year observations.

Since CCTS maintains an independent system of firm registration codes, it cannot be mapped directly into ASIE or WMS. We follow standard practice in the literature and match CCTS to ASIE using an algorithm based on firms’ name, address and phone number. Using ASIE as a bridge, we match 296 companies from WMS to CCTS. We then match 58 of the remaining unmatched firms in WMS directly to CCTS by postcode and name. We ensure match quality by manually researching company webpages and reports. We thus locate detailed CCTS trade data for 354 of the 507 WMS companies, for a match rate of 70%. Of these 354 firms, 11% only export, 17% only import, and 72% both export and import according to CCTS. This is consistent with the fact that about 60% of the matched WMS-ASIE firms report positive exports on their accounts, while more firms may appear in the comprehensive CCTS records.

4.4 Summary Statistics

Table 2 summarizes the substantial variation in management practices, production and trade activity across firms in China and the US. Starting with the US, 45% of the 32,000 establishments in our 2010 matched sample export. The typical exporter sells 19 different HS-8 digit products to 13 destinations and, conditional on importing inputs, buys 20 distinct products from 6 countries, with large dispersion around these means. These numbers are generally similar for the sample of 485 firms in our baseline 2000-2008 panel for China, where 58% of all firms export. On average, Chinese exporters ship 9 HS-8 digit products to 13 markets and, conditional on importing inputs, sources 33 different products from 6 origins.

Our baseline results at the HS-8 level hold at the HS-6 level, as well as at the most disaggregated HS-10 level (available for the US).

For the US, we report summary statistics for production at the establishment level and trade activity at the firm level, since this is the level at which such data are collected in ASM and LFTTD respectively. The ASM statistics look similar at the firm level.
Table 2 corroborates stylized facts in the literature that exporters are on average larger and more productive than non-exporters. We document that exporters are on average also better managed: The unconditional export management premium equals 15% of a standard deviation in China and 38% of a standard deviation in the US. In comparison, the export size premia in China and the US stand at 19% and 186% respectively based on firm output and 36% and 123% based on employment.\(^\text{10}\)

5 Management and Export Performance

In this section, we first examine the relationship between firms’ management practices and export performance. This exercise constitutes a direct test of Propositions 1 and 2. To inform the efficiency and quality mechanisms through which management operates, in Section 5 we then confront Propositions 3 and 4 with data.

We perform the entire analysis separately for China and the US. Given the vast difference in income, institutional quality and factor market frictions between the two countries, this allows us to assess whether management plays a fundamental role in firm activities, and if so, whether its function depends on the specific economic environment. To the extent that the management surveys are biased towards successful production practices in the West, measurement error would introduce downward bias and work against us finding consistent patterns for both China and the US.

5.1 Empirical Strategy

We evaluate the empirical validity of Propositions 1 and 2 with the following estimating equation for the link between firms’ management competence and export performance:

\[
ExportOutcome_f = \beta Management_f + \Gamma Z_f + \phi_i + \phi + \epsilon_f
\]

We consider multiple dimensions of export activity as guided by theory. In different specifications, \(ExportOutcome_f\) refers to firm \(f\)’s export status, log global export revenues, and various ex-

\(^{10}\)Average firm size is bigger for China than the US because WMS covers a randomized sample of Chinese firms above a size threshold, while MOPS has comprehensive coverage of US firms.
tensive and intensive margins of exporting. We measure firm’s managerial competence \(\text{Management}_f\) with the comprehensive management z-score.

We account for any systematic variation in supply and demand conditions across firms in the same location \(l\) or industry \(i\) with fixed effects, \(\phi_l\) and \(\phi_i\). These capture differences in factor costs, factor intensities, infrastructure, institutional frictions, tax treatment, etc. that might impact export performance. In the case of China, we add dummies for 31 provinces and 82 SIC 3-digit sectors. In the case of the US, we use indicators for 50 states and about 300 NAICS 6-digit industries.

We further condition on a vector of firm characteristics \(Z_f\). We always include the full set of survey noise controls to alleviate potential measurement error in \(\text{Management}_f\). We subsume the role of Chinese firms’ ownership type with fixed effects for private domestic, state owned, and foreign owned companies; such data is not available for the US. We also report results with an extended set of firm controls \(Z_f\) such as age, capital and skill intensity.

The coefficient of interest \(\beta\) reflects the sign of the conditional correlation between firms’ management competence and export performance. Given the fixed-effects structure, it is identified from the variation across companies within narrow segments of the economy. This correlation can be interpreted in two ways through the lens of our model. On the one hand, management excellence may be an exogenous productivity draw or one component of it as in our baseline model, such as managers’ exogenous ability or style \(\text{(Bertrand and Schoar, 2003)}\). In this case, \(\beta\) would capture the causal impact of management on export success. On the other hand, a primitive firm attribute may determine both the choice of management technology and trade activity, for example if exogenously different entrepreneurs endogenously hire managers of different skill levels. Estimates of \(\beta\) would then reflect the equilibrium relationship between a production input and output that are joint outcomes of the firm’s maximization problem. These two alternatives are isomorphic for our purposes and we do not seek to distinguish between them.\(^{11}\)

MOPS spans over 10,000 US firms in 2010, and we estimate equation (4) in this cross-section. By contrast, WMS covers about 500 Chinese firms in 2007. In order to fully exploit the Chinese

\(^{11}\)Reverse causality does not pose classical estimation bias: If higher export demand or learning from foreign partners induce firms to upgrade management, this would be consistent with our argument \(\text{(Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman, 2017)}\).
panel customs and production data, we estimate specification (4) at the firm-year level, controlling for macroeconomic conditions with year fixed effects $\phi_t$. This is motivated by the evidence in Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Patnaik, Saporta-Eksten, and Van Reenen (2019) and patterns in our own MOPS data that management practices evolve slowly within firms over time. We cluster standard errors by firm since $Management_f$ is measured at the firm level.

5.2 Export Status, Revenues and Profits

We first establish in Table 3 that better managed firms are significantly more likely to export and earn higher export revenues conditional on exporting. In Columns 1 and 5, we examine firms’ export status by setting the dependent variable $ExportOutcome_f$ to 1 if a firm reports any exports and 0 otherwise. We estimate equation (4) in the matched ASIE-WMS sample for China and the matched ASM-MOPS sample for the US.\(^{12}\) Firms with more effective management practices are systematically more likely to enter foreign markets.\(^{13}\) In Columns 3 and 7, we then re-estimate specification (4) using the log value of global exports as the outcome variable $ExportOutcome_f$ in the matched CCTS-WMS sample of Chinese exporters and the matched LFTTD-MOPS sample of US exporters.\(^{14}\) Well-run exporters realize substantially higher sales abroad.

The strong association between management competence and export activity persists when we add an extended set of firm characteristics $Z_f$ in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8. We control for firm age using information on the year of establishment from ASIE and ASM. We find some evidence that older US manufacturers export more. We further condition on firms’ production technology as reflected in their capital intensity (log net fixed assets per worker) and skill intensity (share of workers with a college degree; log average wage). The results corroborate prior evidence in the literature that more skill- and capital intensive firms are more active exporters, although the point estimates are not

\(^{12}\)For the US, we observe export status at the plant level from ASM and all other trade outcomes at the firm level from LFTTD. We run the baseline regressions for export status at the plant level, and note that corresponding coefficient magnitudes are 30%-50% higher at the firm level.

\(^{13}\)We report OLS results, but similar patterns hold with other estimators such as Probit or Logit.

\(^{14}\)We measure firms’ global exports based on the customs records that cover the universe of trade transactions. Similar results hold for total exports as reported in production surveys.
always precisely estimated. To guard against omitted variable bias, we always include this broader vector of controls $Z_f$ in the rest of the analysis.

Our findings point to potentially large economic consequences from improving management practices. Based on the estimates with the extended set of controls, a one-standard-deviation rise in the management z-score is associated with 5% higher probability of exporting and 23% higher export revenues in China; these numbers are 3% and 37% for the US. Given the large management gaps across countries in Appendix Figure 2, this implies that variations in management competence could account for substantial differences in trade intensity across countries. These magnitudes are also sizeable relative to the role of firm age, skill- and capital intensity (comparable statistics for these are in the range of 2% to 28%).

In Appendix Table 1, we corroborate the baseline findings for the US with more stringent specifications that exploit available panel data. We first find similar results when we regress export outcomes in year 2011 on firms’ management score in 2010. We then regress the change in trade activity from 2005 to 2010 on the concurrent change in firms’ management competence. Within-firm upgrading of management practices is associated with significant improvements in export performance, controlling for state and industry fixed effects that now absorb divergent time trends. Point estimates are typically an order of magnitude smaller, consistent with management exerting greater effects on performance levels than growth rates.

In addition to export status and revenues, Proposition 2 also has implications for firms’ export profits. While ASIE and ASM report firms’ consolidated global profits, in Appendix Table 2 we exploit the available information as best we can to provide indicative evidence of a positive link between effective management and export profits. We confirm that superior managerial practices are associated with higher total profits. Moreover, this holds even conditioning on domestic sales, calculated as the difference between total turnover and total exports.

\footnote{In 2010 (2015), MOPS asked US firms about their management practices in both 2005 and 2010 (2010 and 2015). The contemporaneous and recall data for 2010 line up well.}
5.3 Extensive and Intensive Export Margins

As a first step to understanding the mechanisms through which management contributes to export success, we decompose exporters’ trade activity into the number of foreign markets they enter and the sales they make in each market. We find that better managed firms have the capacity both to serve more export markets and to sell more in individual markets.

We measure the extensive margin of firm exports with the log number of destinations they supply, the log number of products they ship to at least one country, and the log number of destination-product markets they penetrate. We quantify the intensive margin with average log exports per destination-product. We define products at the granular HS 8-digit level. We re-estimate equation (4) using each export margin in place of $\text{ExportOutcome}_f$, and report our findings in Table 4. Appendix Table 3 contains symmetric regressions without the wider set of firm controls $Z_f$.

We consistently observe positive significant coefficients on $\text{Management}_f$ across all specifications (except for the intensive margin in China). For Chinese firms, a one-standard-deviation improvement in managerial competence is associated with 19% more export destinations, 17% more export products, 22% more destination-product markets, and 2% higher exports in the average market (Columns 1-4). For American companies, these magnitudes stand respectively at 13%, 17%, 20%, and 18% (Columns 6-9). Overall, the extensive margin of market entry accounts for just over half of the contribution of management to firm exports in the US and about 90% in China.

These results are in line with the theoretical predictions for the margins of firms’ export activity summarized in Proposition 2. As a check on internal consistency, we consider the variation in export sales across a firm’s destination-product markets. In the model, exporters add foreign markets in decreasing order of profitability. As a result, better managed firms serve more markets by entering progressively smaller markets where they earn lower sales. Further analysis supports this composition effect. For each firm, we identify its largest destination-product market by sales revenues, and regress log exports to this top market on $\text{Management}_f$. We obtain much larger coefficients than those for the intensive margin that are significant for both China and the US (Columns 5 and 10). As we replace the outcome variable with log average sales to the top two, top three, etc. export markets, we record progressively lower point estimates as anticipated.
5.4 Exports vs. Domestic Activity

In theory, effective management improves firm performance both at home and abroad, such that better managed firms have higher domestic sales, higher probability of exporting, and higher export revenues. The elasticities of these three outcomes with respect to management differ and generally depend on modeling assumptions about demand. In our CES set-up, strong management increases firm revenues proportionately in all markets served, but it also induces entry into more markets. As a result, total exports rise faster with management competence than domestic sales.

Appendix Table 4 corroborates these predictions in the data. Better managed firms do sell more at home, with domestic sales twice as elastic as exports with respect to management in China and about on par in the US. When we then control for log domestic sales in the regressions for firms’ export status, global export revenues and various export margins, we continue to record positive significant coefficients on $Management_f$ (except for the intensive margin in China as before).

6 Management Mechanisms

Having established that advanced managerial practices are associated with superior export performance, we next examine the mechanisms through which management operates. We first provide evidence for the production efficiency and quality capacity channels. We then consider the relationship between management competence and TFP. We conclude by exploring whether the returns to management vary across management dimensions and segments of the economy.

6.1 Efficiency and Quality

To assess if effective management improves firms’ production efficiency, quality capacity or both, we evaluate the empirical validity of Propositions 3 and 4. We establish robust patterns consistent with management acting through both the efficiency and quality channels.

6.1.1 Structural Estimates

We first analyze the link between firms’ management practices, product quality, and quality-adjusted prices per Proposition 3. We exploit the rich dimensionality of the data and examine firms’ behavior
in finely disaggregated export markets. This allows us to study the role of management while accounting for supply and demand conditions with an extensive set of fixed effects:

\[
\ln(\text{Quality}_{fdp}) = \beta^q \text{Management}_f + \Gamma^q Z_f + \phi^q_t + \phi^q_{dp} + \varepsilon^q_{fdp} \tag{5}
\]

\[
\ln(\frac{\text{Price}_{fdp}}{\text{Quality}_{fdp}}) = \beta^{p/q} \text{Management}_f + \Gamma^{p/q} Z_f + \phi^{p/q}_t + \phi^{p/q}_{dp} + \varepsilon^{p/q}_{fdp} \tag{6}
\]

Through the lens of the model, coefficient \(\beta^q\) identifies structural parameter \(\theta\), which governs the effect of management on product quality. Similarly, coefficient \(\beta^{p/q}\) identifies structural parameter \(\delta\), which captures the effect of management on productive efficiency. From Proposition 3, \(\beta^q > 0\) and \(\beta^{p/q} < 0\) if and only if management operates through the quality and the efficiency channel, respectively. Note this interpretation is conservative given the potential for variable mark-ups.\(^{16}\)

The unit of observation is now the firm–destination–HS8 product(-year). \(\text{Price}_{fdp}\) is the export unit value that firm \(f\) charges for product \(p\) in destination \(d\) (in year \(t\)). We use free-on-board export prices that exclude duties, transportation costs and retailers’ mark-up, such that \(\text{Price}_{fdp}\) corresponds to the sum of \(f\)’s marginal cost and mark-up. We construct model-consistent proxies for firms’ export product quality and quality-adjusted price from their export prices and quantities by product, destination (and year). Since \(\ln q_{ji} \propto \sigma \ln p^\text{fob}_{ji} + \ln x_{ji}\), log quality \(\ln q_{ji}\) can be inferred as the sum of log quantity \(x_{ji}\) and log free-on-board price \(p^\text{fob}_{ji}\), adjusted for the elasticity of substitution across varieties \(\sigma\). We set \(\sigma = 5\) (the median in the literature), but our results are robust to alternative values (Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei, 2013).\(^{17}\)

We continue to include location fixed effects \(\phi_l\) and firm controls \(Z_f\), as well as year fixed effects for China. Instead of fixed effects for firms’ primary industry, we now condition on destination-product pair fixed effects \(\phi_{dp}\).\(^{17}\) These subsume variation in total expenditure, consumer price indices and trade costs across countries and products in the model, as well as differences in consumer

\(^{16}\)If better managed firms set higher mark-ups, our conclusions for \(\beta^q\) would be unaffected, but \(p^\text{fob}_{ji}/q_{ji}\) would be inflated and we would be less likely to find \(\beta^{p/q} < 0\).

\(^{17}\)All results for China hold when we distinguish between processing and ordinary exports and include a complete set of destination–product–trade regime triple fixed effects.
preferences, institutional frictions and other forces outside the model. In the stringent specifications (5) and (6), the coefficient on Management is thus identified from the variation across firms within narrow segments of the global economy, such as Chinese exporters of men’s leather shoes to Germany or US exporters of cell phones to Japan. We conservatively cluster standard errors by firm to accommodate correlated shocks across destinations and products within firms.

Equations (5) and (6) are in the spirit of prior studies of the relationship between measured firm productivity (TFPR), prices and revenues (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009; Manova and Zhang, 2012). Since these variables are all constructed from the same sales and quantity data, however, ruling out estimation bias due to correlated measurement error in the right- and left-hand side variables has been a challenge. We circumvent this problem by using direct measures of management practices that are independent of the sales and quantity data.

The evidence in Table 5 lends strong support to managerial competence improving both production efficiency and product quality. In both China and the US, management is associated with significantly higher export quality (Columns 1 and 5) and significantly lower quality-adjusted prices (Columns 2 and 6). Formally, $\theta_{CH} = 0.531$, $\delta_{CH} = 0.385$, $\theta_{US} = 0.048$ and $\delta_{US} = 0.045$. Based on these estimates, upgrading management by one standard deviation entails a 53% increase in product quality and a 39% decline in quality-adjusted prices in China. These numbers are both 5% for the US, such that quality and quality-adjusted prices are equally elastic with respect to management competence. These patterns hold in panel data for the US (Appendix Table 1): Lagged management practices are correlated with current efficiency and quality, and managerial improvements are associated with efficiency and quality upgrading.

The results suggest that management may matter more for both productive efficiency and product quality in China than in the US, $\delta_{CH} > \delta_{US}$ and $\theta_{CH} > \theta_{US}$. One possible explanation is diminishing returns to management, since management practices are on average worse in China. The estimates also indicate that management may have a relatively bigger effect on quality than on efficiency in China compared to the US, $\theta_{CH} - \delta_{CH} > \theta_{US} - \delta_{US} = 0$. We explore this further with the following estimating equation for prices:

$$\ln(Price_{fdp}) = \beta_p Management_f + \Gamma_p Z_f + \phi_{l}^{p} + \phi_{dp}^{p} + \varepsilon_{fdp}^{p}$$  (7)
The relationship between prices and management is indeed significantly positive in China and insignificantly different from 0 in the US (Columns 3 and 7). This suggests that when quality levels are relatively low, improvements in managerial competence are likely to boost product quality much more than efficiency. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Sutton (2007) that moving up the quality ladder through better management practices is critical for emerging economies.

The elasticity of export quantity with respect to management is theoretically ambiguous, $\delta \sigma - \theta \gtrless 0$. In practice, it is indistinguishable from 0 in China and positive in the US (Columns 4 and 8).

6.1.2 Robustness

We perform several specification checks to alleviate concerns with alternative interpretations of the results for export prices and quality. First, qualitatively similar patterns obtain when we infer product quality using alternative values for the price elasticity of demand $\sigma = \{4, 7, 10\}$ instead of the baseline $\sigma = 5$. The results also hold when we allow $\sigma$ to vary across SIC 3-digit industries using estimates from Broda and Weinstein (2006) (Panel A of Appendix Table 5).

Second, management practices may affect not only production efficiency and product quality, but also mark-ups; this channel is moot in our model because CES preferences imply constant mark-ups. The prior literature has shown that in environments with variable mark-ups and no quality differentiation, more productive firms charge lower prices even though they set higher mark-ups (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). With alternative market structures or strategic behavior, however, mark-ups could in principle rise sufficiently quickly with productivity to dominate the associated decline in marginal cost and result in higher prices. Under quality differentiation, variable mark-ups might therefore confound the inference of quality from price and quantity data, and lead us to under- or over-estimate the role of management effectiveness for firms’ quality capacity and production efficiency. To alleviate this concern, we confirm that the results change little when we control for firms’ market share as a proxy for their ability to extract higher mark-ups (Panel B of Appendix Table 5). We use a Chinese (US) firm’s share of total Chinese (US) exports to a given destination-product, $\frac{\text{Exports}_{fdp}}{\sum_j \text{Exports}_{fdp}^j}$, as an indicator of its market power there.
6.2 Input Characteristics

We next test the predictions of Proposition 4 for the quality of firms’ intermediate inputs and the complexity of their assembly technology. We proxy the latter with input characteristics that we construct from data on firms’ total material purchases (ASM/ASIE) and imported input purchases by product and country of origin (LFTTD/CCTS). As common with production data, we do not observe detailed information on domestic inputs.

We estimate specifications of the following two types:

\[
InputCharacteristic_f = \beta Management_f + \Gamma Z_f + \phi_l + \phi_i + \varepsilon_f \tag{8}
\]

\[
InputCharacteristic_{fop} = \beta Management_f + \Gamma Z_f + \phi_l + \phi_{op} + \varepsilon_{fop} \tag{9}
\]

As in equation (4), the unit of observation in regression (8) is the firm, and we include the same controls (location and industry fixed effects, noise and firm controls). Similar to equation (5), the unit of observation in regression (9) is the firm-origin country-product, and we condition on the same controls (location fixed effects, origin-product pair fixed effects, noise and firm controls). We continue to cluster errors by firm and to exploit the panel for China with year fixed effects.

6.2.1 Input Quality

In the model, producing goods of higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs. One possibility is that this reflects the need for higher-quality intermediate inputs. Table 6 provides evidence consistent with better managed firms sourcing more expensive, higher-quality inputs from richer countries of origin ($\theta > 0$).\(^{18}\) In Columns 1-2 and 6-7, we estimate regression (8) for the log value of imports and the log share of imports in total input purchases. In both China and the US, better managed firms have higher imports, consistent with their operating on a bigger scale and using more inputs overall. Better managed Chinese producers also import a bigger share of their

\(^{18}\)As we show in Appendix 2.3, one justification for the quality production function in our model is complementarity between input quality and management competence in the production of output quality. We find some evidence consistent with this mechanism in unreported results for the US.
Inputs, in line with priors about the paucity of specialized, high-quality domestic inputs in China. By contrast, the insignificant estimates for the US serve as a corroborating placebo test.

Columns 3 and 8 confirm that well-run companies source inputs from richer, more developed economies. Such economies are believed to produce higher-quality, more sophisticated goods because they employ advanced technologies and more skilled workers (Schott 2004). In these specifications, the outcome variable is the weighted average log GDP per capita across a firm’s supplier countries, using imports as weights. A one-standard-deviation rise in management competence is associated with 4%-5% higher average origin-country income.

In Columns 4 and 9, we estimate regression (9) for the log unit value of firm imports by product and country. Advanced management practices are accompanied by higher imported input prices in China, but not in the US. In Columns 5 and 10, we find that better managed firms use higher-quality imported inputs, where we infer imported-input quality in the same way as export product quality. Improving management effectiveness by one standard deviation corresponds to 10% and 58% higher imported-input price and quality in China, but only 0% and 5% in the US. Appendix Table 1 provides consistent panel evidence for the US: Lagged management practices are strongly correlated with current input sourcing strategies, and improvements in management quality are associated with input quality upgrading within firms over time.

These results suggest that at lower levels of management competence and product quality good management can help firms to not only more effectively source and process inputs from advanced countries, but also to better identify high-quality suppliers within each country. This additional channel might contribute to the higher elasticity of output quality with respect to management documented above for China relative to the US.

6.2.2 Assembly Complexity

An alternative rationalization for higher marginal costs of producing higher-quality goods is that it requires the coordination of multiple production stages and efficient inventorization to assemble a wider range of specialized inputs (Johnson and Noguera 2012). We proxy the complexity of firms’ assembly technology with the variety of their imported inputs, measured as the log number of HS-8 products, origin countries, or origin country-product pairs in a firm’s import portfolio. As Table 7
demonstrates, better managed companies indeed source more distinct inputs from more suppliers, after conditioning on their log number of export products.

In light of Proposition 4, the patterns in Tables 5 and 6 support the idea that effective management enables firms to produce higher-quality products using higher-quality inputs and more complex production processes.

### 6.3 Management and TFP

The results indicate that successful export performance is associated with sophisticated management practices. We now explore the relationship between management competence and firm productivity.

Unlike the theoretical notion of quantity-based total factor productivity TFPQ, standard TFPR measures are constructed from data on sales revenues and input costs. TFPR thus incorporates input and output prices and mark-ups (De Loecker, 2011), which introduces bias in regressions of firm outcomes such as export activity on TFPR. As a production function residual, TFPR also constitutes a conceptual black box. Separately, TFPQ is the single attribute that determines all firm outcomes in many models, while in practice TFPR is positively but imperfectly correlated with many firm metrics (e.g., Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013)). This points to either measurement error in TFP and/or multiple firm attributes playing a role (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013).

We view management competence as a measurable, tangible counterpart to the theoretical concept of TFPQ, or an important component of TFPQ. On the one hand, management practices are measured independently from firms’ production and trade activity and immune to the estimation and black-box concerns with standard productivity measures. On the other hand, TFPR is in principle more comprehensive and reflects both management and non-management dimensions to productivity, albeit measured with error.

We investigate the relationship between observed management practices and estimated TFPR in Table 8. We construct $TFPR_f$ as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) using survey data on firm sales, capital expenditures, labor costs and material purchases, and accounting for differences in production technology across industries and ownership types. Column 1 confirms that the conditional correlation between $Management_f$ and $TFPR_f$ is indeed strongly positive. Columns 2-3 then replicate regression (4) for $TFPR_f$ in place of $Management_f$. TFPR enters positively and
significantly, except for Chinese firms’ export status.

We next decompose $TFPR_f$ into two components by regressing it on $Management_f$ with no other controls: the projection onto $Management_f$ and the residual term $non\,Management\,TFPR_f$. In Columns 4-12, we regress the full range of firms’ export and import outcomes on both $Management_f$ and $non\,Management\,TFPR_f$ to assess their absolute and relative contribution. The bottom three rows show what percent share of a 1-standard-deviation spread in each trade outcome can be explained by a 1-standard-deviation spread in each productivity component. We refer to this metric as explanatory power, and also report its ratio across the two TFPR components.

We find that both productivity dimensions matter in an absolute sense, especially given the large set of fixed effects included. The estimates for $Management_f$ are similar to the baseline and always highly economically and statistically significant: its explanatory power is 4.5-19% (China) and 0.5%-13.1% (US) depending on the trade outcome. In a few instances, $non\,Management\,TFPR_f$ is imprecisely estimated or plays a negligible role. The relative explanatory power of $Management_f$ varies from 0.9 to 7.4 times that of $non\,Management\,TFPR_f$ for China, with an average ratio of 2.3. The two productivity components are of more comparable relevance in the US, where the ratio varies from 0.4 to 5.5 with a mean of 1.3.

### 6.4 Differential Returns to Management

A policy-relevant question is whether some managerial practices are more beneficial to firm performance than others. Also of interest is whether effective management is especially crucial to firm success in certain environments or segments of the economy. We now explore several dimensions along which the returns to managerial competence may vary. While we find some degree of differential returns, it is limited in terms of magnitude or significance.

**Management components** We first unpack the role of different management practices. The baseline management score aggregates information across 16 questions in the MOPS US survey and 18 questions in the WMS China survey. We group and average these questions into two sub-components: $Monitoring_f$ reflects the management of physical capital, production inputs and pro-

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19 We bootstrap standard errors to account for how $non\,Management\,TFPR_f$ is constructed.
duction processes through the setting of operation targets and monitoring progress towards these targets, while Incentives$_f$ captures the management of human resources through the provision of effort- and performance based incentives.

In Table 9, we regress each trade outcome on Monitoring$_f$ and Incentives$_f$ to gauge their absolute and relative significance. We generally find qualitatively similar patterns for both sets of management practices when considered one at a time. Monitoring strategies appear quantitatively more important for firms’ overall export performance and specific efficiency and quality channels in the US. By contrast, monitoring and incentives play comparable roles for overall export activity in China, with incentives being more consequential for certain efficiency and quality dimensions. Given the high correlation between Monitoring$_f$ and Incentives$_f$, the significance and differential magnitude of the estimated elasticities are typically dampened in horse-race specifications with both management components.

Country and industry heterogeneity China and the US have very different levels of economic development, institutional efficiency, and average management competence, but the export performance of Chinese and American firms is equally sensitive to good management in terms of export entry and revenues. This points to a fundamental role for management, rather than idiosyncracies of specific contexts. Yet the efficiency and quality returns to management at the firm-product and firm-product-destination levels can be significantly bigger in China than in the US, consistent with diminishing returns to management in improving production efficiency and quality capacity.

Unreported analysis confirms that our results are not driven by differences in the composition of Chinese and US trade flows: Similar patterns obtain when we weight US export (import) regressions at the firm-product and firm-country-product level by the number of Chinese exporters (importers) in each HS-6 product or country-product market.

We also assess whether the importance of management strategies varies systematically across products or industries (unreported). We expand specifications for export and import prices, quality and quality-adjusted prices at the firm-product-country level to include the interaction of Management$_f$ with various product and industry characteristics. Based on the Rauch (1999) indicator for product differentiation at the HS-6 level, management practices matter more for firm efficiency and quality in differentiated rather than homogeneous goods in China, while the opposite holds for the US.
However, these patterns are often not statistically significant. Using industry measures at the ISIC-3 level from [Braun (2003)], management competence appears more closely associated with improved efficiency and quality in less capital intensive and in more skill intensive sectors in China. The opposite, if less significant pattern emerges for the US. We observe no systematic variation across sectors with different advertising and R&D intensity.

Ownership structure  Finally, we consider the relationship between firms’ ownership structure, management practices and trade activity. This informs the potential for productivity-enhancing spillovers in managerial know-how from multinational to domestic firms, as well as concerns about poor management practices in state-owned firms.

The Chinese customs data distinguish between private domestic firms (DOM), state-owned enterprises (SOE), and affiliates of foreign multinationals (MNC). On average, MNCs are better managed than DOMs, which are in turn better managed than SOEs. In unreported regressions, we find some variation in the management elasticity of different trade outcomes across ownership types, but it is rarely statistically significant.

The US customs data identify each firm-country-product level transaction as intra-firm or arm’s-length. We label firms with at least one intra-firm transaction as multinational, whether they be US- or foreign-owned. On average, MNCs are better managed than DOMs, and the management elasticity of different trade outcomes is generally higher for MNCs.

7 Conclusion

This paper examines for the first time the role of management practices for firms’ trade activity. We theoretically and empirically establish that management competence enhances firms’ production efficiency and quality capacity, and thereby performance: It enables firms to more effectively source foreign inputs and process them into higher-quality outputs, which in turn improves export performance. Moreover, management practices have large explanatory power compared to the residual non-management component of TFP.

We find that better management is associated with greater efficiency and quality in both China and the US, and that it matters relatively more in China, especially for the quality channel. Given the
striking differences in economic and institutional development between these countries, our results suggest that management capability plays a fundamental role that is not specific to particular economic environments. They also speak to policy concerns about the impact of limited management know-how on structural transformation in developing economies.

More broadly, our findings shed light on the nature and consequences of firm heterogeneity. A promising avenue for future work is uncovering the reasons for weaker managerial ability in some firms and countries compared to others and the scope for policy interventions in this context.

References


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### Table 1. Motivating Evidence: India RCT, 2008-2017

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<tr>
<td># Observations</td>
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<td>109</td>
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</table>

This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and trade activity following a randomized control trial that provided management consulting to plants in the textile industry in India, 2008-2017. Results are at the plant-year level, the pre-treatment period is 2008, and the post-treatment period is 2011, 2014, and 2017. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level using the sample-size appropriate t-distribution tables.
Table 2. Summary Statistics

Panel A. Characteristics of exporters and non-exporters

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>China Exporters</th>
<th>China Non-exporters</th>
<th>US Exporters</th>
<th>US Non-exporters</th>
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<td>11.72</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Employment</td>
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<td>6.15</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>3.96</td>
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<td>TFPR</td>
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<td>4.77</td>
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<td>Log Value Added / L</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>3.95</td>
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Panel B. Firms' management, export and import activity

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<th>China St Dev</th>
<th>US Mean</th>
<th>US St Dev</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>11.58</td>
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<td>5.67</td>
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</table>

This tables provides summary statistics. China: all firms in the matched WMS-ASIE sample for 1999-2007 (Panel A) and all exporters in the matched WMS-CCTS sample for 2000-2008 (Panel B). US: all plants in the matched MOPS-ASM sample for 2010 (Panel A) and all exporting firms in the matched MOPS-LFTTD sample for 2010 (Panel B).
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, probability of exporting, and global export revenues. In Columns 1-2 and 5-6, the sample includes all Chinese firms and US establishments in the matched sample with balance sheet and management data, and the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 for exporters. In Columns 3-4 and 7-8, the sample includes all exporters in the matched sample with trade and management data, and the dependent variable is log total exports. All columns control for the share of workers with a college degree and management survey noise controls. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership type. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Log Exports</td>
<td>Exporter Dummy</td>
<td>Log Exports</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<td>(9.82)</td>
<td>(11.47)</td>
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<td>(16.79)</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
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Table 4. Extensive and Intensive Margins of Exports

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<th>US</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Log # Dest</td>
<td>Log # Prod</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>0.185*** (2.80)</td>
<td>0.166*** (3.33)</td>
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<td>Province, SIC-3 Industry, Own, Year</td>
<td>State, NAICS-6 Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise Controls</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firm Controls</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.42</td>
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<td>1,935</td>
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This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and the extensive and intensive margins of their exports. The dependent variable is firms' log number of export destinations in Columns 1 and 6, log number of HS 8-digit export products in Columns 2 and 7, log number of destination-product pairs in Columns 3 and 8, log average exports per destination-product in Columns 4 and 9, and log exports in a firm's highest-revenue destination-product in Columns 5 and 10. All columns include a full set of fixed effects, firm and noise controls as described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and the price, quality, quality-adjusted price and quantity of their exports. The dependent variable is log export product quality in Columns 1 and 5, quality-adjusted log export unit value in Columns 2 and 6, log export unit value in Columns 3 and 7, and log export quantity in Columns 4 and 8, by firm-destination-product. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, destination-product pair, year, and ownership type. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and destination-product pair. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and imported input quality. The dependent variable is log firm imports in Columns 1 and 6, log share of imports in total intermediate inputs in Columns 2 and 7, log average GDP per capita across origin countries in Columns 3 and 8, log import unit value by origin country-product in Columns 4 and 9, and log import product quality by origin country-product in Columns 5 and 10. All columns include a full set of fixed effects, firm and noise controls as described in Table 3, except Columns 4-5 and 9-10 include fixed effects for origin country-product pair instead of firm main industry. Standard errors clustered by firm in Columns 1-5 and 9-10 and robust in Columns 6-8. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and imported input complexity. The dependent variable is firms' log number of origin countries in Columns 1 and 4, log number of imported products in Columns 2 and 5, and log number of origin country-product pairs in Columns 3 and 6. All columns also include a full set of fixed effects, firm and noise controls as described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

### Table 7. Assembly Complexity

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<td>Log # Import Prod (2)</td>
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<td>Log # Export Products</td>
<td>0.245*** (7.69)</td>
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<td>State, NAICS-6 Industry</td>
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<td>Noise Controls</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>Firm Controls</td>
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Table 8. Management vs. TFPR

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<tr>
<td>Management</td>
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<td>0.053*</td>
<td>0.250**</td>
<td>0.520*</td>
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<td>0.620***</td>
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<td>(2.08)</td>
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<td>0.274***</td>
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<td>(3.67)</td>
<td>(2.82)</td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(2.66)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(-1.63)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
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<td>Non-Manage TFPR</td>
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<td>0.257***</td>
<td>(-0.57)</td>
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<td>(3.67)</td>
<td>(2.82)</td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(2.66)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
<td>(-1.63)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of 1 st dev in outcome explained by 1 st dev in attribute:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Manage TFPR</td>
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<td>12.1%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel B. US</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management</td>
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<td>-0.046***</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
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<td>0.050***</td>
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<td>(12.09)</td>
<td>(9.27)</td>
<td>(8.66)</td>
<td>(8.13)</td>
<td>(8.66)</td>
<td>(8.13)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Manage TFPR</td>
<td>0.037***</td>
<td>0.273***</td>
<td>0.156***</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
<td>-0.024**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.035***</td>
<td>0.142***</td>
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<td>(10.79)</td>
<td>(9.82)</td>
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<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of 1 st dev in outcome explained by 1 st dev in attribute:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Manage TFPR</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, total factor productivity, and trade activity. Non-Management TFPR is the residual from the regression of TFPR on management and no other controls or fixed effects. All columns include a full set of fixed effects, firm and noise controls as described in Table 3, except Columns 7-9 and 11 include fixed effects for destination or origin country-product pair instead of firm main industry. Standard errors bootstrapped 600 times in Panel A and 1,000 times in Panel B. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
### Table 9. Management Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep Variable:</th>
<th>Export Performance</th>
<th>Quality and Efficiency</th>
<th>Imported Input Quality and Assembly Complexity</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exporter Dummy</td>
<td>Log Exports</td>
<td>Log # Prod-Dest</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.92)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.58)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># observations</td>
<td>3,123</td>
<td>1,935</td>
<td>1,935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel A. China: Estimation with Both Components**

| Monitoring    | 0.069***           | 0.127                  | 0.120                                         |
| Incentives    | -0.033             | 0.128                  | 0.117                                         |
| # observations| 3,123              | 1,935                  | 1,935                                         |

**Panel B. China: Estimation with Single Component**

| Monitoring    | 0.060***           | 0.217                  | 0.202**                                       |
| Incentives    | 0.032*             | 0.211*                 | 0.196***                                      |
| # observations| 3,123              | 1,935                  | 1,935                                         |

**Panel C. US: Estimation with Both Components**

| Monitoring    | 0.022***           | 0.307***               | 0.157***                                      |
| Incentives    | 0.013***           | 0.141***               | 0.077***                                      |
| # observations| 32,000             | 13,000                 | 13,000                                        |

**Panel D. US: Estimation with Single Component**

| Monitoring    | 0.026***           | 0.335***               | 0.173***                                      |
| Incentives    | 0.019***           | 0.224***               | 0.120***                                      |
| # observations| 32,000             | 13,000                 | 13,000                                        |

This table examines the role of the Monitoring and Incentives components of firms' management practices. All columns include a full set of fixed effects, firm and noise controls as described in Table 3, except Columns 4-6 and 8 include fixed effects for destination or origin country-product pair instead of firm main industry. Standard errors clustered by firm, except for Columns 1, 2, 7 and 9 for the US where they are robust. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
This figure displays how improvements in firms' management practices relate to improvements in productivity and quality control following a randomized control trial that provided management consulting to plants in the textile industry in India, 2008-2011. It plots the firm-by-week change in log TFP and in the log quality defects index against the change in the management score, both relative to their pre-experiment average.
Managing Trade: Evidence from China and the US*

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University of Nottingham

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Abstract

This appendix provides the theoretical foundation for the companion paper. Section 1 develops an international trade model with multi-product heterogeneous firms in which management competence determines firms’ production efficiency and quality capacity. Section 2 presents formal proofs for this baseline model. Finally, Section 3 examines three model extensions that allow for an endogenous choice of management practices, multiple components of firm ability, or an endogenous choice of input and output quality.

*We thank Rui Zhang and Xincheng Qiu of Peking University for their excellent research assistance for this appendix.
†Kalina Manova (corresponding author): k.manova@ucl.ac.uk.
1 Baseline Model

We develop a theoretical model of international trade in which heterogeneous firms choose how many products to manufacture, what markets to enter, and which products to sell in each market. In the baseline set-up, firms receive an exogenous draw of management competence which uniquely determines firm choices and performance outcomes. We consider the endogenous adoption of management practices in an extension to this benchmark model in Section 3.1. We posit that effective management can enhance firm performance by increasing production efficiency and/or quality capacity. We characterize the relationship between firms’ management competence and trade activity under alternative assumptions about the relative importance of these two channels, and derive testable predictions that allow us to empirically assess their relevance in practice. We relegate all detailed proofs to Section 2.

We incorporate management competence in a partial-equilibrium trade model that features quality and efficiency differentiation across firms and across products within multiproduct firms. In our baseline, we treat management effectiveness as equivalent to TFP, such that our model closely resembles that in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and most closely Manova and Yu (2017). We examine the alternative in which management practices are one of multiple components of firm productivity in Section 3.2.

1.1 Set Up

Consider a world with $J + 1$ countries. In each country, a continuum of heterogeneous firms produce horizontally and vertically differentiated goods which they sell at home and potentially export abroad. Consumers exhibit love of variety such that the representative consumer in country $j$ has CES utility $U_j = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^\alpha \, di \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}$, where $q_{ji}$ and $x_{ji}$ are the quality and quantity consumed by country $j$ of variety $i$, and $\Omega_j$ is the set of goods available to $j$. The elasticity of substitution across products is $\sigma \equiv 1/(1-\alpha) > 1$ with $0 < \alpha < 1$. 
If total expenditure in country \( j \) is \( R_j \), \( j \)'s demand for variety \( i \) is
\[
x_{ji} = R_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} q_j^{\sigma - 1} p_j^{-\sigma},
\]
where \( P_j = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} \left( \frac{p_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \right)^{1-\sigma} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \) is a quality-adjusted ideal price index and \( p_{ji} \) is the price of variety \( i \) in country \( j \). Quality is thus defined as any objective attribute, subjective taste preference or other demand shock that increases the consumer appeal of a product given its price. Note that a sufficient statistic for unobserved product quality \( \ln q_{ji} \) within market \( j \) can be constructed from observed price and quantity data as \( \sigma \ln p_{ji} + \ln x_{ji} \), since \( R_j \) and \( P_j \) do not vary across products sold in \( j \) (Khandelwal, 2010; Khandelwal, Schott, and Wei, 2013).

### 1.2 Production and Sales Technology

The production technology is characterized by a production function for physical units of output and a production function for output quality. Firms’ management competence can affect both the ability to assemble given inputs at low cost and the capacity to make high-quality goods. We refer to these two mechanisms as production efficiency and quality capacity.

In order to begin manufacturing, entrepreneurs have to incur sunk entry costs associated with research and product development. They face uncertainty about their production efficiency and product quality, and observe them only after completing this irreversible investment. At that point they decide whether to exit immediately or commence production and possibly export.

Upon entry, firms draw firm-wide managerial ability \( \varphi \in (0, \infty) \) from distribution \( g(\varphi) \) and a vector of firm-product specific expertise levels \( \lambda_i \in (0, \infty) \) from distribution \( z(\lambda) \). We will think of better managed firms as having a higher ability draw \( \varphi \). Since the success of research and product development may differ across products within a firm, we assume that \( g(\varphi) \) and \( z(\lambda) \) are independent of each other and common across firms with continuous cumulative distribution functions \( G(\varphi) \) and \( Z(\lambda) \) respectively, while \( \lambda \) is i.i.d. across products and firms.

Producing one unit of physical output requires \( (\varphi \lambda_i)^{-\delta} \) units of labor whose wage is
normalized to 1 to serve as the numeraire. The parameter $\delta > 0$ governs the extent to which good management practices can lower unit input requirements and increase the efficiency with which these inputs are assembled into final goods. Intuitively, effective management can improve production efficiency by optimizing inventory control, synchronizing and monitoring production targets across manufacturing stages, reducing wastage, incentivizing workers, etc.

At a marginal cost of $\left( \varphi \lambda_i \right)^{\theta - \delta}$ workers, the firm produces one unit of product $i$ with quality $q_i \left( \varphi, \lambda_i \right) = \left( \varphi \lambda_i \right)^{\theta}$, $\theta > 0$. This reduced-form quality production function captures the idea that manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs because it requires the use of more complex assembly processes and more expensive intermediate inputs of higher quality. For example, while sewing a dress using unskilled labor, cotton and plastic buttons might entail the same assembly process as sewing a dress using skilled labor, silk and mother-of-pearl buttons, the latter utilizes more expensive inputs and is considered higher quality. Similarly, while a printer built from 50 components might only be able to print, the sophisticated assembly of 150 parts might produce a multi-functional printer that can print, scan and photocopy. The parameter $\theta$ reflects the degree to which superior management enables firms to produce higher-quality products. Intuitively, effective management can enhance quality capacity by tightening quality control, facilitating specialized assembly, minimizing costly mistakes, etc.

For expositional simplicity, we do not explicitly model firms’ input choice in our baseline set-up, but follow Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) in assuming that product quality is fixed by exogenous draws. In Section 3.3, we formally establish that endogenizing input quality in a richer framework would preserve our theoretical predictions. Following Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), we show how complementarity between firm ability and input quality in the production function for output quality would induce more capable firms to use higher-quality inputs in order to produce higher-quality goods.

Firms’ marginal cost thus reflects two opposing forces: On the one hand, better managed firms have higher production efficiency. On the other hand, better managed firms produce
higher quality using more expensive inputs and/or more complex assembly. The net effect of these two forces on marginal costs is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the relative magnitudes of $\theta$ and $\delta$.

We make a number of standard assumptions about firms’ production and sales costs that are motivated by salient patterns in the data. Firms incur a fixed operation cost of headquarter services $f_h$ and a fixed overhead cost $f_p$ for each active product line, in units of labor. This will imply that companies with different ability draws will choose to produce a different number of products. Entering each foreign market $j$ is associated with additional headquarter services $f_{hj}$ necessary for complying with customs and other regulations, as well as for the maintenance of distribution networks. As a result, some low-ability sellers in the domestic market will not become exporters or will supply some but not all countries. Finally, exporting entails destination-product specific fixed costs $f_{pj}$ (constant across products within $j$, but varying across countries), which reflect market research, product customization and standardization, and advertising. There are also variable transportation costs such that $\tau_j$ units of a good need to be shipped for 1 unit to arrive. These trade costs will ensure that firms might not offer every product they sell at home in every foreign market they enter.

1.3 Profit Maximization

Firms must decide which products to produce, where to sell them and at what prices in order to maximize profits from their global operations. With monopolistic competition and a continuum of varieties, individual producers take all aggregate expenditures $R_j$ and price indices $P_j$ as given, and separately maximize profits in each country-product market.\footnote{See Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015) and Eckel and Neary (2010) for an alternative model which incorporates product cannibalization effects.} A firm with management competence $\varphi$ will choose the sales price and quantity of a product.
with expertise draw $\lambda_i$ in country $j$ by solving

$$\max_{p_{ji}, x_{ji}} \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) x_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) - \tau_j x_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) (\varphi \lambda_i)^{q - \delta} - f_{pj} \quad (1.1)$$

s.t. $x_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} q_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i)^{\sigma - 1} p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i)^{-\sigma}$.

Producers therefore charge a constant mark-up $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ over marginal cost, and have the following price, quantity, quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product $i$ in market $j$:

$$p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{q - \delta}}{\alpha}, \quad x_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta \sigma - \theta}, \quad (1.2)$$

$$q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i) = (\varphi \lambda_i)^{q}, \quad p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) / q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{-\delta}}{\alpha}, \quad (1.3)$$

$$r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta (\sigma - 1)}, \quad \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\sigma} - f_{pj}. \quad (1.4)$$

When $j$ corresponds to the firm’s home market, there are no iceberg costs ($\tau_j = 1$) and the destination-product fixed cost $f_{pj}$ is replaced by the product-specific overhead cost $f_{pj}$. Note that the empirical analysis examines free-on-board export prices and revenues, that is $p_{ji}^{fob} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = (\varphi \lambda_i)^{q - \delta}$ and $r_{ji}^{fob} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j (P_j \alpha)^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta (\sigma - 1)}$.

If $\theta = 0$ and $\delta > 0$, effective management improves firm performance only by increasing production efficiency but the quality channel is moot. The model then reduces to the BRS framework in which all firms offer the same product quality level, but better managed firms have lower marginal costs and therefore set lower prices, sell higher quantities, and earn higher revenues and profits. While formally $\delta = 1$ in BRS, this normalization is immaterial when $\theta = 0$.

Conversely, if $\theta > 0$ and $\delta = 0$, management competence benefits firm performance by improving product quality but the production efficiency mechanism is not active. Now all firms share the same quality-adjusted prices, revenues and profits, but better managed companies charge higher prices, offer higher quality and sell lower quantities.
The most interesting scenario arises when $\theta > 0$ and $\delta > 0$, such that management operates through both the production efficiency and the product quality channels. We focus on this scenario below as it is most relevant empirically. In this case, superior management is unambiguously associated with higher product quality, lower quality-adjusted prices, higher revenues and higher profits. However, the implications for quantity and price levels are theoretically ambiguous. If $\theta > \delta$, as management competence grows, product quality rises sufficiently quickly with the cost of sophisticated inputs and assembly to overturn the effects of improved production efficiency. As a result, effective management corresponds to higher output prices. If $\theta < \delta$ by contrast, good management practices translate into lower prices. In the knife-edge case of $\theta = \delta$, production efficiency and product quality are equally elastic in management capacity, and prices are invariant across the firm management distribution. Finally, better managed firms sell higher quantities if and only if $\sigma \delta > \theta$.

### 1.4 Selection into Products and Markets

Consumers’ love of variety and the presence of product-specific overhead costs $f_p$ imply that no firm will export a product without also selling it at home. In turn, firms optimally manufacture only goods for which they can earn non-negative profits domestically. Since profits increase with product expertise $\lambda_i$, there is a zero-profit expertise level $\lambda^*_i(\varphi)$ for each management ability draw $\varphi$ below which firm $\varphi$ will not make $i$. This value is defined by:

$$\pi_d(\varphi, \lambda^*_i(\varphi)) = 0 \iff r_d(\varphi, \lambda^*_i(\varphi)) = \sigma f_p,$$

where $d$ indicates that revenues are calculated for the domestic market.

Recall that product expertise is independently and identically distributed across goods. By the law of large numbers, the measure of varieties that a firm with ability $\varphi$ produces equals the probability of an expertise draw above $\lambda^*_i(\varphi)$, or $[1 - Z(\lambda^*_i(\varphi))]$. Since $d\lambda^*_i(\varphi)/d\varphi < 0$, better managed firms have a lower zero-profit expertise cut-off and offer
more products. One interpretation of this result is that better managed firms bring superior quality control to any product line. This can partially offset using less skilled workers or inputs of lower quality such that output quality and consumer appeal remain high.

Following the same logic, a firm with ability $\varphi$ will export product $i$ to country $j$ only if its expertise draw is no lower than $\lambda^*_j(\varphi)$ given by:

$$
\pi_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda^*_j(\varphi)) = 0 \Leftrightarrow r_j(\varphi, \lambda^*_j(\varphi)) = \sigma f_{pj}.
$$

(1.6)

The measure of products that firm $\varphi$ sells to $j$ is thus $[1 - Z(\lambda^*_j(\varphi))]$. Since $d\lambda^*_j(\varphi)/d\varphi < 0$, better managed firms export more products than worse run firms to any given destination.

When the exporting expertise cut-off lies above the zero-profit expertise cut-off, $\lambda^*_j(\varphi) > \lambda^*(\varphi)$, there will be selection into exporting. Across products within a firm, not all goods sold at home will be shipped to $j$. Similarly, across firms supplying a product domestically, not all will be able to market it abroad. Given the overwhelming evidence for both patterns in the prior literature, we assume that $\lambda^*_j(\varphi) > \lambda^*(\varphi)$ holds for all $j$.

For every management level $\varphi$, the expertise cut-off for exporting generally varies across destinations because the market size $R_j$, price index $P_j$, variable $\tau_j$ and fixed $f_{pj}$ trade costs are country specific. Firms therefore adjust their product range across markets. Each exporter follows a product hierarchy and adds goods in decreasing order of expertise until it reaches the marginal product that brings zero profits. Within a supplier, higher-quality goods are shipped to more countries, earn higher revenues in any given market, and generate higher worldwide sales.

Firms enter a market only if total expected revenues there exceed all associated costs. The export profits in country $j$ of a firm with management competence $\varphi$ are:

$$
\pi_j(\varphi) = \int_{\lambda^*_j(\varphi)}^{\infty} \pi_j(\varphi, \lambda) z(\lambda) \, d\lambda - f_{kj}.
$$

(1.7)

Export profits $\pi_j(\varphi)$ increase with management ability because better managed firms
sell more products in \( j \) (i.e. lower \( \lambda_j^*(\varphi) \)) and earn higher revenues from each good (i.e. higher \( \pi_j(\varphi, \lambda) \)) than firms with the same product expertise draws but worse management. Therefore only firms with management level above a cut-off \( \varphi_j^* \) will service destination \( j \), where \( \varphi_j^* \) satisfies:

\[
\pi_j(\varphi_j^*) = 0. \tag{1.8}
\]

With asymmetric countries, \( \varphi_j^* \) varies across destinations and better managed firms enter more markets because they are above the export ability cut-off for more countries. Better managed exporters thus outperform worse run producers along all three margins: number of export destinations, product scope in each destination, and sales in each destination-product market.

Finally, not all firms that incur the sunk cost of entry survive. Once they observe their management ability and expertise draws, firms begin production only if their expected profits from all domestic and foreign operations are non-negative. Firm \( \varphi \)'s global profits are given by:

\[
\pi(\varphi) = \int_{\lambda^*(\varphi)}^{\infty} \pi_d(\varphi, \lambda) z(\lambda) \, d\lambda + \sum_j \left( \int_{\lambda_j^*(\varphi)}^{\infty} \pi_j(\varphi, \lambda) z(\lambda) \, d\lambda - f_{hj} \right) - f_h. \tag{1.9}
\]

The first integral in this expression captures the firm’s domestic profits from all products above its expertise cut-off for production \( \lambda^*(\varphi) \), while the summation represents worldwide export profits from all traded products and destinations.

Total profits increase in \( \varphi \) because better managed firms sell more products domestically, earn higher domestic revenues for each product, and have superior export performance as described above. Companies below a minimum management level \( \varphi^* \) are thus unable to break even and exit immediately upon learning their attributes. This cut-off is defined by the zero-profit condition:

\[
\pi(\varphi^*) = 0. \tag{1.10}
\]
1.5 Empirical Predictions

The following propositions summarize the key empirical predictions of the model.

**Proposition 1** Better managed firms are more likely to export.

**Proposition 2** Better managed firms export more products to more destination markets and earn higher export revenues and profits.

**Proposition 3** Better managed firms offer higher-quality products if \( \theta > 0 \), but quality is invariant across firms if \( \theta = 0 \). Better managed firms set lower quality-adjusted prices if \( \delta > 0 \), but quality-adjusted prices are invariant across firms if \( \delta = 0 \). Better managed firms charge higher prices if \( \theta > \delta \) and lower prices if \( \delta > \theta \), but prices are invariant across firms if \( \theta = \delta \).

**Proposition 4** Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or more expensive assembly of higher complexity if \( \theta > 0 \), but input quality and assembly complexity are invariant across firms if \( \theta = 0 \).

2 Detailed Proofs for Baseline Model

2.1 Set Up

**Product demand.** The representative consumer in country \( j \) has CES utility

\[
U_j = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^\alpha di \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}
\]

where \( q_{ji} \) and \( x_{ji} \) are quality and quantity consumed by country \( j \) of variety \( i \), and \( \Omega_j \) is the set of goods available to \( j \). The elasticity of substitution across products is \( \sigma = 1/(1 - \alpha) > 1 \) with \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \). If total expenditure in country \( j \) is \( R_j \), \( j \)'s demand for variety \( i \) is

\[
x_{ji} = R_j P_{ji}^{\sigma-1} q_{ji}^{\sigma-1} p_{ji}^{-\sigma}.
\]
**Proof.** The utility maximization problem is

\[
\max_{\{x_{ji}\}} U_j = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^\alpha di \right]^\frac{1}{\alpha} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (p_{ji} x_{ji}) di = R_j,
\]

where \(p_{ji}\) is the price of variety \(i\) in country \(j\). Define the Lagrangian function as

\[
L = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^\alpha di \right]^\frac{1}{\alpha} + \lambda \left( R_j - \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (p_{ji} x_{ji}) di \right).
\]

The first order condition implies:

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_{ji}} = \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^\alpha di \right]^\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^{-1} q_{ji} - \lambda p_{ji} = 0,
\]

\[
\Rightarrow x_{ji} = \left( \frac{\lambda p_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha-1}} \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^\alpha di \right]^\frac{1}{\alpha} q_{ji}.
\]

Substituting for \(x_{ji}\) in the budget constraint and rearranging yields

\[
\lambda = \left\{ \frac{\left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} (q_{ji} x_{ji})^\alpha di \right]^\frac{1}{\alpha} \int_{i \in \Omega_j} \left( \frac{p_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \right)^{1-\sigma} di}{R_j} \right\}^{1-\alpha}
\]

and

\[
x_{ji} = R_j P_j^{\sigma-1} q_{ji}^{-\sigma-1} p_{ji}^{-\sigma},
\]

where we have used \(\sigma = 1 / (1 - \alpha)\) and defined \(P_j \equiv \left[ \int_{i \in \Omega_j} \left( \frac{p_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \right)^{1-\sigma} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}\) as a quality-adjusted ideal price index.
2.2 Profit Maximization

**Optimal firm behavior.** Individual producers separately maximize profits for each destination-product market by solving

\[
\max_{p_{ji}, x_{ji}} \pi_{ji} = p_{ji} x_{ji} - \tau_j x_{ji} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta - \delta} - f_{pj}
\]

s.t. \( x_{ji} = R_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} q_{ji}^{\sigma - 1} p_{ji}^{-\sigma} \).

Product quality is exogenously determined by the quality production function as \( q_{ji} = q_i = (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta} \). A producer with management competence \( \varphi \) and product expertise \( \lambda_i \) will therefore charge a constant mark-up \( \frac{1}{\alpha} \) over marginal cost and have the following price, quantity, quality, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product \( i \) in market \( j \):

\[
p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta - \delta}}{\alpha}, \quad x_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j P_j^{\alpha - 1} \left( \frac{\alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta \sigma - \theta},
\]

\[
q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i) = (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta}, \quad p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) / q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{-\delta}}{\alpha},
\]

\[
\pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\sigma} - f_{pj}.
\]

**Proof.** Define the Lagrangian function as

\[
L = p_{ji} x_{ji} - \tau_j x_{ji} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta - \delta} - f_{pj} + \mu \left( R_j P_j^{\alpha - 1} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta (\sigma - 1)} p_{ji}^{-\sigma} - x_{ji} \right).
\]

The first order conditions are:

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial x_{ji}} = \frac{p_{ji} - \tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta - \delta} - \mu}{\alpha} = 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial p_{ji}} = \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta (\sigma - 1)}}{\sigma} - \sigma \mu (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta (\sigma - 1)} p_{ji}^{-\sigma - 1} x_{ji} = 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial \mu} = R_j P_j^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta (\sigma - 1)} p_{ji}^{-\sigma} - x_{ji} = 0.
\]

Plugging the second condition into the third one, one obtains \( p_{ji} = \sigma \mu \). Substituting
into the first condition, it follows that \( \mu = \tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta-\delta} / (\sigma - 1) \). Using simple algebra and \( \sigma = 1 / (1 - \alpha) \) delivers the following expressions for the outcomes of interest:

\[
\begin{align*}
    p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= \sigma \mu = \sigma \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta-\delta}}{\sigma - 1} = \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta-\delta}}{\alpha}, \\
x_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= R_j \sigma^{-1} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta(\sigma-1)} p_{ji} = R_j \sigma^{-1} \left( \frac{\alpha}{r_j} \right)^{\sigma} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta(\sigma-1)}, \\
\frac{p_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i)}{q_i (\varphi, \lambda_i)} &= \frac{\tau_j (\varphi \lambda_i)^{-\delta}}{\alpha}, \\
r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= p_{ji} x_{ji} = R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma-1} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta(\sigma-1)}, \\
\pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) &= p_{ji} x_{ji} - \tau_j x_{ji} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta-\delta} - f_{pj} = (1 - \alpha) r_{ji} - f_{pj} = \frac{r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\sigma} - f_{pj}. 
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{(2.17)}\]

\[\text{(2.18)}\]

\[\text{(2.19)}\]

\[\text{(2.20)}\]

\[\text{(2.21)}\]

### 2.3 Selection into Products and Markets

**Product expertise cut-off for production.** Since profits \( \pi_d (\varphi, \lambda_i) \) increase with product expertise \( \lambda_i \), there is a zero-profit expertise level \( \lambda^* (\varphi) \) for each management ability draw \( \varphi \) below which the firm will not produce \( i \) for the domestic market. This cut-off is defined by the zero-profit condition \( \pi_d (\varphi, \lambda^* (\varphi)) = 0 \) and is decreasing in \( \varphi \), i.e. \( \frac{d \lambda^* (\varphi)}{d \varphi} < 0 \).

**Proof.** The definition of the product expertise cut-off \( \lambda^* (\varphi) \) delivers a closed-form solution for it:

\[
\pi_d (\varphi, \lambda^* (\varphi)) = 0 \Leftrightarrow r_d (\varphi, \lambda^* (\varphi)) = R_d (P_d \alpha)^{\sigma-1} (\varphi \lambda^* (\varphi))^{\delta(\sigma-1)} = \sigma f_p 
\]

\[\text{(2.22)}\]

\[
\Rightarrow \lambda^* (\varphi) = \frac{1}{\varphi} \left[ \frac{\sigma f_p}{R_d (P_d \alpha)^{\sigma-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\delta(\sigma-1)}}. 
\]

\[\text{(2.23)}\]

Therefore \( \frac{d \lambda^* (\varphi)}{d \varphi} < 0 \). ■

**Product expertise cut-off for exporting.** Similarly, export profits \( \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) \) increase
with product expertise $\lambda_i$, such that there is a cut-off expertise level $\lambda^*_j(\varphi)$ for each management ability draw $\varphi$ below which the firm will not export product $i$ to country $j$. This cut-off is defined by the zero-profit condition $\pi_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda^*_j(\varphi)) = 0$ and is decreasing in $\varphi$, i.e. $\frac{d\lambda^*_j(\varphi)}{d\varphi} < 0$.

**Proof.** The definition of the export product expertise cut-off $\lambda^*_j(\varphi)$ delivers a closed-form solution for it:

$$\pi_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda^*_j(\varphi)) = 0 \iff r_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda^*_j(\varphi)) = R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma-1} (\varphi \lambda^*_j(\varphi))^{\delta(\sigma-1)} = \sigma f_{pj}$$

$$\implies \lambda^*_j(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\varphi} \left[ \frac{\sigma f_{pj}}{R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma(\sigma-1)}}. \tag{2.25}$$

Therefore $\frac{d\lambda^*_j(\varphi)}{d\varphi} < 0$. ■

**Management ability cut-off for exporting.** The export profits in country $j$ of a firm with management competence $\varphi$ are:

$$\pi_j(\varphi) = \int_{\lambda^*_j(\varphi)}^{\infty} \pi_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda) z(\lambda) \, d\lambda - f_{hj}. \tag{2.26}$$

Since export profits $\pi_j(\varphi)$ increase with management ability $\varphi$, only firms with management level above a cut-off $\varphi^*_j$ will service destination $j$. This cut-off is defined by the zero-profit condition $\pi_j(\varphi^*_j) = 0$.

**Proof.** According to Leibniz’s rule,

$$\frac{d\pi_j(\varphi)}{d\varphi} = \int_{\lambda^*_j(\varphi)}^{\infty} \frac{\partial \pi_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda)}{\partial \varphi} z(\lambda) \, d\lambda - \pi_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda^*_j(\varphi)) z(\lambda^*_j(\varphi)) \frac{d\lambda^*_j(\varphi)}{d\varphi}. \tag{2.27}$$
Since \( r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{(\varphi \lambda_i)^{-1}} \) and \( \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{r_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\sigma} - f_{pj} \), it follows that

\[
\frac{\partial \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda)}{\partial \varphi} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{\partial r_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda)}{\partial \varphi} = \frac{\delta (\sigma - 1)}{\sigma} R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{(\varphi \lambda)^{-1}} (\varphi \lambda)^{\delta (\sigma - 1) - 1} \lambda > 0
\] (2.28)

because \( \delta > 0 \) and \( \sigma > 1 \). We have already proved that \( \frac{{d \lambda^*_j (\varphi)}}{{d \varphi}} < 0 \). Therefore \( \frac{d \pi_j (\varphi)}{d \varphi} > 0 \), such that export profits in country \( j \) increase with management ability and only firms above a zero-profit management cut-off will export to \( j \). □

**Management ability cut-off for production.** Firm \( \varphi \)'s global profits are given by

\[
\pi (\varphi) = \pi_d (\varphi) + \sum_j \pi_j (\varphi) = \int_{\lambda^*_j (\varphi)}^{\infty} \pi_d (\varphi, \lambda) z (\lambda) d\lambda + \sum_j \left( \int_{\lambda^*_j (\varphi)}^{\infty} \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda) z (\lambda) d\lambda - f_{hj} \right) - f_h
\] (2.29)

Since global profits \( \pi (\varphi) \) increase with management ability \( \varphi \), firms with management below a minimum level \( \varphi^* \) will be unable to break even and exit immediately upon learning their attributes. This cut-off is defined by the zero-profit condition \( \pi (\varphi^*) = 0 \).

**Proof.** According to Leibniz’s rule,

\[
\frac{d \pi (\varphi)}{d \varphi} = \int_{\lambda^*_j (\varphi)}^{\infty} \frac{\partial \pi_d (\varphi, \lambda)}{\partial \varphi} z (\lambda) d\lambda - \pi_d (\varphi, \lambda^* (\varphi)) z (\lambda^* (\varphi)) \frac{d \lambda^* (\varphi)}{d \varphi} + \sum_j \frac{d \pi_j (\varphi)}{d \varphi}. \tag{2.30}
\]

Since \( r_d (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_d (P_d \alpha)^{-(\varphi \lambda_i)} (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\delta (\sigma - 1)} \) and \( \pi_d (\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{r_d (\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\sigma} - f_p \), it follows that

\[
\frac{\partial \pi_d (\varphi, \lambda)}{\partial \varphi} = \frac{1}{\sigma} \frac{\partial r_d (\varphi, \lambda)}{\partial \varphi} = \frac{\delta (\sigma - 1)}{\sigma} R_d (P_d \alpha)^{-(\varphi \lambda)^{\delta (\sigma - 1) - 1}} (\varphi \lambda)^{\delta (\sigma - 1) - 1} \lambda > 0
\] (2.31)

because \( \delta > 0 \) and \( \sigma > 1 \). We have already proved that \( \frac{d \lambda^*_j (\varphi)}{d \varphi} < 0 \) and \( \frac{d \pi_j (\varphi)}{d \varphi} > 0 \). Therefore \( \frac{d \pi (\varphi)}{d \varphi} > 0 \), such that global profits increase with management ability and only firms above a zero-profit management cut-off will commence production. □
2.4 Empirical Predictions

Proposition 1: Better managed firms are more likely to export.

Proof. This proposition follows from the result that total export profits $\pi_X(\varphi) = \sum_j \pi_j(\varphi)$ increase with management ability $\varphi$. On the intensive margin, we have already established that bilateral export profits increase with management competence, $\frac{\partial \pi_j(\varphi)}{\partial \varphi} > 0$. On the extensive margin, only firms with ability $\varphi \geq \varphi_j^*$ will sell to destination $j$. For destinations $j = \{1, 2, \ldots, J\}$, denote

$$\varphi_X^* = \min \{\varphi_1^*, \varphi_2^*, \ldots, \varphi_J^*\}$$ (2.32)

Since firms with higher $\varphi$ are more likely to have both $\varphi \geq \varphi_j^*$ for any $j$ and $\varphi \geq \varphi_X^*$ overall, they have a higher propensity to export to any given destination $j$, as well as a higher propensity to be exporters, i.e. to export to at least one destination. The proof to the next proposition is closely related and provides detailed derivations for these claims.

Proposition 2: Better managed firms export more products to more destination markets and earn higher export revenues and profits.

Proof. First, denote the number of destinations a firm enters as $n(\varphi) = \sum_j I(\varphi \geq \varphi_j^*)$, where

$$I(\varphi \geq \varphi_j^*) = \begin{cases} 1, & \varphi \geq \varphi_j^* \\ 0, & \varphi < \varphi_j^* \end{cases}$$ (2.33)

A higher $\varphi$ means that a larger number of destinations $j$ satisfy $\varphi \geq \varphi_j^*$ because $\frac{\partial I(\varphi \geq \varphi_j^*)}{\partial \varphi} > 0$. Therefore $n(\varphi)$ is increasing in $\varphi$ and better managed exporters enter more markets, i.e. $\frac{\partial n(\varphi)}{\partial \varphi} > 0$.

Second, for any given market $j$, we have already shown that bilateral export revenues and profits increase with management ability, $\frac{\partial r_j(\varphi)}{\partial \varphi} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial \pi_j(\varphi)}{\partial \varphi} > 0$. From the product
expertise cut-off condition for exporting, we know that $\frac{d\lambda_j^*(\phi)}{d\phi} < 0$. This implies that a higher $\phi$ is associated with a bigger measure of products $N_j(\phi) = 1 - Z(\lambda_j^*(\phi))$ exported to destination $j$:

$$\frac{dN_j(\phi)}{d\phi} = -\frac{dZ(\lambda_j^*(\phi))}{d\phi} = -\frac{dZ(\lambda_j^*(\phi))}{d\lambda_j^*} \frac{d\lambda_j^*(\phi)}{d\phi} > 0. \quad (2.34)$$

Third, total export sales $r_X(\phi)$, profits $\pi_X(\phi)$ and number of products $N_X(\phi)$ are:

$$r_X(\phi) = \sum_j r_j(\phi) I(\phi \geq \phi_j^*), \quad \pi_X(\phi) = \sum_j \pi_j(\phi) I(\phi \geq \phi_j^*), \quad N_X(\phi) = 1 - Z(\lambda_X^*(\phi)) \quad (2.35)$$

where $\lambda_X^*(\phi) = \min \{\lambda_1^*(\phi), \lambda_2^*(\phi), ..., \lambda_J^*(\phi)\}$ denotes the minimum product expertise cut-off for exporting $\lambda_j^*(\phi)$ across countries $j$ for a firm with given $\phi$. Note that firms export a nested set of products $i$ to different markets, which follows a strict pecking order based on $\lambda_i$.

Since $\frac{dr_j(\phi)}{d\phi} > 0$, $\frac{d\pi_j(\phi)}{d\phi} > 0$, $\frac{\partial I(\phi \geq \phi_j^*)}{\partial \phi} > 0$ and $\frac{dN_j(\phi)}{d\phi} > 0$, it directly follows that:

$$\frac{dr_X(\phi)}{d\phi} = \sum_j \left[ \frac{dr_j(\phi)}{d\phi} I(\phi \geq \phi_j^*) + \frac{dI(\phi \geq \phi_j^*)}{d\phi} r_j(\phi) \right] > 0, \quad (2.36)$$

$$\frac{d\pi_X(\phi)}{d\phi} = \sum_j \left[ \frac{d\pi_j(\phi)}{d\phi} I(\phi \geq \phi_j^*) + \frac{dI(\phi \geq \phi_j^*)}{d\phi} \pi_j(\phi) \right] > 0, \quad (2.37)$$

$$\frac{dN_X(\phi)}{d\phi} = -\frac{dZ(\lambda_X^*(\phi))}{d\lambda_X^*} \frac{d\lambda_X^*(\phi)}{d\phi} > 0. \quad (2.38)$$

**Proposition 3:** Better managed firms offer higher-quality products if $\theta > 0$, but quality is invariant across firms if $\theta = 0$. Better managed firms set lower quality-adjusted prices if $\delta > 0$, but quality-adjusted prices are invariant across firms if $\delta = 0$. Better managed firms charge higher prices if $\theta > \delta$ and lower prices if $\delta > \theta$, but prices are invariant across firms if $\theta = \delta$. 


Proof. This proposition can be established directly from the solution to the firm’s profit-maximization problem above. Taking the partial derivative of firm’s price, quality and quality-adjusted price with respect to management ability, we have:

\[ p_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda_i) = \frac{\tau_j(\varphi\lambda_i)^{\theta-\delta}}{\alpha} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial p_{ji}}{\partial \varphi} = \frac{\theta - \delta}{\alpha} \tau_j(\varphi\lambda_i)^{\theta-\delta-1}\lambda_i \] (2.39)

\[ q_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda_i) = (\varphi\lambda_i)^\theta \Rightarrow \frac{\partial q_{ji}}{\partial \varphi} = \theta (\varphi\lambda_i)^{\theta-1}\lambda_i \] (2.40)

\[ \frac{p_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda_i)}{q_{ji}(\varphi, \lambda_i)} = \frac{\tau_j(\varphi\lambda_i)^{-\delta}}{\alpha} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial \varphi} \left( \frac{p_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \right) = -\frac{\delta}{\alpha} \tau_j(\varphi\lambda_i)^{-\delta-1}\lambda_i \] (2.41)

Recall that \( \theta \geq 0 \) and \( \delta \geq 0 \). It immediately follows that \( \frac{\partial q_{ji}}{\partial \varphi} > 0 \) if and only if \( \theta > 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial}{\partial \varphi} \left( \frac{p_{ji}}{q_{ji}} \right) < 0 \) if and only if \( \delta > 0 \). Since the sign of \( \frac{\partial p_{ji}}{\partial \varphi} \) depends on \( \theta - \delta \), \( \frac{\partial p_{ji}}{\partial \varphi} > 0 \) if \( \theta > \delta \), \( \frac{\partial p_{ji}}{\partial \varphi} < 0 \) if \( \delta > \theta \), and \( \frac{\partial p_{ji}}{\partial \varphi} = 0 \) if \( \theta = \delta \). \( \blacksquare \)

Proposition 4: Better managed firms use more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or more expensive assembly of higher complexity if \( \theta > 0 \), but input quality and assembly complexity are invariant across firms if \( \theta = 0 \).

Proof. From Proposition 3, we know that better managed firms produce goods of higher quality if and only if \( \theta > 0 \). While we do not explicitly model firms’ endogenous choice of product quality in the baseline framework, we assume that producing goods of higher quality entails higher marginal production costs. The implicit micro-foundation for this quality production function is that manufacturing higher-quality products requires more expensive inputs of higher quality and/or more costly assembly technologies. See also Section 2.3 in this Appendix. \( \blacksquare \)
3 Model Extensions

3.1 Extension 1: Endogenous Management

Our baseline model assumes that management competence is an exogenous draw at the firm level. We now establish that Propositions 1-4 would continue to hold if an exogenous firm primitive endogenously determines the firm’s choice of management practice, as long as implementing more effective management practices improves firm performance but is sufficiently more costly. Intuitively, adopting more sophisticated management practices can enhance existing firm capabilities and thereby stimulate market entry and firm revenues. Good management and intrinsic firm attributes may also be complementary, such that effective firm productivity may be supermodular in these two components. At the same time, superior management strategies arguably require higher sunk costs of adoption (e.g. hiring a manager, re-designing production facilities, training staff to use new data monitoring, etc.) and higher fixed costs of production (e.g. collecting data, analyzing performance, communicating results to staff, etc.). As a result of such economies of scale, exogenously better firms that expect to be more competitive in the market and generate higher sales would endogenously choose better management practices, thereby further improving their performance. Propositions 1-4 would then hold both for the exogenous firm primitive and for the endogenous management quality. In particular, the Propositions would state causal effects for the firm primitive and conditional correlations for management, where the latter would constitute one mechanism through which the former operates.

To illustrate this insight tractably and transparently, we make minimal functional form assumptions for the impact of management choice on firm ability and for the cost of management adoption. The same insight would however apply more generally, as long as the benefit to management upgrading increases faster with management competence than the cost of management upgrading.

We assume that firm entrepreneurs receive an exogenous talent draw $\phi$ and choose to use
management practice \( m \) at a convex fixed cost of \( f_m \), where \( df_m/dm > 0 \) and \( d^2f_m/dm^2 > 0 \).

Firm ability \( \varphi = \phi m (\phi) \) depends on the combination of talented entrepreneurs and management effectiveness. Given product expertise draws \( \lambda_i \), firms can produce one unit of product \( i \) with quality \( q_i = [\varphi \lambda_i]^\theta = [\phi m (\phi) \lambda_i]^\theta \) at a marginal cost of \( [\varphi \lambda_i]^{\theta-\delta} = [\phi m (\phi) \lambda_i]^{\theta-\delta} \).

In this environment, the proof below establishes that Propositions 1-4 continue to hold as conditional correlations for the endogenous management level in two steps: We first show that Propositions 1-4 apply for effective firm ability \( \varphi = \phi m (\phi) \). We then demonstrate that effective firm ability and management are monotonically related, \( d\varphi/dm > 0 \). Together, these two results directly imply that Propositions 1-4 must also hold for management \( m (\phi) \).

**Proof. Step One**

This extension of the model closely follows the solution concept in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this Appendix. Since the fixed cost of management adoption is independent of the firm’s product scope, market penetration, and production scale, the firms’ profit maximization problem can be solved in steps. The choice of management practice will be determined in the last of these steps. All preceding steps will remain in essence the same as in the baseline model, such that all key equations can be obtained simply by replacing \( \varphi \) with \( \phi m (\phi) \).

First, note that entrepreneurial talent \( \phi \) and management competence \( m \) always enter multiplicatively as firm ability \( \varphi = \phi m (\phi) \) and fix product quality at \( q_i = [\varphi \lambda_i]^\theta = [\phi m (\phi) \lambda_i]^\theta \). The firm will therefore begin by choosing the profit-maximizing price and quantity in each potential destination-product market, conditional on entry there. The optimal price, quantity, quality-adjusted price, revenues and profits for product \( i \) in country \( j \) will be given by equations (2.17). In particular, domestic profits \( \pi_{di} (\phi, m, \lambda_i) \) from product \( i \) and export profits \( \pi_{ji} (\phi, m, \lambda_i) \) from product \( i \) in country \( j \) will be given by the expressions below and increasing in management competence as before:

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_{di} (\phi, m, \lambda_i) &= \frac{1}{\sigma} R_d (P_{di} \alpha)^{\sigma-1} (\phi m \lambda_i)^{\delta (\sigma-1)} - f_p \frac{\partial \pi_{di} (\phi, m, \lambda)}{\partial m} > 0 \quad (3.1) \\
\pi_{ji} (\phi, m, \lambda_i) &= \frac{1}{\sigma} R_j \left( \frac{P_{ji} \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma-1} (\phi m \lambda_i)^{\delta (\sigma-1)} - f_{pj} \frac{\partial \pi_{ji} (\phi, m, \lambda)}{\partial m} > 0 \quad (3.2)
\end{align*}
\]
Second, the firm will decide which products to produce and which products to export to destination \( j \) based on product expertise cut-offs for production and for exporting, \( \lambda^* (\phi, m) \) and \( \lambda_j^* (\phi, m) \). As before, these cut-offs are given by zero-profit conditions and defined by equations (2.23) and (2.25). However, these are no longer closed-form solutions that depend only on the exogenous firm attribute \( \varphi \) and model parameters, since firm ability \( \varphi = \phi m (\phi) \) is now endogenous. Note also that these product expertise cut-offs are decreasing in both entrepreneurial talent and management capacity:

\[
\lambda^* (\phi, m) = \frac{1}{\phi m} \left[ \frac{\sigma f_p}{R_d (P_d \alpha)^{\sigma-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha (\sigma-1)}}, \quad \frac{\partial \lambda^* (\phi, m)}{\partial m} = -\frac{\lambda^*}{m} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \lambda^* (\phi, m)}{\partial \phi} = -\frac{\lambda^*}{\phi} < 0 \quad (3.3)
\]

\[
\lambda_j^* (\phi, m) = \frac{1}{\phi m} \left[ \frac{\sigma f_{pj}}{R_j (P_j \alpha \tau_j)^{\sigma-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha (\sigma-1)}}, \quad \frac{\partial \lambda_j^* (\phi, m)}{\partial m} = -\frac{\lambda_j^*}{m} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \lambda_j^* (\phi, m)}{\partial \phi} = -\frac{\lambda_j^*}{\phi} < 0 \quad (3.4)
\]

Third, the firm will choose which export markets \( j \) to enter. This decision will be guided by firm ability cut-offs for exporting, \( \varphi_j^* \), which are pinned down by the zero-profit condition \( \pi_j (\varphi_j^*) = 0 \) as earlier.

Together, the results above imply that Propositions 1-4 hold for effective firm ability \( \varphi = \phi m (\phi) \).

**Step Two**

Given **Step One** above, Propositions 1-4 will automatically hold for management competence \( m \) if effective firm ability \( \varphi = \phi m (\phi) \) is increasing in \( m \). We now prove this monotonicity.

In the final stage of the firm’s problem, the entrepreneur will decide whether to begin production upon learning his talent draw. It is at this point that the firm will also choose its optimal management practice \( m \) and thereby effective ability \( \varphi \), in order to maximize global profits from domestic sales and any exports abroad. This profit maximization problem closely
resembles equation (2.29) in the baseline model:

$$\max_m \pi(\phi, m) = \int_{\lambda^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} \pi_{di}(\phi, m, \lambda) z(\lambda) d\lambda + \sum_j \left( \int_{\lambda_j^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} \pi_{ji}(\phi, m, \lambda) z(\lambda) d\lambda - f_{kj} \right) - f_h - f_m. \tag{3.5}$$

The first order condition with respect to management practices $m$ implies that:

$$\frac{\partial \pi(\phi, m)}{\partial m} = \left( \int_{\lambda^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} \frac{\partial \pi_{di}(\phi, m, \lambda)}{\partial m} z(\lambda) d\lambda - \pi_{di}(\phi, m, \lambda^*) z(\lambda^*) \frac{\partial \lambda^*(\phi, m)}{\partial m} \right) +$$

$$+ \sum_j \left( \int_{\lambda_j^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} \frac{\partial \pi_{ji}(\phi, m, \lambda)}{\partial m} z(\lambda) d\lambda - \pi_{ji}(\phi, m, \lambda_j^*) z(\lambda_j^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_j^*(\phi, m)}{\partial m} \right) - \frac{\partial f_m}{\partial m} =$$

$$= \int_{\lambda^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} A_d \delta \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \left( \frac{\phi m \lambda}{m} \right)^{\delta(\sigma-1)} z(\lambda) d\lambda +$$

$$+ \sum_j \left( \int_{\lambda_j^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} A_j \delta \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \left( \frac{\phi m \lambda}{m} \right)^{\delta(\sigma-1)} z(\lambda) d\lambda \right) - \frac{\partial f_m}{m} = 0.$$

Note that by the definition of the zero-profit product expertise cut-offs $\lambda^*(\phi, m)$ and $\lambda_j^*(\phi, m)$, the terms involving $\pi_{di}(\phi, m, \lambda^*) = \pi_{ji}(\phi, m, \lambda_j^*) = 0$ drop out. For ease of notation, the exogenous terms characterizing aggregate expenditure, aggregate price indices, and bilateral trade costs have been collected in $A_d \triangleq \frac{1}{\sigma} R_d (P_d \alpha)^{\sigma-1}$ and $A_j \triangleq \frac{1}{\sigma} R_j \left( \frac{P_j \alpha}{\tau_j} \right)^{\sigma-1}$.

Using this first order condition, one can solve for the firm’s optimal management competence level $m$ as an implicit function of $\phi$ defined as $F(\phi, m)$:

$$F(\phi, m) \equiv \int_{\lambda^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} A_d \delta \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \left( \frac{\phi m \lambda}{m} \right)^{\delta(\sigma-1)} z(\lambda) d\lambda +$$

$$+ \sum_j \left( \int_{\lambda_j^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} A_j \delta \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \left( \frac{\phi m \lambda}{m} \right)^{\delta(\sigma-1)} z(\lambda) d\lambda \right) - \frac{\partial f_m}{m} \triangleq F_d(\phi, m) + \sum_j F_j(\phi, m) - \frac{\partial f_m}{m}. \tag{3.7}$$

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We want to prove that \( \varphi = \phi m(\phi) \) is increasing in \( m \). We therefore need to show that:

\[
\frac{d(\phi m(\phi))}{dm} = \frac{d\phi}{dm}m + \phi = \phi \left( \frac{d\phi}{dm} \frac{m}{\phi} + 1 \right) > 0. \tag{3.8}
\]

From the Implicit Function Theorem, it follows that:

\[
\frac{d\phi}{dm} = -\frac{\partial F/\partial m}{\partial F/\partial \phi}. \tag{3.9}
\]

Therefore, all we need is to prove that:

\[
\frac{\partial F/\partial m}{\partial F/\partial \phi} < \frac{\phi}{m}. \tag{3.10}
\]

We first show that the denominator \( \partial F/\partial \phi \) is positive. Note that

\[
\frac{\partial F}{\partial \phi} = F_{1d}(\phi, m) + \sum_j F_{1j}(\phi, m), \tag{3.11}
\]

where for each country \( k \) in the set comprising the home economy \( d \) and all potential export destinations \( j, k \in \{d\} \cup \{1, 2, \ldots, J\} \), \( F_{1k}(\phi, m) \) is given by:

\[
F_{1k}(\phi, m) = A_k \delta(\sigma - 1) (\phi m)^{\delta(\sigma - 1) - 1} \left[ \delta(\sigma - 1) \int_{\lambda_k^*(\phi, m)}^{\infty} \lambda^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z(\lambda) d\lambda - \phi (\lambda_k^*)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z(\lambda_k^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_k^*(\phi, m)}{\partial \phi} \right]. \tag{3.12}
\]

Since \( \partial \lambda_k^*(\phi, m)/\partial \phi < 0 \) as shown above, it follows that \( \partial F/\partial \phi > 0 \).

We next examine the numerator \( \partial F/\partial m \):

\[
\frac{\partial F}{\partial m} = F_{2d}(\phi, m) + \sum_j F_{2j}(\phi, m) - \frac{d^2 f_m}{dm^2}, \tag{3.13}
\]
where for each country $k$, $F_{2k}(\phi, m)$ is given by:

$$F_{2k}(\phi, m) = A_k \delta (\sigma - 1) (\phi m)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} \frac{1}{m} \left[ \frac{\delta (\sigma - 1) - 1}{m} \int_{\lambda_k^*}^{\infty} \lambda^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda) d\lambda - (\lambda_k^*)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda_k^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_k^*}{\partial m} \right].$$  

(3.14)

Since $\partial F/\partial \phi > 0$ and $d^2 f_m/dm^2 > 0$, we therefore know that:

$$\frac{\partial F/\partial m}{\partial F/\partial \phi} < \frac{F_{2d}(\phi, m) + \sum_j F_{2j}(\phi, m)}{F_{1d}(\phi, m) + \sum_j F_{1j}(\phi, m)}.$$  

(3.15)

Recalling that $\partial \lambda_k^*/\partial \phi = -\lambda_k^*/\phi$ and $\partial \lambda_k^*/\partial m = -\lambda_k^*/m$ for all $k \in \{d\} \cup \{1, 2, \ldots, J\}$, one can show that $F_{2k}(\phi, m)/F_{1k}(\phi, m) < \phi/m$:

$$\frac{F_{2k}(\phi, m)}{F_{1k}(\phi, m)} = \frac{A_k \delta (\sigma - 1) (\phi m)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} \frac{1}{m} \left[ \frac{\delta(\sigma - 1) - 1}{m} \int_{\lambda_k^*}^{\infty} \lambda^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda) d\lambda - (\lambda_k^*)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda_k^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_k^*}{\partial m} \right]}{A_k \delta (\sigma - 1) (\phi m)^{\delta(\sigma - 1) - 1} \left[ \delta (\sigma - 1) \int_{\lambda_k^*}^{\infty} \lambda^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda) d\lambda + \phi (\lambda_k^*)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda_k^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_k^*}{\partial \phi} \right]}$$

$$= \frac{\phi}{m} \frac{\left[ \frac{\delta(\sigma - 1) - 1}{m} \int_{\lambda_k^*}^{\infty} \lambda^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda) d\lambda + \phi (\lambda_k^*)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda_k^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_k^*}{\partial m} \right]}{\left[ \delta (\sigma - 1) \int_{\lambda_k^*}^{\infty} \lambda^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda) d\lambda + \phi (\lambda_k^*)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda_k^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_k^*}{\partial \phi} \right]}$$

$$= \frac{\phi}{m} \left[ \delta (\sigma - 1) - 1 \int_{\lambda_k^*}^{\infty} \lambda^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda) d\lambda + (\lambda_k^*)^{\delta(\sigma - 1)} z (\lambda_k^*) \frac{\partial \lambda_k^*}{\partial \phi} \right]$$

$$< \frac{\phi}{m}.$$  

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial F/\partial m}{\partial F/\partial \phi} < \frac{F_{2d}(\phi, m) + \sum_j F_{2j}(\phi, m)}{F_{1d}(\phi, m) + \sum_j F_{1j}(\phi, m)} < \frac{\phi}{m}.$$  

(3.17)

We have thus proven that effective firm ability $\varphi = \phi m(\phi)$ is increasing in management competence $m$. Since all comparative statics for $\varphi$ hold as in the baseline model, it follows that all propositions also hold as conditional correlations for management quality $m$ even when firms endogenously choose their management practices. ■
3.2 Extension 2: Multiple Ability Components

The theoretical predictions of our baseline model would continue to hold if management is one of multiple draws that jointly determine firm ability $\varphi$. For example, firm ability $\varphi = m \cdot \phi$ may depend on the entrepreneur’s intrinsic talent $\phi$ and the manager’s competence for implementing effective management practices $m$. If entrepreneurs and managers do not match perfectly assortatively due to labor market frictions, then $|\text{corr}(m, \phi)| \neq 1$. While all firm outcomes would now be pinned down by $\varphi$ instead of $m$ alone, management competence would have the same effects as in our baseline model \textit{ceteris paribus}. Propositions 1-4 would now hold for $\varphi$ unconditionally, for $\phi$ conditional on $m$, and for $m$ conditional on $\phi$. The last result is the conditional relationship that remains relevant for our empirical analysis.

3.3 Extension 3: Endogenous Quality

For expositional simplicity, we do not model firms’ choice of product quality in the baseline model, and adopt instead a reduced-form quality production function. Endogenizing firms’ choice of input and output quality in a richer framework would however preserve our theoretical predictions. What is sufficient for this to occur is that output quality - and by extension firm profits - is supermodular in firm ability and either the quality of inputs or the complexity of the assembly process. We illustrate this point here by incorporating endogenous quality choice as in \cite{Kugler and Verhoogen 2012} into our baseline framework. The same key insights would emerge with alternative microfoundations for the quality production function.

We assume that there is complementarity between firm ability and input quality in the production of output quality. In particular, using an input of quality $c_{ji}$, the firm can produce one unit of product $i$ with output quality

$$q_{ji} = \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left( (\varphi \lambda_i) \right)^\rho + \frac{1}{2} (c_{ji}^2) \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.18)
at a marginal cost of $c_{ji}$. In this setting, the parameter $b$ can be interpreted as the scope for quality differentiation, while the parameter $\rho$ governs the degree of complementarity between input quality $c_{ji}$ and firm-specific management $\varphi$ (as well as firm-product specific expertise $\lambda_i$). The quadratic specification for $c_{ji}$ is not crucial but adopted for tractability.

Given this quality production function, more capable firms will optimally use higher-quality inputs in order to produce higher-quality goods.

**Proof.** Now the firm’s maximization problem becomes

$$\max_{p_{ji}, x_{ji}, c_{ji}} \pi (\varphi, \lambda_i) = p_{ji} x_{ji} - \tau_j x_{ji} c_{ji} - f_{pj}$$

subject to $x_{ji} = R_j P^\sigma - 1 q_{ji}^{\sigma - 1} p_{ji}^{-\sigma}$

Substituting the constraint into the objective function, this is equivalent to solving

$$\max_{p_{ji}, c_{ji}} \pi_{ji} (\varphi, \lambda_i) = R_j P_j^\sigma \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\varphi \lambda_i)^b + \frac{1}{2} c_{ji}^{2\rho} \right] \sigma^{-1} p_{ji}^{-\sigma} (p_{ji} - \tau_j c_{ji}) - f_{pj}$$

The first order conditions with respect to $p_{ji}$ and $c_{ji}$ yield the following equations respectively:

$$p_{ji} = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \tau_j c_{ji} \quad (3.19)$$

$$(\sigma - 1) c_{ji}^{2\rho - 1} (p_{ji} - \tau_j c_{ji}) = \tau_j \left[ \frac{1}{2} (\varphi \lambda_i)^b + \frac{1}{2} c_{ji}^{2\rho} \right] \quad (3.20)$$

Substituting equation (3.19) into equation (3.20) and using equation (3.18) delivers the following endogenous input quality $c_{ji}$ and output quality $q_{ji}$ as a function of firm management ability $\varphi$ and product expertise $\lambda_i$: 
\[ c_{ji} = c_i = (\varphi \lambda_i)^b, \quad q_{ji} = q_i = (\varphi \lambda_i)^b. \] (3.21)

This expression immediately implies that better managed firms will endogenously choose to source higher-quality inputs in order to produce higher-quality goods, i.e. \( \frac{\partial c_i(\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\partial \varphi} > 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial q_i(\varphi, \lambda_i)}{\partial \varphi} > 0 \). While we have allowed firms to freely vary input and output quality across markets \( j \), the quality production function we have considered guarantees that firms optimally select a single quality level for each product \( i \) in their portfolio. Intuitively, better managed firms would endogenously produce higher-quality goods for any given market under alternative formulations that allow for quality customization across markets.

Finally, note that when \( \theta = b \) and \( \delta = \frac{b}{2} \), the solution in equation (3.21) corresponds exactly to the reduced-form formulation of the quality production function in our baseline model: Firms then produce one unit of product \( i \) with quality \( q_i = (\varphi \lambda_i)^\theta \) at a marginal cost of \( c_i = (\varphi \lambda_i)^{\theta - \delta} \).
References


Appendix Figure 1A. US Management and Organizational Practices Survey: Examples

Example 1: Monitoring

2 In 2005 and 2010, how many key performance indicators were monitored at this establishment? Examples: Metrics on production, cost, waste, quality, inventory, energy, absenteeism and deliveries on time.

Check one box for each year

- 1-2 key performance indicators
- 3-9 key performance indicators
- 10 or more key performance indicators
- No key performance indicators (If no key performance indicators in both years, SKIP to 8)

Example 2: Targets

8 In 2005 and 2010, who was aware of the production targets at this establishment? Check one box for each year

- Only senior managers
- Most managers and some production workers
- Most managers and most production workers
- All managers and most production workers

Example 3: Incentives

14 In 2005 and 2010, what was the primary way managers were promoted at this establishment?

Check one box for each year

- Promotions were based solely on performance and ability
- Promotions were based partly on performance and ability, and partly on other factors (for example, tenure or family connections)
- Promotions were based mainly on factors other than performance and ability (for example, tenure or family connections)
- Managers are normally not promoted

This figure provides examples of the 16 questions in the MOPS survey for the US that span the management of physical capital resources (subdivided into monitoring production and setting targets) and of human capital resources (incentives design).
Appendix Figure 1B. China World Management Survey: Examples

Example 1: Monitoring: How is performance tracked?

| Score | (1): Measures tracked do not indicate directly if overall business objectives are being met. Certain processes aren’t tracked at all | (3): Most key performance indicators are tracked formally. Tracking is overseen by senior management | (5): Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of visual management tools |

Example 2: Targets: How are targets set?

| Score | (1): Goals are exclusively financial or operational | (3): Goals include non-financial targets, which form part of the performance appraisal of top management only | (5): Goals are a balance of financial and non-financial targets. Senior managers believe the non-financial targets are often more inspiring and challenging than financials alone |

Example 3: Incentives: How does promotion work?

| Score | (1) People are promoted primarily upon the basis of tenure, irrespective of performance (ability & effort) | (3) People are promoted primarily upon the basis of performance | (5) We actively identify, develop and promote our top performers |

This figure provides examples of the 18 questions in the WMS survey for China that span the management of physical capital resources (subdivided into monitoring production and setting targets) and of human capital resources (incentives design).
This figure plots the WMS average management score across all firms in a country, averaged over all WMS waves from 2004 to 2014. Each firm is scored on 18 questions and each question is marked on a scale of 1 to 5, such that the overall firm and country scores have a range of 1 to 5.
This figure plots the MOPS management score distribution for the US (top) and the WMS management score distribution for China (bottom). The management scores are averaged across all questions before being normalized for the regression analysis.
### Appendix Table 1. US Panel: Management and Trade Activity over Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep Variable:</th>
<th>Export Performance</th>
<th>Quality and Efficiency</th>
<th>Imported Input Quality and Assembly Complexity</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Log # Dest-Prod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel A. Lags: Trade Activity 2011 and Management 2010</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, export and import activity in the panel for US firms with matched data in 2010. All variables are defined in Tables 3-7. In Panel A, the dependent variable is for year 2011, while the management variable is for year 2010. In Panel B, both the dependent and management variables are within-firm changes from 2005 to 2010. All regressions include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry, noise controls, and a full set of 2010 firm controls as described in Table 2. Robust standard errors. Sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Appendix Table 2. (Export) Profits

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>0.361***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(6.98)</td>
<td>(5.70)</td>
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<td>(64.28)</td>
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<td>State, NAICS-6 Industry</td>
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This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and profits. The dependent variable is firms' log profits. All regressions for China include noise controls and fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US include noise controls and fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 also include a full set of firm controls as described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
## Appendix Table 3. Extensive and Intensive Margins of Exports: No Firm Controls

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<td>Log # Dest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>0.159**</td>
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<td>Fixed Effects</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>Noise Controls</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.40</td>
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<tr>
<td># observations</td>
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This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices and the extensive and intensive margins of their exports. All variables, fixed effects, and noise controls are as described in Table 3, but the regressions exclude firm controls. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
## Appendix Table 4. Export vs. Domestic Activity

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<th>Log Exports</th>
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<th>Log Avg Exports per Dest-Prod</th>
<th>Log Dom Sales</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(2.96)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
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<td>Log Dom Sales</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(9.87)</td>
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<tr>
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This table examines the relationship between firms' management practices, domestic and export activity. All regressions for China include fixed effects for firm province, main SIC-3 industry, year, and ownership status. All regressions for the US include fixed effects for firm state and main NAICS-6 industry. All columns also include a full set of firm and noise controls as described in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm (China) and robust (US). US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
# Appendix Table 5. Production Efficiency and Product Quality: Robustness

## Panel A. Sector-specific demand elasticity (Broda-Weinstein)

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</thead>
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<td>- ( \delta^C )</td>
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<td>Management</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Province, Dest-Product, Own, Year</td>
<td>State, Dest-Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm controls</td>
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<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># observations</td>
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## Panel B. Controlling for market power

<table>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td># observations</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table examines the robustness of the relationship between firms’ management practices and the price, quality, quality-adjusted price and quantity of their exports. All variables, controls and fixed effects are as described in Table 5 with two exceptions. In Panel A, quality and quality-adjusted prices are constructed using industry-specific demand elasticities from Broda-Weinstein (2006). In Panel B, an additional control is added for a firm's market power: its share of total Chinese exports by destination-product-year (Columns 1-4) or of total US exports by destination-product (Columns 5-8). Standard errors clustered by firm. US sample sizes rounded for disclosure reasons. T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.